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ABSTRACT 
 
CEO Employment History and Risk-taking in Firm Policies 
By 
Lingling Wang 
 
April 28, 2009 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Harley E. Ryan 
Major Department: Finance 
I propose that CEO employment history is an observable characteristic that reveals the 
CEO’s unobservable risk-taking preferences. I hypothesize that CEOs that change employers 
more frequently (mobile CEOs) have a propensity to bear risk and implement riskier firm 
policies. Using a sample of S&P 1500 CEOs, I find that firms are more likely to hire mobile 
CEOs when the firm’s prior risk is high, firm-specific human capital is less important, the prior 
CEO turnover is forced, the prior CEO has a shorter tenure and the board is smaller and has 
fewer insiders. Mobile CEOs increase financial leverage, invest more in advertising and less in 
capital expenditures, and increase firm-specific risk. Mobile CEOs invest more (less) in R&D in 
homogenous (heterogeneous) industries where firm-specific knowledge is less (more) important 
in making investment decisions. Shareholders react positively to appointments of CEOs who 
change employers more frequently. I find no difference in long-run accounting performance for 
CEOs with different employment histories. Firms’ annual stock returns and sales growth are 
higher for CEOs who change employers more frequently. The cost of debt increases after the 
firm appoints a mobile CEO. These findings suggest that lower CEO risk aversion and the 
potential risk-shifting from shareholders to bondholders are sources of shareholder value 
increases. In sum, my findings provide evidence that CEO employment history is an observable 
characteristic that reveals the risk-taking preference of the CEO. 
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CEO Employment History and Risk-taking in Firm Policies 
1. Introduction 
A prevailing perception in the popular press and academic research is that managers have 
different styles when they make decisions in their firms.1 However, evidence is scant on why 
there are different managing styles, why firms choose different managing styles, and how 
different managing styles influence firm policies. 2  Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
employment history conveys important information about the CEO. For instance, when a firm 
announces the appointment of a new CEO, it usually gives a detailed description of the CEO’s 
employment history.3 In this paper, I propose that CEO employment history is an observable 
characteristic that reveals the CEO’s risk-taking preferences. Because accepting a position with a 
different employer involves numerous uncertainties, switching employers indicates a manager’s 
willingness to bear risk. Therefore, I propose that CEOs that change employers more frequently 
have a propensity to bear more risk and implement riskier policies in their firms. Using five 
measures of employment history, I provide empirical evidence on how employment history 
relates to a firm’s choice of a new CEO and the relation between the new CEO’s employment 
history and changes in the riskiness of firm policies. My evidence supports the premise that a 
CEO’s employment history provides information about her propensity to bear risk.   
Research supports the idea that CEOs who change employers more frequently are prone to 
bear more risk. Job search models in labor economics show that less risk-averse employees are 
                                                 
1 For example, an article in the Wall Street Journal on August 8th, 2007, titled “Chrysler's New 'Tough-as-Nails' 
CEO”, discusses the aggressive and controversial managing style of Robert Nardelli. Examples of academic 
research include Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2008) and Graham, Harvey, and 
Puri (2008). 
2  A few recent exceptions include Kaplan et al. (2008) and Graham et al. (2008). They use survey data or 
psychological test results to study CEO personalities or psychological traits. Similar to the approach in this paper, 
Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2007) use observable information to infer the overconfidence level of managers. 
3  For example, see the announcement of Wachovia’s new CEO, Robert K. Steel, in the Wall Street Journal on July 
10th, 2008. 
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more likely to change jobs, ceteris paribus (e.g. Harris and Weiss, 1984, Pissarides, 1974, 1976 
and Vesterlund, 1997). Job turnover theories suggest that CEOs who change employers less 
frequently are likely to be more risk averse because they make greater human capital investments 
in a firm (e.g. Becker, 1962, and Jovanovic, 1979b) or achieve better CEO-firm match qualities 
(e.g., Jovanovic, 1979a and Mortensen, 1978). Organizational behavior studies provide survey 
evidence that people with more employer changes have higher risk propensities (e.g., Nicholson 
et al., 2005 and Pfeifer, 2008) and use the number of employer changes as an empirical proxy for 
the willingness to engage in risky behavior (e.g., Nicholson and West, 1988, and Nicholson et al 
2005). 
Motivated by these studies, I construct five employment proxies that I propose will provide 
information about the unobservable risk-taking trait of the CEO. The first proxy is the number of 
employers for which a CEO has worked. To control for differences in CEOs’ career lengths, I 
construct a second proxy, the number of employers per year, defined as the number of employers 
divided by the CEO’s career length. Some CEOs change employers very frequently at the 
beginning of their careers and remain in one firm for a long time. Other CEOs change employers 
frequently throughout their careers. To control for these different patterns, I create a third proxy 
that captures the recency of a CEO’s employer changes. CEOs that have worked for multiple 
employers are more likely to develop diversified experience. To proxy for the degree of 
diversification of the CEO’s firm experience, I construct a fourth proxy based on time durations 
a CEO spends with different employers. Some CEOs change employers but remain in the same 
industry and other CEOs work for multiple employers in different industries. To control for 
differences in industry experience, I construct a fifth proxy based on time durations a CEO 
spends in different industries. The first three proxies measure the number, the frequency and the 
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recency of employer changes and the last two proxies capture the degree of diversification for a 
CEO’s firm or industry experience.  
The literature in labor economics and organizational behavior, discussed above, implies that 
CEOs that change employers more frequently (henceforth, mobile CEOs) are less risk averse, 
ceteris paribus. To shed light on the relation between CEO employment history and risk-taking 
in firm policies, I seek to answer four related research questions. First, why does a firm hire a 
mobile CEO?  Assuming that the decision to hire a CEO is a constrained optimum, one would 
expect the firm’s need to implement risky policies, firm characteristics, corporate governance, 
the prior CEO’s characteristics, and industry conditions to influence this decision. Second, do 
mobile CEOs implement riskier firm policies and increase firm risk? I expect mobile CEOs to 
implement riskier firm policies based on the argument that employment history can reflect a 
person’s risk-taking preference. As a result of riskier firm policies, one would also expect mobile 
CEOs to increase firm risk. Third, do shareholders and bondholders react differently to 
appointments of mobile CEOs? Although shareholders can diversify firm-specific risk by 
holding a diversified portfolio, managers’ income and human capital highly depend on one firm 
and cannot be easily diversified (e.g., Fama 1980). This argument implies that shareholders 
would generally prefer less risk-averse CEOs, ceteris paribus. If mobile CEOs have a higher 
propensity to bear risk, I expect shareholders to react positively to appointments of mobile 
CEOs. Since bondholders have a fixed claim on the firm’s assets, I expect bondholders to react 
negatively to appointments of mobile CEOs. In anticipation of an increase in firm risk, 
bondholders would also require a higher return following the appointment of a mobile CEO. 
Fourth, does long-run stock and operating firm performance differ for CEOs with different 
employment histories? If boards of directors optimally choose the right CEO to match firm 
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needs, then one would not expect mobile CEOs to perform differently than other CEOs. Analysis 
on long-run performance provides evidence on the efficiency of CEO-firm matches. Taken 
together, the analysis of firm risk, stock price and operating performance should shed light on the 
sources of firm value gains that relate to CEO employment history. 
To provide answers to these four research questions, I examine CEO hiring decisions and the 
changes in firm policies implemented by the new CEO after the CEO turnover year for a sample 
of S&P 1500 CEOs and 5,125 firm years from 1992 to 2007. A perusal of the data reveals 
significant dispersion in CEOs’ employment histories. As of 2005, among 1,144 CEOs from 
non-finance and non-utility S&P 1500 firms, 189 CEOs (16.52%) have worked for only one 
employer and 254 CEOs (22.20%) have worked for at least five employers. Some CEOs (for 
example, David O’Reilly of Chevron) never change employers and some CEOs (for example, 
Terry L. Hall of GenCorp Inc.) change employers every three years. Three hundred and forty six 
CEOs (30.24%) spent their entire careers in one industry and 190 CEOs (16.61%) worked in four 
or more industries. These differences in CEO employment history provide a suitable sample for 
testing the relation between the frequency of a CEO’s employer changes and the riskiness of the 
CEO’s policies.  
Using this sample, I first examine why firms hire mobile CEOs. I find that firms are more 
likely to hire mobile CEOs when the firm’s firm-specific human capital is less important, firm 
risk is high, the prior CEO turnover is forced, the prior CEO has a shorter tenure and the board is 
smaller and has fewer insiders. In the presence of negative industry shocks, firms prefer to hire 
CEOs with diversified industry experience. Examining changes in firm policies after CEO 
turnovers, I find mobile CEOs increase financial leverage, invest more in advertising and less in 
capital expenditures. Mobile CEOs invest more in R&D in homogenous industries where firm-
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specific knowledge is less important in making investment decisions and invest less in R&D in 
heterogeneous industries where the firm-specific knowledge is more important. Mobile CEOs 
also increase firm-specific risk. These results support my hypothesis that mobile CEOs engage in 
riskier firm policies. The levered CAPM beta remains constant, but unlevered CAPM beta 
decreases. I also examine how CEO employment history affects betas estimated from a four-
factor model (Fama-and-French three factors plus a momentum factor). I find mobile CEOs 
increase the book-to-market beta, which suggests that mobile CEOs change the growth aspect of 
their firms. These findings are robust to controls for the CEO-firm match endogeneity and the 
inclusion of an extensive set of factors that have been shown to impact financing and investment 
firm policies, including firm policies prior to the year of CEO turnover, firm profitability, 
Tobin’s Q, firm age, firm size, industry concentration, activist institutional ownership, surplus 
cash, whether directors receive equity-based compensation, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO 
compensation vega and delta, CEO founder status, the number of functional areas the CEO has 
worked in, whether the CEO worked in the finance area, whether the CEO has an MBA degree, 
whether the CEO is an insider or outsider, industry and year fixed effects. I obtain similar results 
when I use a principal component based on the five employment history variables to proxy for 
the CEO employment history. To control for the possibility that CEO hiring decisions and the 
riskiness of firm policies are simultaneously determined, I estimate a system of simultaneous 
equations and obtain similar results. 
Consistent with the notion that managers significantly impact firm policies (e.g., Bertrand 
and Schoar, 2003), my parameter estimates suggest that the influence of CEO on firm policies is 
economically significant. Holding other explanatory variables at their respective means, I find 
that allowing a CEO’s number of employers to increase from 1 to 5 (approximately 25th 
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percentile to 75th percentile) increases the market leverage by 4.8%. Based on the mean market 
leverage of 17%, this result implies an average increase of 27.12% for market leverage. In 
comparison, increasing firm size from 25th percentile to 75th percentile increases market leverage 
by 4.17%. The influence of CEO employment history is higher than the influence of firm size. 
The increases in R&D expenditures (0.8%, a 27.69% increase) and advertising expenditures 
(0.8%, a 61.13% increase) are also comparable to the influence of firm size.  
Given differences in firm policies, I examine how differences in CEO employment history 
affect shareholders’ wealth and firm performance. Shareholders react positively to appointments 
of CEOs with more employer changes. For forced CEO turnovers, the announcement returns are 
on average positive if the firm appoints a CEO with at least four employer changes and are on 
average negative for CEOs with no employer change. For unforced CEO turnovers, the 
announcement returns for CEOs with at least four employer changes are positive and statistically 
significant, but the announcement returns for CEOs with no employer change are slightly 
negative or not different from zero. The reactions appear to be economically significant. For 
instance, the four-day reaction to an unforced turnover when the new CEO has changed 
employer at least four times is 1.46%. Based on the mean market capitalization of 9.039 billion 
dollars, this result implies an average wealth increase of 131.97 million dollars. These findings 
are similar for both insider and outsider successions. A cross-sectional regression of cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) indicates that the number of employers a CEO has worked for relates 
positively to the CARs. This result is robust to controls for whether the CEO has an MBA 
degree, the number of functional areas the CEO has worked in, whether the CEO has worked in 
the finance area, firm size and whether the prior CEO was forced out. These findings support the 
argument that mobile CEOs are less risk averse, which mitigates the shareholder-manager 
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conflict due to different attitudes toward risk.  
I find no difference in long-run accounting performance for CEOs with different numbers of 
employer changes. However, annual stock returns and sales growth are higher for CEOs with 
more employer changes. Taken together, the findings that mobile CEOs increase financial 
leverage and firm-specific risk, do not improve accounting performance, but improve stock 
performance suggest a potential risk shifting from shareholders to bondholders as one source of 
shareholder value increase. In support of the risk-shifting explanation, I find that firms that 
appoint mobile CEOs increase bond spreads and downgrade bond ratings after CEO 
appointments.  
In summary, my evidence indicates that the riskiness of the CEO’s policies is related to his 
employment history. These findings suggest that CEO employment history is an observable 
characteristic that reveals the unobservable risk-taking preferences of CEOs. Therefore, 
employment history can help boards of directors identify management styles and achieve better 
CEO-firm matches. My study relates to the literature that shows that CEOs’ managing styles and 
education (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003), psychological traits (e.g., Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 
2008; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2007; Hackbarth, 2007), personalities (Kaplan, Klebanov, 
and Sorensen, 2008), and functional areas (e.g. Hambrick, 2007) influence firm policies and 
success. My findings complement the results in Graham et al. (2008) who find that firm policies 
relate to CEOs’ risk-taking traits as measured by a psychological survey. 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. In section 2, I discuss why employment history 
conveys information about the CEO’s risk-taking preferences. I also develop testable empirical 
hypotheses on CEO hiring decisions and firm policies in this section. Section 3 presents data, 
variable construction and summary statistics. Section 4 presents the results on the CEO-firm 
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match. Section 5 studies the impact of CEO employment history on firm policies and firm risk. I 
present results on market reactions and firm performance in Section 7 and influence on 
bondholders in Section 8. Section 9 concludes the paper. Appendix A summarizes variable 
constructions for all firm and industry variables. Appendix B includes robustness tables. 
 
2. Conceptual Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Employment History and Risk Taking 
Switching employers involves numerous uncertainties, such as the suitability of the new job, 
the quality of the working environment, the relationships with the new managers or co-workers, 
the likelihood of success in the new firm, and the potential impact on the employee’s family. I 
propose that employees who choose to switch employers are prone to bear risk than employees 
who do not change employers. 
Theoretical models of job search in labor economics recognize the importance of risk 
aversion in job changes. Incorporating risk aversion into a model of job search, Harris and Weiss 
(1984) show that when wages are downward rigid, firms provide risk-averse workers wage 
insurance, which never declines but will increase when necessary to prevent the worker from 
moving to another firm. This wage insurance gives workers an incentive to delegate the job 
turnover decision to their employers, which suggests that they will not leave their jobs unless 
their employers fire them. Pissarides (1974) shows that more risk-averse workers accept lower 
wages than equally productive but less risk-averse workers. Thus, one would expect more risk-
averse workers to be more likely to stay with the same employer than less risk-averse workers. 
Consistent with this argument, Pissarides (1976) and Vesterlund (1997) show that more risk-
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averse employees search less for other jobs, accept lower quality worker-firm matches, and are 
less likely to participate in the labor market. 
Job turnover theories suggest that employees with different employment histories differ in 
their levels of firm-specific human capital investments (Becker 1962, and Jovanovic 1979b) and 
firm-employee match qualities (Jovanovic, 1979a and Mortensen, 1978). Both differences in 
specific human capital investments and firm-employee match qualities affect an employee’s risk 
preference. CEOs that spend most of their business careers in one firm make more firm-specific 
human capital investments than CEOs who change employers more frequently. Because specific 
human capital investments would be lost if the firm fails, a CEO with more firm-specific human 
capital investments will be more risk averse than a CEO with lower firm-specific human capital 
investments. CEOs with more employer changes and more diversified firm or industry 
experience have lower levels of first-specific human capital investment and therefore, be less risk 
averse. Job matching theories (e.g., Jovanovic, 1979a and Mortensen, 1978) suggest that 
employees who match well with their firms are unlikely to change employers. CEOs with fewer 
employer changes are likely to be the ones that match well with their firms. Prospect theory (e.g. 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) predicts that individuals are more risk averse toward positive 
outcomes than toward negative outcomes. Thus, CEOs that match well with their firms should be 
averse to lose the right matches (positive outcomes) and become more risk averse in decision 
making.  
Empirical evidence also lends support to the proposition that employment history can reveal 
a CEO’s risk-taking traits. Organizational behavior studies (e.g., Nicholson and West, 1988 and 
Nicholson et al. 2005) use the number of job changes as an indicator of willingness to engage in 
risky behavior. Nicholson et al. (2005) provide empirical evidence that people with higher 
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frequencies of career and employer changes have higher risk propensities. Using a longitudinal 
survey of private households and persons in Germany, Pfeifer (2008) finds that the number of 
employer changes relates positively and significantly to individual’s risk-taking behaviors. 
In summary, both theory and empirical evidence support the idea that employees with greater 
propensities to bear risk change employers more frequently and have more diversified firm and 
industry experience. 
2.2 CEO-firm Match 
As a first step in understanding the relation between the CEO’s employment history and risk-
taking in firm policies, I examine why a firm hires a CEO that have changed employers multiple 
times. Optimally, firms prefer to hire CEOs whose skill sets match with firm needs. Based on the 
conceptual development in the previous section, I expect the level of firm risk prior to the CEO 
turnover and the importance of firm-specific knowledge to influence a firm’s decision to hire a 
mobile CEO. In addition to these two factors, I also control for prior firm performance, industry 
conditions, board structure and the prior CEO’s characteristics in the CEO-firm match analysis.  
I expect the firm’s risk level prior to the CEO turnover to influence the firm’s decision to hire 
a mobile CEO. A firm in which taking risk is more important would prefer to hire a CEO who is 
less risk averse to better align incentives. For example, young firms or firms in a high-growth 
industry would need a CEO that is more risk-taking (Graham et al., 2008). Thus, I expect these 
firms to prefer mobile CEOs. Additionally, the lifecycle of the firm can influence the optimal 
CEO-firm match. If a firm has reached a mature stage, it would arguably require less risky 
policies than in its high-growth stage and prefer to hire a CEO with a lower propensity to 
implement riskier policies. This argument implies that firms with high pre-turnover risk are less 
likely to hire a mobile CEO. Though both situations are likely to exist, which one dominates is 
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an empirical question. In addition, firms, that are riskier (more conservative) than other firms in 
the same industry, might prefer to hire a less (more) risk-taking CEO to reduce firm risk. 
Therefore, I expect firms to prefer mobile CEOs when their firms’ pre-turnover risk is lower than 
the average risk level in the industry. 
Firms with high requirements for firm-specific knowledge are more likely to hire CEOs who 
are less mobile and have worked a long time in their firms. I use firm age, size, industry 
homogeneity, and the ratio of R&D to total assets (R&D intensity) to proxy for the importance of 
firm-specific knowledge. Older and larger firms have more established corporate culture, 
complex internal social networks and operational processes. Thus, I expect older and larger firms 
to require more firm-specific knowledge than younger and smaller firms. In homogenous 
industries, the manager’s human capital is more likely to be transferable among firms (Parrino, 
1997), which reduces the importance of firm specific human capital in these industries. 
Therefore, I expect firms in homogeneous industries to prefer mobile CEOs. Firms with high 
R&D intensity may require their employees to make more firm-specific investments than firms 
with low R&D intensity (e.g., Titman and Wessels, 1988 and Kale and Shahrur, 2007).  
A firm’s need to change its prior policies can also affect the decision to hire a mobile CEO. 
Evidence suggests that CEOs learn from their work experiences (Hambrick, 2007). I argue that 
since a mobile CEO has experienced different corporate policies and environments, she is more 
capable of dealing with uncertainty and can selectively adapt the strengths of her prior firms to 
the current firm. Hence, I expect firms with poor prior performance or that have experienced 
negative industry or firm shocks, and therefore have a need to change policies, to hire a mobile 
CEO. A forced turnover suggests a mismatch between the prior CEO and the firm (Allgood and 
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Farrell, 2003). As a result, I expect firms that dismiss their prior CEOs to prefer mobile CEOs, 
who are more likely to change the policies of the previous CEO. 
Weisbach (1988) finds that insiders are appointed to the board before a CEO turnover and 
resign from the board after the CEO turnover. Raheja (2005) suggests that firms in which 
information asymmetry is high will optimally have more insiders on the board. Together, these 
articles suggest that firms that appoint more insiders to the board before a CEO turnover are 
likely to be the firms where information asymmetry is high and insider succession is optimal. 
Because mobile CEOs are less likely to be insiders and possess lower firm-specific knowledge, I 
expect firms that have larger boards and more insiders in their boards prior to CEO turnover to 
prefer CEOs that do not change employers frequently and have more firm-specific knowledge.  
I also expect the prior CEO’s tenure and chairman status to influence a firm’s decision to hire 
a mobile CEO. Prior CEOs with long tenure and chairman status are more likely to be CEOs 
whose policies have been successful (e.g., Vancil, 1987). Firms with successful prior CEOs are 
more likely to groom a CEO that can continue the “status quo” of the firm. Managers who spend 
a longtime working with the prior CEO are better candidates for this purpose. Moreover, based 
on assumptions that boards optimally choose CEOs to match with firm characteristics and firm 
characteristics persist for a long time, the new CEO is likely to possess a managing style that is 
similar to that of the prior CEO. Long-tenured prior CEOs are less likely to be mobile CEOs, 
ceteris paribus. Thus, the prior CEO’s long tenure can also signal the firm’s need for firm-
specific knowledge. In sum, I expect that firms where prior CEOs have long tenure and are also 
the chairman of the board are less likely to hire mobile CEOs.  
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2.3 CEO Employment History and Risk-taking in Firm Policies 
If mobile CEOs have a higher propensity to bear risk than less mobile CEOs, as discussed in 
section 2.1, one would expect mobile CEOs to implement riskier firm policies. Below, I develop 
hypotheses for the influence of a CEO’s employment history on his firm’s financing and 
investment policies. 
A risk-averse CEO has incentives to implement financing policies that involve lower levels 
of debt in the firm’s capital structure. First, the higher level of debt in a firm’s capital structure 
increases the possibility that the firm experiences financial distress. CEOs bear significant 
personal costs in the event of financial distress (e.g., Gilson, 1989 and 1990, and Gilson and 
Vetsuypens, 1993). Second, a higher level of debt increases stock volatility which in general 
reduces the CEO’s certainty equivalent of wealth (Lewellen, 2006). The extent to which these 
volatility costs reduce CEO utility relates positively to the degree of a CEO’s risk aversion. 
Therefore, more risk-averse CEOs are likely to use less debt. Combining both career and firm 
volatility concerns, I expect mobile CEOs to be less risk averse and take on more debt. 
A CEO’s risk-aversion level can affect the riskiness of his investment policies. Evidence 
suggests that investments in intangible assets are riskier than investments in tangible assets 
(Ryan and Wiggins, 2002; Coles et al., 2006). Moreover, Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone (2002) 
and Amir, Guan, and Livne (2007) find that investments in R&D expenditures and advertising 
contribute to earnings variability more than capital expenditures. Thus, I examine the influence 
of CEO employment history on the firm’s investment in intangible assets (R&D and advertising 
expenditures) and tangible assets (capital expenditures). I expect mobile CEOs to increase 
investment in advertising and decrease capital expenditure, ceteris paribus. For R&D, however, 
the propensity of a mobile CEO to bear risk can be offset by the increased importance of firm-
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specific knowledge associated with high R&D intensity. Mobile CEOs possess lower firm-
specific knowledge and would be less likely to invest in R&D when firm-specific knowledge is 
important in managing these investments. Because the firm-specific knowledge is less important 
in homogeneous industries (Parrino, 1997), I expect mobile CEOs to increase R&D investment 
in homogenous industries and decrease R&D in heterogeneous industries 
As a result of higher financial leverage and riskier investment policies, I expect mobile CEOs 
to increase firm risk. Because changes in financing and investment policies may affect both the 
firm’s systematic and idiosyncratic risk, I also examine whether mobile CEOs increase more 
systematic risk, or idiosyncratic risk or both.  
 
2.4 CEO Employment History, Market Reactions, and Long-run Performance 
If mobile CEOs implement riskier firm policies, it stands to reason that shareholders would 
react differently to appointments of CEOs with different employment histories. One source of 
shareholder-manager conflicts is that shareholders and managers have different attitudes toward 
risk (e.g., Fama 1980). Although shareholders can diversify firm-specific risk by holding a 
portfolio of firms, the manager’s future income and career depends on what happens in the firm. 
Furthermore, a manager’s human capital is inalienable and difficult to diversify. The manager, 
therefore, will be averse to implement risky policies. This conflict between shareholders and the 
manager is mitigated when the manager is less risk-averse. If mobile CEOs are less risk-averse, 
one would expect shareholders to react positively to the appointment of a mobile CEO, ceteris 
paribus. 
On the other hand, bondholders receive fixed periodic interest payments from the firm and 
are averse to risky firm policies. As a result, I expect bondholders to react negatively to the 
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appointment of a mobile CEO. The equity claim in a levered firm is like holding an European 
call option on the firm’s assets (e.g., Myers, 1977, and Galai and Masulis, 1976). The value of 
this call option is an increasing function of the volatility of the firm’s future cash flows. Thus, 
shareholders prefer riskier firm policies at the expense of bondholders. Empirical evidence, for 
example, Defusco, Johnson and Zorn (1990) supports this argument. As proposed in the previous 
section, mobile CEOs are likely to implement riskier firm policies and increase firm risk. In 
anticipation of risk-shifting from shareholders to bondholders, bondholders would require a 
higher return and increase the firm’s cost of debt after the firm hires a mobile CEO.  
If the board optimally hires the CEO for the firm, idiosyncratic managing styles will not lead 
to inefficiency in firm performance. Thus, if CEOs are matched to firms that need their specific 
styles, one would not expect mobile CEOs to perform differently than other CEOs. On the other 
hand, differences in the quality of corporate governance and frictions in the CEO labor market 
can lead to suboptimal matches between CEOs and firms. In this case, idiosyncratic managing 
styles can cause firms to implement suboptimal policies and CEO employment history would 
relate to firm performance. To draw inferences on the efficiency of firm-CEO matches, I 
examine if CEO employment history affect subsequent firm performance after the CEO turnover.  
 
3 Data, Variable Construction and Summary Statistics 
3.1 Sample and Data Sources 
To obtain a sample, I start with the CEOs of all firms in the S&P 1,500 as of January 2005. 
From the original 1,500 CEOs, I exclude 210 CEOs of financial firms (SIC codes 6000 – 6999) 
and 91 CEOs of utilities firms (SIC codes 4900 - 4999). I also exclude 55 CEOs with missing 
data in Compustat. The final CEO sample consists of 1,144 CEOs. I collect information on a 
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CEO’s employment history and education from proxy statements, Marquis Who’s Who in 
Finance and Business, Forbes.com, Hoovers.com, Reuters.com, corporate web sites, and the 
CEO profiles published by Spencer Stuart. I cross check data from different sources to make sure 
the information is consistent and accurate. For every CEO, I collect the CEO turnover date, 
announcement date and turnover reason from newswire reports on LexisNexis.  
I obtain firm financial, accounting, and bond rating data from the Standard and Poor’s 
Compustat database from a year before the year of CEO turnover to 2007. To be included in the 
sample, I require firms to have information on total assets, sales, number of shares outstanding 
and stock price at the end of the fiscal year. The data used to compute CEO compensation 
variables are from the Execucomp database. From the sample of 1,144 CEOs, I exclude 203 
CEOs that became CEO before their firms went public or in the year of their firms’ IPOs, 16 
CEOs that became CEO before 1992 (the year ExecuComp starts), and 8 CEOs whose firms 
have negative book equity. The final sample for firm policy and risk analysis includes 917 CEOs 
and 5,139 firm years from 1992 to 2007.  
Information on institutional blockholders comes from the CDA Spectrum database of SEC 
13-f filings. The stock return data is from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) 
database. The bond data is from Mergent’s Fixed Incomes Security Database (FISD) and the 
yields on Treasury securities are from H15 release of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. I 
collect the size of board, the number of board insiders, prior CEO’s chairman status from 1995 to 
2002 from firms’ annual proxy statements. Information for these governance variables after 2002 
is from Corporate Library. From proxy statements, I also collect information on whether the 
CEO is a member of the founding family. 
 
18   
  
3.2 CEO characteristics and summary statistics 
3.2.1 Variables for CEO employment history 
I construct five proxies to measure different dimensions of a CEO’s employment history and 
propose that these proxies will relate to the riskiness of the CEO’s policies. The first two proxies 
relate to the number of employer changes, the third one captures the recency of employer 
changes, and the fourth and fifth proxies are designed to measure the degree of diversification for 
a CEO’s firm or industry experience.  
Variable One: The number of employers the CEO has worked for (# Employers) 
I measure a CEO’s #Employers as the number of employers the CEO has worked for 
throughout his career, starting from his first full-time job and excluding military assignments. I 
do not count mergers and spinoffs as additional employer changes, because these employer 
changes are not initiated by employees and do not reflect employees’ risk-taking preferences. If 
one of the CEO’s prior firms was acquired by another firm and the CEO continues to work for 
the acquirer, I count the acquired firm and the acquirer as one firm. If one of the CEO’s prior 
firms is a spin-off from another firm and the CEO works for the spin-off firm, then I count the 
spin-off firm and the parent firm as one firm. I cannot rule out the possibility that some of 
employer changes are forced. Since CEOs are highly successful employees, however, it is 
unlikely that any CEO would incur multiple dismissals. To the extent that a CEO’s employment 
history might include some forced job turnovers that do not reflect risk aversion, my 
employment history measures bias against finding relations between CEO employment history 
and the riskiness of the firm’s policies. 
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Variable Two: The number of employers per year (#Employers per year) 
To control for differences in career lengths, I compute #Employers per year as the total 
number of employers divided by the CEO’s career length: 
      #Employers per year = 
reerLengthCEOTotalCa
Employers# . 
The variable, CEOTotalCareerLength, is the number of years the CEO has worked since his 
first full-time job. The number of employers per year, to some degree, captures the likelihood of 
changing employers in a given year.  
Variable Three: The recency of employer changes (Employer Change Recency) 
Some CEOs change employers more at the beginning of their careers and some other CEOs 
change employers more recently.  To account for the possibility that more recent changes are 
more relevant than distant changes, for each CEO and sample year, I construct a variable to 
capture the recency of a CEO’s employer change:  
Employer Change Recency = ∑
=
−−n
i
i
reerLengthCEOTotalCa
FirstYearYearreerLengthCEOTotalCa
1
)(  
The variable CEOTotalCareerLength is the number of years the CEO has worked since his 
first full-time job. FirstYeari is the year in which the CEO starts work for firm i. Year is the year 
of the observation. Year-FirstYeari measures the number of years from the year in which the 
CEO changes employer to firm i to the year of observation. For example, CEOA and CEOB both 
have worked for two employers. But CEOA changed her employer in 1988 and CEOB changed 
her employer in 1998. Assuming both of them started working for their first firms in 1983, their 
Employer Change Recency in year 2005 would be: 
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The variable has a higher value for CEOs that change employers more recently than CEOs 
that change employers at the beginning of their careers. If the CEO has only worked for one 
employer throughout his career, his Employer Change Recency would be zero.  
A CEO who changes employers frequently at the beginning of his career and remains in the 
same firm for a long time has a different employment history than a CEO who changes employer 
frequently throughout his career. Moreover, a CEO who changes employers across industries has 
different industry experience than a CEO who changes employers in the same industry. To 
measure these differences in the diversification level of a CEO’s firm or industry experience, I 
construct two variables based on time durations the CEO spends with different firms or 
industries. Similar to the computation of a Herfindahl Index, I measure a CEO’s firm (industry) 
experience diversification as follows: 
Variable Four: CEO Firm Experience Diversification 
CEO firm diversification = 2
1
1
)(∑ ∑=
=
n
i
n
i
i
i
FY
FY  
The variable FYi is the number of years the CEO worked for employer i and n is the number 
of employers for which the CEO has worked. 
Variable Five: CEO Industry Experience Diversification 
CEO industry diversification = 2
1
1
)(∑ ∑=
=
n
i
n
i
i
i
IY
IY  
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Where IYi is the number of years the CEO worked in industry i and n is the number of 
industries for which the CEO has worked.  
CEOs with low values for these two diversification variables have more diversified 
experience and CEOs with high values for these two diversification variables have more focused 
firm or industry experience. 
The 1,144 CEOs in my sample have worked in a total of 2,704 firms. Out of these 2,704 
firms, 1,030 cannot be found in the Compustat database. For firms that cannot be found in the 
Compustat database, I search the Internet for the company’s SIC code information. In most 
cases, I can find a firm’s SIC code from the following three websites: www.answer.com, 
www.siccodes.us and www.manta.com. I check the company’s website to make sure the SIC 
code found from the internet matches the company’s main business. If I cannot find a firm’s SIC 
code, I assign the firm a SIC code based on the main business of the firm. For example, if the 
firm is described as a supermarket chain, then I classify it as 5411, which is the SIC code for 
grocery stores. I am not able to assign SIC codes for 130 firms, because they were either self-run 
small business or were described as “some company” in the CEO’s biography. In my study, I 
treat these companies as in different industries than the CEO’s current firm. Results are robust if 
I drop these 130 firms or treat them as the same industry of the CEO’s current firm. After I 
identify the SIC codes of each firm, I classify all the firms into 48 industries described in Fama 
and French (1997). I compute how long a CEO has worked in each industry by adding the 
number of years they have worked for different firms in the same industry.  
3.2.2 Other CEO Characteristics 
I include several variables to control for other CEO characteristics that might influence the 
riskiness of a CEO’s policies. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Graham et al. (2008) find that 
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whether the CEO has an MBA degree relates to firm policies. Therefore, I include a dummy 
variable that equals one if the CEO has an MBA degree. Hambrick (2007) documents that a 
CEO’s functional areas can influence firm policies. To control for a CEO’s functional area 
experience, I include a variable, #Functional Areas, to indicate how many functional areas the 
CEO has worked in. Since CEOs with a finance background are likely to better understand risk, I 
include a Finance dummy to indicate whether the CEO worked in the finance area. This dummy 
equals one if the CEO had positions as financial analyst, CFO, treasurer, controller or investment 
banker.  
To control for the possibility that founder CEOs and CEOs from the founder’s family behave 
differently than other CEOs, I include a Founder dummy that equals one if the CEO is the 
founder or a family member of the founder. Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) find that 
powerful CEOs increase firm performance variability. To control for CEO power, I include CEO 
tenure, the number of years the CEO has been CEO in the current firm, as an additional control 
variable. Graham et al. (2007) find that younger CEOs are more prone to bear risk than older 
CEOs. I include CEO age in my regressions to control for the age effect.  
 
3.2.3 Summary Statistics for CEO Employment History and Characteristics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the five CEO Employment History variables. As of 
2005, for the 1,144 CEOs in my sample, the average (median) number of employers for which a 
CEO has worked is 3.23 (3) employers. One hundred and eight nine CEOs (16.52%) have 
worked for only one employer and 254 CEOs (22.20%) have worked for at least five employers. 
The CEO who has worked for the maximum number of employers (11 employers) is Andrew 
Gatto, the CEO of Russ Berrie and Company Inc.  
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The mean #Employers per year is 0.106, which suggests an average of one employer change 
in every 10 years. The CEO of Maverick Tube Corporation, C. Robert Bunch, has the highest 
value for # Employers per year. In his 26-year career, he has worked for ten companies, which 
results in one employer change every 2.6 years. The mean (median) for Employer Change 
Recency is 1.129 (0.833). If the CEO has never changed employers, the recency variable is zero. 
CEOs with higher (lower) values for the two experience diversification variables have more 
specific (general) firm or industry experience. As of 2005, the average (median) diversification 
levels for a CEO’s firm experience is 0.555 (0.506) and for a CEO’s industry experience is 0.708 
(0.702). If a CEO has worked in only one industry or one firm, his industry or firm experience 
diversification variables will have a value of one. 
Table 1 also presents the descriptive statistics for other CEO characteristics. About 36% 
CEOs in my sample have an MBA degree. About 22.9% CEOs in the sample have experience in 
the finance area. The average (median) CEO age is 55.6 (56) years. The average CEO tenure is 
7.7 years and the median is 5 years. Two hundred and thirteen (18.62%) CEOs in my sample are 
either the founder or from the founding family. Results are robust if I exclude these 213 CEOs 
from the sample.  
 
3.2.4 Differences in CEO Characteristics, Industry and Time Panel Distribution for CEOs with 
Different Employment Histories 
To examine differences in CEO characteristics for CEOs with different employment 
histories, I first classify the 1,144 CEOs into four groups based on the quartiles of #Employers. 
The first group has CEOs who have worked for only one employer, the second group has CEOs 
who have worked for two employers, the third group includes CEOs who have worked for three 
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or four employers, and the fourth group has CEOs who have worked for at least five employers. 
In Panel B of Table 1, I compare how CEO characteristics differ for CEOs in the first and the 
fourth groups.  
CEOs who have worked for at least five employers have experience in more functional areas 
than CEOs who have worked for only one employer. The percentage of founding family 
members is much higher in the first group of CEOs that have worked for only one employer. 
CEOs that have worked for at least five employers are more likely to have an MBA degree and 
experience in the finance area. These CEOs also have shorter tenure. These findings are all 
statistically significant based on t-test for means and the nonparametric signed rank tests for 
medians. I find no difference in CEO age between these two groups.   
I next examine whether CEO Employment History differ across industries and time panels. 
Figure 1 (a) shows industry distributions of CEOs that have worked for only one employer and 
CEOs that has worked for at least five employers. The p-value obtained by performing a Chi-
Square test for the difference in these two distribution is 0.263, suggesting that these two 
distributions are not statistically different. However, Figure 1 (a) shows some noticeable 
differences in manufacturing and service industries. Fifty percent of the firms that hire a CEO 
who has only worked for one firm are in the manufacturing industries and about 37% of the 
firms that hire a CEO that has worked for at least five employers are in the manufacturing 
industries. Although only about 7.5% of the firms that hire a CEO that has worked for one firm 
are in service industry, twenty-one percent of the firms that hire a CEO that has worked for at 
least five employers are in service industries. Figure 1 (b) presents how CEOs with different 
employment histories are distributed within an industry. Firms in communication, trade, service, 
technology, and transportation industries hire more CEOs who have worked for at least five 
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employers. Firms in construction and manufacturing industries hire more CEOs who have never 
changed employers.  
I present the distribution of CEO employment histories across different time panels in Figure 
2. Figure 2 (a) shows the time panel distributions of CEOs who have worked for only one 
employer and CEOs who have worked for at least five employers. For firms that hire CEOs that 
have worked in only one firm, 8.28% are in the time panel before 1990s, 35.5% are in 1990s, and 
56.21% are in 2000s. For firms that hire CEOs that have worked for at least five employers, 
3.37% are in the time panel of 1990s, 30.29% are in 1990s, and 66.35% are in 2000s. The p-
value obtained by performing a Chi-Square test for the difference in these two distribution is 
0.199, suggesting that these two distributions are not statistically different. Figure 2 (b) presents 
how CEOs with different employment histories distribute within a time panel. In the time panel 
before 1990s, firms hire more CEOs that have worked for only one firm. In 1990s, firms’ choices 
between these two groups are more balanced. About 20% hire CEOs have worked for only one 
employer and about 21% hire CEOs that have worked for at least five employers. In the time 
panel of 2000s, firms hire more CEOs that have worked for at least five employers.  Results from 
Figure 1 and 2 suggest that mobile CEOs are more preferable in certain industries and more 
mobile CEOs are hired in recent years. 
 
4 CEO Employment History and the CEO-firm Match 
To properly examine how a mobile CEO changes firm polices, I first study why a firm would 
hire a mobile CEO. Firms seek certain types of CEOs to match firm needs. At the same time, 
CEOs seek to work for certain type of firms to match their personal attributes. The observed 
CEO-firm matches are results of this mutual selection. Using survey data, Graham et al. (2008) 
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find that firms with high historical and future growth rates are more likely to be run by risk-
loving CEOs. Thus, the risk of the firm and the risk tolerance of the CEO appear to be important 
to achieving a good CEO-firm match. In this section, I analyze how CEOs with different 
employment histories are matched to firms with different policies.  
To understand what factors may influence a firm’s decision to hire a mobile CEO, I focus on 
firm policies in the year before the CEO turnover. In section 4.1, I discuss the construction of 
variables that potentially impact the firm’s CEO hiring decision and present summary statistics 
for these variables measured in the year prior to the year of CEO turnover. Then I study how pre-
turnover firm policies differ based on the new CEO’s employment history using both univariate 
(section 4.2) and multivariate analysis (section 4.3).  
4.1 Summary Statistics for firm policies in the year before CEO turnover 
As discussed in the hypothesis section, I expect the level of firm risk prior to the CEO 
turnover (pre-turnover firm risk), the importance of firm-specific knowledge, prior firm 
performance, industry conditions, board structure and some prior CEO’s characteristics to 
influence a firm’s decision to hire a mobile CEO. In the following paragraph, I briefly discuss 
the proxies for these factors. 
I measure a firm’s pre-turnover Total Firm Risk as the annualized standard deviation of daily 
stock returns in the year before CEO turnover. I use firm age, size and R&D intensity to proxy 
for the importance of firm-specific knowledge.4 Prior performance variables include industry-
median-adjusted operating return on assets and annual stock return. Operating return on assets is 
measured as the ratio of operating income before depreciation and amortization divided by total 
                                                 
4 I also include industry homogeneity as an additional variable to proxy for the importance of the firm-specific 
knowledge for a subsample of firms with industry homogeneity information. The CEO-firm match results for this 
subsample are included in Appendix B. 
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assets. To control for industry shocks, I construct a negative (positive) industry shock dummy 
that equals one if total sales in the industry decreases (increases) 10% or more in the year prior to 
CEO turnover.5 I classify a firm as having a positive (negative) firm shock if the firm’s sales 
growth is more (less) than 10% of the industry’s median sales growth. Board size is the total 
number of board directors in the firm and Board Insider Ratio is the percentage of insiders in the 
board. I define insiders as board members who are current or former employees of the firm, or 
family members of current employees of the firm. Prior CEOs’ tenures are from the Execucomp 
database or from the firm’s proxy statement if missing in the ExecuComp database. From proxy 
statements, I also collect whether the prior CEO is the chairman of the board. I follow Parrino 
(1997) and classify a turnover as forced when news stories indicate that the CEO has been 
ousted, there were conflicts between the CEO and the board, the CEO resigned following poor 
performance, the CEO resigned or retired following an SEC investigation or class action lawsuit, 
or the CEO resigns without an outside job appointment within six months and the CEO is below 
the age of 60.  
Out of the 917 CEOs with data for firm financial variables, I exclude 139 CEOs whose prior 
CEOs’ compensation data are not available in ExecuComp. Due to missing stock price 
information, I cannot compute prior leverage for 47 CEOs. I also exclude 13 CEOs whose firm’s 
daily stock return data in the year prior to CEO turnover are not available for a minimum of 30 
days. I collect information on board size, CEO/Chairman dual status, the percentage of insiders 
from firms’ proxy statements. For the remaining 718 firms, four of them have no proxy 
                                                 
5 Results on shocks are similar, if (1) I specify industry shocks based on industry median market to book ratio; (2) I 
set industry; (2) I set the negative (positive) industry shock dummy to one if total sales in the industry decreases 
(increases) 20% or more in the year prior to CEO turnover; (3) I classify a firm as having a positive (negative) firm 
shock if the firm’s sales growth is more (less) than 20% of the industry’s median sales growth. 
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statement available in the year before the respective CEO turnover. As a result, the final sample 
for the CEO-firm match analysis includes 714 firms (CEOs).  
Table 2 presents summary statistics for firm policies measured in the year prior to the 
respective CEO turnover year. These 714 CEOs have an average tenure of 8.9 years (7 for 
median). Ninety-seven firms dismissed their prior CEOs (13.59%). The CEO with the longest 
tenure is Charles Kaman. He has been the CEO of Kaman Corporation for 50 years. About 75% 
prior CEOs were also chairman of their boards. The average (median) board size is 9.5 (9). The 
largest board is the board of Verizon Communications Inc., which has 26 directors. About 37% 
of the sample firms experience a positive industry shock and 7.14% experience a negative 
industry shock in the year prior to the year of CEO turnover. About 20% (22.13%) of the firms 
increase (decrease) their sales 10% or more than the corresponding industry medians.  
4.2  Univariate Comparison of Pre-turnover Firm Policies 
To examine differences in pre-turnover firm policies for CEOs with different employment 
histories, I classify the 714 CEOs into four groups based on the quartiles of the corresponding 
CEO employment history measure. I present means and medians for each quartile and compare 
differences in means and medians for firms in the bottom and the top quartiles. Table 3 presents 
results for #Employers. Table B.3.1 of Appendix B includes results for the other four CEO 
employment history variables. For #Employers, the first group has CEOs who have worked for 
one employer, and the fourth group has CEOs who have worked for at least five employers. I use 
t-test (nonparametric signed rank test) to test whether differences in means (medians) are 
statistically significant. In firms that are going to hire a CEO that has worked for multiple 
employers, their prior CEOs have shorter tenures and are less likely to be the chairman of the 
board. Firms that are going to hire a mobile CEO have smaller boards and fewer insiders prior to 
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the CEO turnover. These firms are younger and smaller and have higher pre-turnover firm risk 
for all firm risk measures. I find that the firm is more likely to hire a mobile CEO when the firm 
dismisses the prior CEO, has poor prior performance, experienced a negative firm shock in the 
year prior to the year of CEO turnover. These findings are consistent with the premise that firms 
that need to change their prior policies are more likely to hire a CEO that has worked for 
multiple firms.  
Results are similar when Q1 to Q4 groups are based on the other four CEO employment 
history variables. Taken together, results from univariate comparison support my argument that 
the importance of firm-specific knowledge, the board structure, pre-turnover firm risk, prior 
CEO characteristics, and the firm’s need to change its prior policies relate to the firm’s decision 
to hire a mobile CEO.  
 
4.3 Multivariate analysis of the CEO -firm Match 
Table 4 provides multivariate results on how CEOs with different employment history are 
matched to different firms. The five CEO employment history measures are the dependent 
variables. Independent variables include pre-turnover firm risk, firm size, firm age, R&D 
intensity, prior CEO and current CEO characteristics, turnover types and industry or firm shocks. 
I also include the following firm control variables in the CEO-firm regression analysis: financial 
leverage, Tobin’s Q, CEO cash compensation, CEO compensation delta, CEO compensation 
vega, industry concentration, activist institutional ownership, whether directors receive equity-
based compensation. Appendix A discusses variable constructions for these variables and Table 
2 presents summary statistics for these variables.  
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In Table 4, the coefficients on Total Risk are positively and statistically significant at 1% 
when the dependent variables are #Employers, #Employers per year, and Employer Change 
Recency. This finding suggests that firms that have higher risk prior to CEO turnover prefer to 
hire CEOs that change employers more frequently.6 However, the coefficients on Total Risk are 
not statistically significant when the dependent variables are the diversification levels of CEO 
experience. Larger and older firms choose CEOs with fewer employer changes and more specific 
firm (industry) experience. This finding is consistent with the argument that larger and older 
firms require more firm-specific knowledge. High-R&D-intensity firms require more firm-
specific investments from their employees. Thus, they are more likely to choose CEOs who 
move less. Consistent with this argument, I find R&D intensity relates negatively to the New 
CEO’s #Employers, #Employers per year, and Employer Change Recency. R&D-intensive firms 
are also less likely to hire a CEO with diversified firm experience. The diversification of the 
CEO’s industry experience, however, does not relate to the firm’s R&D intensity. This result 
suggests that R&D intensity matters more for firms that need firm-specific knowledge than for 
firms that need industry-specific knowledge. Firms with larger boards hire CEOs that change 
employer less frequently and have more focused experience. When firm-specific knowledge is 
more important, the firm would optimally appoint more insiders as board directors (e.g., Raheja, 
2005). Therefore, firms with a higher percentage of insiders in the board might require more 
firm-specific knowledge. Consistent with this argument, I find that boards with more insiders 
prefer CEOs that change employers less frequently and have more focused experience.  
                                                 
6 In untabulated results, I also include an additional dummy variable that equals one when the firm’s prior Total Risk 
is above the industry median. The coefficient on this variable is negative, but not statistically significant with a p-
value of 0.565. 
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Because mobile CEOs have more opportunities to deal with uncertainties, I expect that firms 
that need to change their prior policies are more likely to hire mobile CEOs. In support of this 
argument, I find that the coefficient on Negative Industry Shock dummy is negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% level when the dependent variable is the CEO’s industry 
experience diversification. In untabulated results, I find no relation between CEO employment 
history and positive industry shocks. I also examine the relation between firm shocks and the 
CEO hiring decision. I find that firms that experience negative firm shocks prefer to hire CEOs 
that have worked for multiple employers and CEOs with more recent employer changes. 
However, the presence of negative firm shocks is not related to the diversification level of a 
CEO’s professional experience. I find no relation between positive firm shocks and the CEO 
employment history.  
Allgood and Farrell (2003) suggest that CEO dismissals signal mismatches between the CEO 
and the firm. The most common reason for a CEO to be dismissed is poor prior performance. 
Therefore, I would expect firms that fire their prior CEOs to hire a mobile CEO who is more 
likely to bring changes to the firm. Consistent with this argument, I find that firms that dismiss 
their prior CEOs are more likely to hire a CEO that has worked for multiple employers.  The 
coefficients on prior industry adjusted operating and stock performance are negative. The 
coefficient on the industry-median-adjusted stock return is statistically significant for Employer 
Change Rencency. This results suggests when the prior stock performance is poor, the firm is 
more likely to hire  a CEO that has more recent employer changes.  
Results in Table 4 also provide evidence that prior CEOs’ characteristics relate to the firm’s 
decision to hire a mobile CEO. If the prior CEO has shorter tenure, the firm is more likely to hire 
a mobile CEO. One possible interpretation of this result is that the prior CEO has a shorter tenure 
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because he/she was not successful. Therefore, the firm is looking for a mobile CEO to change the 
firm’s prior policies. Another possible interpretation is that it is optimal for the firm to hire CEOs 
that are mobile. Therefore, both the prior CEO and the new CEO are mobile CEOs with shorter 
tenures.  
The new CEO’s education, age, founder status, and functional area experience also relate to 
the CEO’s employment history. The coefficient on CEO age is positive when the dependent 
variable is #Employers and negative when the dependent variable is #Employers per year. As 
one would expect, this finding suggests that older CEOs are likely to have more employers over 
the span of their careers, but are less likely to move in a given year. CEOs with an MBA degree 
move more often and have less firm-specific experience. CEOs with finance backgrounds are 
more likely to move and have more diversified industry and firm experience. Founders have 
fewer employer changes and more focused experience. 
In summary, regression results in Table 4 indicate that different firms choose CEOs with 
different employment histories. Firms hire CEOs who change employers more frequently and 
have more diversified experience when the firm’s prior risk is high, firm-specific human capital 
is less important, the board is smaller and has fewer insiders, the prior CEO is dismissed and has 
shorter tenure. In the presence of a negative industry shock, firms prefer CEOs with diversified 
industry experience. 
 
5 CEO Employment History and Firm Policies 
In this section, I examine the relation between the CEO’s employment history and the risk-
taking in her policies. I discuss variable construction and summary statistics for firm policies in 
Section 5.1. Section 5.2 presents univariate comparison of firm policies for CEOs with different 
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employment histories. I present the multivariate regression model and discuss the multivariate 
results in Section 5.3.   
5.1 Summary Statistics for Firm Policies after CEO Turnover 
I examine a CEO’s risk-taking in the firm’s financing and investment policies. For the firm’s 
financing policy, I examine the firm’s financial leverage. For the firm’s investing policy, I 
examine the firm’s investments in R&D, Advertising and Capital Expenditures. I measure the 
firm’s Financial Leverage as the book value of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities 
divided by long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities plus the market value of equity. Results 
are robust to using a leverage ratio based on the book value of equity (Table B.1.3 of Appendix 
B). R&D Intensity is the ratio of R&D expenditures divided by total assets. I set R&D intensity 
to zero if the firm did not report R&D expenditures. Advertising intensity is the ratio of 
advertising expenses divided by total assets. Similar to R&D intensity computation, I set 
advertising intensity to zero if the firm did not report advertising expense. Capital expenditure 
intensity, CAPEXP, is computed as capital expenditure divided by total assets. 7 
Financing and investment policies are different channels through which a CEO can influence 
the firm’s risk. I construct three variables, Total Risk, Market Risk and Firm-specific Risk, to 
capture the overall riskiness of a firm’s policies. I measure a firm’s Total Risk as the standard 
deviation of daily returns multiplied by the square root of 254. I measure Firm-specific Risk in 
two ways. Firm-specific risk (CAPM) is the standard deviation of the residuals from a market 
model regression of daily returns on the CRSP value-weighted index multiplied by the square 
root of 254 trading days. Firm specific risk (FF+Momentum) is the annualized standard 
                                                 
7 Results are robust to using net capital expenditures, which is computed as capital expenditure (Compustat item 
128) less sales of property, plant and equipment (Compustat item 107) divided by total assets (Compustat item 6). I 
obtain similar results when scaling all three investment variables by total sales. 
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deviation of the residuals from a regression of daily stock returns on the three Fama-French 
factors plus a momentum factor.8 A firm’s Market Risk is the beta from the market model 
regression used to obtain firm-specific risk (CAPM). To compute these firm risk measures, I 
require a firm to have at least 30 days of returns for a fiscal year. This requirement reduces firm-
years from 5,139 to 5,113 for firm risk measure related analysis.  
Table 5 presents summary statistics for these firm policy variables. As discussed in Section 3, 
the sample for post-turnover firm policy analysis consists of 917 CEOs and 5,139 firm years 
ranges from 1992 to 2007. The mean Leverage is 0.177 and the median is 0.138. R&D Intensity 
has a mean of 0.029 and a median of 0.002. The mean (median) of advertising intensity is 0.013 
(0). Capital Expenditure has a mean of 0.054 and a median of 0.039. The mean (median) for 
Total Risk is 0.384 (0.346). The sample mean (median) for Firm-specific Risk (CAPM) is 0.343 
(0.305), for Firm-specific Risk (Four-Factor) is 0.330 (0.293) and for Market Risk is 1.087 
(1.019). Table 5 also presents summary statistics for CEO employment history variables and 
other CEO characteristics. Except for #Employers, all other four employment history variables 
change for every sample year. Results are robust if I hold these four variables constant and use 
their values in the year of CEO turnover in the analysis (see Table B.1.6 of Appendix B). To 
minimize the influence of outliners, I winsorize all firm-level variables at the 1% and 99% 
levels. 
 
                                                 
8Results are robust if I use equally-weighted market index. All the factors are from WRDS’ Fama-French Research 
Portfolios and Factors database. For constructions of these factors, refer to Kenneth French's web site at Dartmouth.  
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5.2 Univariate analysis of CEO Employment History and firm policies  
To examine the relation between CEO employment histories and the riskiness of firm 
policies, CEOs are classified into Q1 and Q4 groups based on whether they belong to the bottom 
or top quartiles of the corresponding CEO employment history measure. I present results of 
univariate comparison for #Employers in Table 6. In Panel A of Table 6, CEOs who have 
worked for at least five employers have lower CAPEXP, higher R&D, and higher total, firm-
specific and market risk. Results are similar when the Q1 and Q4 groups are based on the 
quartiles of #Employers per year or Employer Change Recency. When the groups are based on 
the quartiles of the diversification levels of a CEO’s firm (industry) experience, CEOs with less 
diversified experience have less risky policies, such as higher capital expenditures, lower R&D 
intensity, and lower firm risk.  
To better understand how CEO employment histories influence firm policies, I compute 
industry-median adjusted changes in firm policies for each post-turnover firm year. If the firm’s 
pre-turnover policy is already above the industry norm, one would expect the new CEO to be 
less likely to increase the level of firm policies regardless of the CEO type. To control for the 
level of the firm’s pre-turnover policy, for each policy or risk measure, I divide the sample into 
two groups based on whether the firm policy in the year prior to CEO turnover is above or below 
industry median. Panel B (C) of Table 6 presents differences in changes in firm policies for 
CEOs that have worked for different numbers of employers when the respective firm policy is 
below (above) the sample median. When the firm’s pre-turnover Leverage is below the industry 
median, changes in Leverage are positive for CEOs in all four quartiles. CEOs that have worked 
for at least five employers, however, increase Leverage more and the difference is statistically 
significant at the 5% for both the t-test and the nonparametric signed rank test. When the firm’s 
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pre-turnover policy or risk is below the industry median, CEOs that have worked for at least five 
employers also invest more in advertising and increase more firm-specific risk. These differences 
are statistically significant. Taken together, these findings are consistent with my hypothesis that 
CEOs who change employers more frequently implement riskier policies. In Panel C, when the 
firm’s pre-turnover policy or risk is above the industry median, CEOs that have worked for at 
least five employers invest more in advertising, less in R&D and Capital Expenditure. I find no 
difference in Leverage and firm risk when the prior leverage or risk is above the industry 
median. 
 
5.3 Multivariate analysis of CEO Employment History and firm policies 
5.3.1 Model Specifications for the Multivariate Analysis 
To examine how CEO employment history affects firm policies, I estimate the following 
model for Leverage, Advertising Intensity, and Firm Risk variables: 
Firm Policy= b1CEO Employment History Proxy+ b2Pre-turnover Firm Policy + b3Firm Control      
                     Variables+ b4CEO Control Variables   + Industry and Year Dummies + e            (1) 
When dependent variables are Leverage and Advertising Intensity, Total Risk, Market Risk 
and Firm-specific Risk, I expect b1 to be positive when CEO employment history is measured as 
#Employers, #Employers per year or Employer Change Recency and negative when CEO 
employment history is measured as the degree of diversification for the CEO’s firm or industry 
experience. When the dependent variable is CAPEXP, I expect b1 to be negative when CEO 
employment history is measured as #Employers, #Employers per year or Employer Change 
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Recency and positive when CEO employment history is measured as the degree of 
diversification for the CEO’s firm or industry experience.9 
Because R&D intensity can serve as a proxy for both the importance of firm-specific 
knowledge and the riskiness of firm policies, I expect mobile CEOs to increase R&D intensity 
when the firm-specific knowledge is less important. Parrino (1997) suggests that skills are more 
transferable and the firm-specific knowledge is less important in homogeneous industries. I use 
industry homogeneity to measure the importance of firm-specific knowledge and include an 
interaction term of CEO employment history and Industry Homogeneity in the model for R&D 
intensity: 
R&D Intensity=  b1CEO Emp. History Proxy+ b2CEO Emp. History Proxy*Industry Homogeneity + 
                          b3Industry Homogeneity + b4Pre-turnover Firm Policy + b5Firm Control Variables 
      + b6CEO Control Variables   + Industry Dummies + Year Dummies + e      (2) 
I expect b2 to be positive when CEO employment history is measured as #Employers, 
#Employers per year or Employer Change Recency and negative when CEO employment history 
is measured as the degree of diversification for the CEO’s firm or industry experience. 
Control variables for firm characteristics include pre-turnover firm policies, firm size, 
Ln(firm age), profitability, CEO cash compensation, CEO compensation vega and delta, activist 
institutional ownership and whether directors receive equity-based compensation, Tobin’s Q, and 
industry concentration. Appendix A includes variable constructions for these control variables 
and summary statistics for these control variables are presented in Table 5. Pre-turnover firm 
policy is the firm policy in the year before the year of CEO turnover. By regressing the post-
                                                 
9 I obtain similar results when the dependent variables are: (1) changes in firm policies, i.e., firm policies after the 
CEO turnover subtract firm polices in the year prior to the CEO turnover; or (2) industry median adjusted firm 
policies. The regression is based on an unbalanced panel dataset. However, results are also robust to using balanced 
subset panels of the dataset. These robustness results are included in Tables B.1.1 and B.1.2 of Appendix B.  
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CEO-turnover policies on pre-turnover policies, I isolate the changes in firm policies after CEO 
turnover. Results are the same if I use changes in firm policies as dependent variables. Control 
variables for CEO characteristics include ln(CEO Tenure + 1), ln(CEO Age), MBA dummy, 
Founder dummy, and Finance Background dummy. Industry dummies based on 48 Fama and 
French Industries are included to control for other possible omitted industry fixed effects that are 
not captured by industry concentration. Year dummies are included in every regression. For 
statistical significance, I report p-values based on heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors 
clustered by firm. 
 
5.3.2 Instrumental Variables for CEO Employment History 
The analysis in Section 4 suggests that it is necessary to control for the CEO-firm match 
endogeneity when I examine the relation between CEO employment history and firm policies. 
Therefore, I use the CEO-firm match regression presented in Table 4 as the first-stage of the 
instrumental variable 2SLS estimation to control for the CEO-firm match selectivity but using 
the sample period after CEO turnover.10 
Based on the literature, I identify three instrumental variables for CEO employment history. 
Valid instruments should closely relate to a CEO’s employment history, but not relate to the 
CEO’s current firm policies through channels other than CEO employment history. Oyer (2006, 
2008) suggests that the economic condition at the time of a person’s job market and the person’s 
initial job placement have long-run effects on the person’s career path. Malmendier and Nagel 
(2007) find that an individual’s experience of macro-economic shocks affects the individual’s 
                                                 
10 OLS results for firm policy analysis are included in Appendix B. Because board structure variables, board size, 
the percentage of insiders, CEO/Chairman dual status, are only available for a subsample of firms, I report the 
results for this subsample in Appendix B. The regressions in the main text do not include these board structure 
variables. 
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subsequent risk-taking in the long term. Based on Oyer and Malmendier and Nagel’s work, the 
first instrumental variable I use is the unemployment rate at the year when the CEO started his 
first full-time job. The second instrumental variable is whether the CEO has non-business career 
before he took a position in a firm. Non-business careers include academic or government jobs. 
Although I expect these two instruments to impact a CEO’s career path, I do not expect them to 
directly relate to the CEO’s current firm polices. The third instrumental variable I use is the 
number of years a CEO has worked in his current firm’s industry. How long a CEO has been 
working in his current firm’s industry directly relate to the CEO’s industry diversification level. 
CEOs that do not change industries also work for fewer employers, ceteris paribus. Therefore, I 
expect the number of years a CEO has worked in his current firm’s industry to closely relate to 
the CEO’s career path. However, one would not expect this variable to relate to firm policies 
through channels other than CEO employment history.  
I formally test the validity of these three instruments using Hansen’s J-test and a first-stage 
F-test. The null hypothesis of the first-stage F-test is that the instruments are jointly insignificant. 
The joint null hypothesis of Hansen’s J-test is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., 
uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from 
the estimated equation. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic is distributed chi-squared in 
the number of over-identified restrictions. I present p-values for instrument validity tests at the 
bottom of each table for second-stage policy results.  
Table 7 presents the first stage regression results for instrumental variables. I use 
contemporaneous financing variables to be consistent with the equation in the second stage. The 
coefficient on Unemployment Rate is negative with a p-value of 0.107 when the dependent 
variable is #Employers. The coefficient on Unemployment Rate is positive and statistically 
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significant at the 1% level when the dependent variable is #Employers per year. This result 
implies that when the economic conditions are poor at the time the CEO first participates in the 
job market, he is more likely to change jobs in the future. If a CEO has non-business occupations 
before he takes a position in a firm, he tends to have more employers, more employers per year, 
less diversified firm and industry experience. Coefficients on the number of years working in the 
current firm’s industry are negative when dependent variables are #Employers, #Employers per 
year and Employer Change Recency and are positive when dependent variables are 
diversification levels of the CEO’s firm and industry experience. These results support the 
argument that CEOs who have worked in the same industry for a long time are less likely to 
work for multiple employers and have less diversified experience. 
5.3.3 CEO Employment History and Financing Policy 
Table 8 presents the 2SLS results for the debt policy. The dependent variable is Leverage. 
Based on the literature, for example, Mackay and Phillips (2005), and Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), I include profitability, capital intensity, and depreciation ratio as additional control 
variables for the debt regression. After including these additional variables and requiring the firm 
to have leverage information in the year prior to CEO turnover, the sample size for debt 
regression declines from 5,139 to 4,826 firm years. As shown at the bottom of Table 8, the F-stat 
for joint significance tests on the instrumental variables are well above 10 for all the models, 
suggesting that these instrumental variables are not weak. The Hansen’s J-test has p-values range 
from 0.406 to 0.684. These p-values fail to reject the null hypothesis that the three instrumental 
variables are valid. #Employers and #Employers per year are positively related to the debt ratio. 
Both relations are statistically significant at the 5% level. Employer Change Recency relates 
positively to leverage and the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
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coefficients on Firm (Industry) Experience Diversification are negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. These results support my hypothesis that CEOs with more employer 
changes and more diversified experience increase financial leverage. Pre-turnover leverage 
relates positively to a firm’s current leverage, which suggests that a firm’s capital structure is 
persistent. The coefficients on control variables are consistent with prior studies. Firms that are 
larger, less profitable, have lower Tobin’s Q, higher capital intensity, and lower R&D 
expenditures have higher leverages. As in Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Graham et al. (2008), 
firms that have CEOs with an MBA degree are related to firms with higher levels of debt. Taken 
together, results in Table 8 support my hypothesis that mobile CEOs increase financial leverage. 
 
5.3.4 CEO Employment History and Investment Policy 
In this section, I discuss the relation between CEO employment history and the firm’s 
investment policies. As in Coles et al. (2006), I include surplus cash and leverage as additional 
control variables for investment policy regressions. The inclusion of surplus cash as additional 
control variable reduces the sample size from 5,139 firm years to 5,074 firm years. Because 
budget constraints can limit total investments, I also include the other two investment policies 
which are not the dependent variable as additional controls. For example, when R&D intensity is 
the dependent variable, I add advertising intensity and capital expenditures as control variables. I 
present 2SLS results for capital expenditures, R&D intensity, and advertising intensity in Table 9 
through Table 11. The three instrumental variables for CEO employment history are the same as 
the ones described in Section 5.3.2. For brevity, I do not repeat first-stage results. However, 
results are similar to first-stage results reported for financial leverage (Table 7). First-stage joint 
significance tests and Hansen’s J-tests indicate that these instrumental variables are valid for 
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investment policy regressions. I report p-values for Hansen’s J-test and F-stat for the first-stage 
joint significance tests at the bottom of Tables 9-11. 
(1) CEO Employment History and Capital Expenditures 
Table 9 presents 2SLS results for capital expenditures. The dependent variable is capital 
expenditures divided by total assets. The exclusion of firm years that do not have capital 
expenditures information in the year prior to CEO turnover reduces the sample size from 5,074 
to 5,029. In support of my hypothesis that mobile CEOs invest less in tangible assets, the 
coefficients on #Employers, #Employers per year, and Employer Change Recency are negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, CEOs with more focused firm or 
industry experience invest more in capital expenditures than CEOs with more diversified 
experience. Both coefficients on firm and industry experience diversification are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. For CEO control variables, Older CEOs and CEOs with longer tenure 
invest less in capital expenditures. CEOs with a finance background also invest less in capital 
expenditures.  
(2) CEO Employment History and R&D Intensity 
As discussed in Section 2, R&D intensity can serve as a proxy for both the importance of 
firm-specific knowledge and the riskiness of firm policies. Mobile CEOs have lower firm-
specific knowledge and are less likely to make R&D investments if it requires firm-specific 
knowledge to manage these investments. When the firm-specific knowledge is less important, 
mobile CEOs can increase firm risk by investing in R&D. The relation between CEO 
employment history and the investment in R&D is an outcome of both effects. I use industry 
homogeneity to proxy for the importance of the firm-specific knowledge. I follow Parrino (1997) 
to construct industry homogeneity and require a minimum of 20 firms in a two-digit SIC code. 
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This requirement reduces the sample for R&D investments from 5,074 to 4,912. I present results 
for R&D investments in Table 10. In Table 10, the coefficients on CEO employment history 
variables are negative when the dependent variable is #Employers, #Employers per year or 
Employer Change Recency, and are positive when the dependent variable is the degree of 
diversification of CEO experience. The coefficients on the interaction terms of CEO employment 
history variables and Industry Homogeneity are positive when the dependent variable is 
#Employers, #Employers per year or Employer Change Recency and are negative when 
dependent variable is Firm or Industry Experience Diversification. These findings suggest that 
increases in industry homogeneity reduce the negative relation between CEO employment 
history and R&D intensity.  
Based on the coefficients on #Employers and #Employers*Industry Homogeneity, when 
Industry Homogeneity is above 0.24, #Employers relates positively to R&D Intensity holding 
other variables constant. When industry homogeneity is less than 0.24, #Employers relates 
negatively to R&D intensity, ceteris paribus. As a reference point, the sample mean (median) for 
industry homogeneity is 0.21 (0.18). When CEO employment history is measured as #Employers 
per year and Employer Change Recency, the coefficients on these two variables are positive if 
industry homogeneity is above 0.34 or 0.21, respectively. When industry homogeneity is above 
0.23 (0.31), Firm (Industry) Experience Diversification relates negatively to R&D intensity 
holding other variables constant. These findings support my hypothesis that when the firm-
specific knowledge is less important, the risk effect of R&D dominants and mobile CEOs invest 
more in R&D. For coefficients on CEO control variables, older CEOs and CEOs with finance 
background invest less in R&D expenditures.  
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(3) CEO Employment History and Advertising Intensity 
Table 11 presents 2SLS results for advertising intensity. Coefficients on the five employment 
history variables all have predicted signs and are statistically significant at the 10% level except 
for Industry Experience Diversification. CEOs who have worked for more employers, change 
employers more frequently, change employers more recently and have more diversified firm 
experience invest more in advertising. These findings support my hypothesis that mobile CEOs 
invest more in intangible assets which could increase the uncertainty of a firm’s future cash 
flows. For control variables on CEO characteristics, older CEOs spend less in advertising.  
Taken together, results in Tables 9 to 11 support my argument that CEOs who change 
employers more and have more diversified experiences are prone to bear more risk and invest 
more in intangible investments (e.g., advertising) and less in tangible investments (e.g., capital 
expenditures).11 Mobile CEOs also invest more in R&D in industries with lower requirements for 
the firm-specific knowledge. 
5.3.5 Simultaneous Equations: CEO Employment History, financing, and Investment Policies 
CEO hiring decisions, financing and investment policies are likely to be simultaneously 
determined by the firm. To account for the simultaneity, I estimate the joint determination of 
CEO hiring decision and firm policies in a system of the following five equations: 
Leverage = (#Employers, CAPEXP, R&D Intensity, Advertising Intensity, Pre-turnover Leverage,  
Depreciation/Total Assets, Operating ROA, Capital Intensity, Firm and CEO Controls) 
CAPEXP= (#Employers, R&D Intensity, Advertising Intensity, Leverage, Pre-turnover CAPEXP, 
       Surplus Cash, Firm and CEO controls) 
                                                 
11 I have also estimate the relation between CEO employment history and the intangible ratio. The intangible ratio is 
measured as the value of intangible assets reported by the firm divided by total assets. I find that mobile CEOs 
increase the intangible ratio for their firms. Results for the intangible ratios are reported in Appendix B. 
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R&D Intensity= (#Employers, CAPEXP, Advertising Intensity, Leverage, Pre-turnover R&D Intensity, 
   Surplus Cash, Firm and CEO controls) 
Advertising Intensity= (#Employers, CAPEXP, R&D Intensity, Leverage, Pre-turnover Advertising  
                                      Intensity, Surplus Cash, Firm and CEO controls) 
#Employers= (CAPEXP, R&D Intensity, Advertising Intensity, Leverage, Unemployment Rate, Non- 
    business Career,  # Years working in the current firm’s industry, Operating ROA, Firm  
    and CEO controls) 
I estimate this system of five equations using three-stage least squares (3SLS). The respective 
instrumental variables for every policy are listed above in parentheses.  The 3SLS results for the 
total sample are presented in Panel A of Table 12. Results from R&D investments analysis 
suggest that the overall effect of CEO employment history on R&D Intensity is positive when 
industry homogeneity is high and negative when industry homogeneity is low. Based on the 
coefficients in Table 10, I estimate the system of equations for a subsample of firms with 
industry homogeneity above 0.26 (the average of reflection points for all five CEO employment 
history proxies). Panel B of Table 12 presents 3SLS results for this subsample. Consistent with 
IV/2SLS estimation results in Tables 8-11, CEOs who have worked for more employers increase 
leverage, invest more in advertising and less in capital expenditures. For firms in homogeneous 
industries, CEOs who have worked for more employers also increase investment in R&D. 
Results based on other four employment history variables are similar to IV/2SLS estimation 
results as well. These findings support the hypothesis that mobile CEOs implement riskier firm 
policies. 
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5.3.6 CEO Employment History and Firm Risk 
Results from prior sections show that CEOs who change employers more and have more 
diversified firm (industry) experience increase financial leverage, invest more in advertising and 
R&D, and less in capital expenditures. The differences in firms’ financing and investment 
policies should impact firm risk. To study the relation between CEO employment history and the 
riskiness of firm policies, I examine whether firm risk is higher for mobile CEOs. Leverage and 
the three variables for investment policies are included as additional control variables in firm-
risk analysis.  
Instrumental variables for firm-risk analysis are the same as the ones described in the firm 
policy section. The p-values of Hansen’s J-test and the first-stage F-stats, reported in the bottom 
of Tables 13-15, fail to reject the null hypothesis that these three instrumental variables are valid 
for firm-risk regressions.  
The dependent variable in Table 13 is Total Risk, measured as the annualized standard 
deviation of daily stock returns. I expect mobile CEOs to increase the firm’s Total Risk. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, the coefficients on #Employers, #Employers per year and 
Employer Change Recency are positive. All these coefficients are statistically significant at the 
10% level. The coefficients on experience diversification variables are negative as predicted. But 
these relations are not statistically significant at the conventional levels. For other CEO control 
variables, I find that younger CEOs, CEOs without an MBA degree, and CEOs from the 
founding family are more likely to increase firm risk. 
Because the change in firm policies can influence both systematic and indiosyncratic risk, I 
next examine do mobile CEOs increase more systematic risk or firm-specific risk. I present 
2SLS results for Firm-specific Risk in Table 14 and for Market Risk in Table 15. The dependent 
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variable in Panel A of Table 14 is the annualized standard deviation of the residuals from a 
market model regression of daily returns on the CRSP value-weighted index. The dependent 
variable in Panel B of Table 14 is the annualized standard deviation of the residuals from the 
Fama-French three factor model plus a momentum factor. Results are similar in both panels A 
and B, the coefficients on #Employers, #Employers per year and Employer Change Recency are 
positive and statistically significant. The coefficients on firm experience diversification are 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level when the firm-specific risk is measured by 
the four-factor model and at the 10% level when the firm-specific risk is measured by the market 
model. Industry experience diversification relates negatively to the firm’s specific risk, but this 
relation is significant at the 10% level for the four-factor model only. Similar to findings in 
Kothari et al. (2002), the coefficients on R&D intensity are much higher than the coefficients on 
capital expenditures, which suggest that investments in R&D intensity increase firm risk more 
than investments in capital expenditures. Consistent with the notion that a higher leverage 
increases firm risk, the coefficient on leverage is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level for all the models in both tables. Older, larger and more profitable firms have lower firm-
specific risk. Similar to the findings for Total Risk, younger CEOs, CEOs without an MBA 
degree and from the founding family are more likely to increase Firm-specific Risk.  
In Table 15, the dependent variable is Market Risk, which is the market beta from the market 
model regression. None of the coefficients on the five employment history proxies are 
statistically significant. This finding suggests that mobile CEOs do not change the market risk of 
their firms. CEOs from the founding family increase Market Risk when the CEO employment 
history is measured as Industry Experience Diversification. None of the other CEO 
characteristics relates to a firm’s market risk.  
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Because increases in a firm’s financial leverage will increase the firm’s equity beta, I 
construct an unlevered beta to examine the relation between CEO employment history and the 
firm’s systematic asset risk. To unlever the equity beta, I assume the debt has a beta of zero and 
multiply the firm’s equity beta by (1- Leverage). Panel B of Table 15 presents results for 
unlevered betas. The coefficients on #Employers, #Employers per year, Employer Change 
Recency are negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. The coefficients on Firm and 
Industry Experience Diversification are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.12 
These findings suggest that mobile CEOs reduce their firms’ unlevered beta, but use leverage to 
help maintain the overall CAPM beta. 
To control for the possibility that the CAPM model does not fully capture the systematic risk 
of the firm, I examine the relation between CEO employment history and betas estimated from 
the four-factor model. The analysis on the factor betas helps to understand whether mobile CEOs 
change the systematic risk of a firm’s assets. The betas estimated from the four-factor model are 
a size beta, a book-to-market beta and a momentum beta. I report results for the size beta in 
Panel C of Table 15, for the book-to-market beta in Panel D of Table 15, and for the momentum 
beta in Panel E of Table 15. I find mobile CEOs do not influence the size beta and the 
momentum beta, but they increase the book-to-market beta. When the book-to-market beta is the 
dependent variable, p-values for the five CEO employment history variables range from 0.062 to 
0.124. These findings suggest that mobile CEOs possibly influence the growth potential of the 
firm.  
                                                 
12 I obtain similar results if I unlever the equity beta using a debt beta of 0.2 (Conine and Tamarkin, 1985). The 
coefficients on Firm (Industry) Experience Diversification, however, are statistically significant at the 10% level 
instead of the 5% level.. 
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If a mobile CEO changes the systematic risk of the firm, one would expect the firm’s asset 
structure to change. To shed light on whether the CEO changes the firm’s asset structure, I 
examine the likelihood of adding or reducing a segment and the concentration of segment 
operation within the firm. Panel F of Table 15 reports results on the concentration of segment 
operations. The coefficients on #Employers are negative and statistically significant. This finding 
suggests that mobile CEOs reduce the concentration of segment sales, operating income, capital 
expenditures and assets. The positive and statistically significant coefficients on Industry 
Experience Diversification suggest that CEOs with concentrated industry experience increase the 
concentration of segment operations. To examine the likelihood of a CEO to add or reduce a 
segment or SIC code, I create a category variable that equals one if the CEO reduces the number 
of segments for his firm, equals two if there is no change in the number of segments, and equals 
three if the CEO increases the number of segments. I report multinomial regression results on 
this category variable in Panel G of Table 15. The base case for the multinomial regression is the 
second category where there is no change in the number of segments. CEOs that change 
employers more are more likely to add a segment or a segment with a new SIC code. CEOs that 
have diversified industry experience are less likely to add and reduce a segment or SIC code for 
their firms. These findings support the argument that CEO employment history relates to the 
firm’s asset structure. 
Taken together, the firm-risk analysis suggests that CEOs who change employers more 
frequently and have more diversified experience increase firm risk. The increase in total firm risk 
comes from increases in firm-specific risk, but not the CAPM market risk.  
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5.3.7 Principal Component Analysis on CEO Employment History Variables 
In this section, I use the principal component analysis to construct one variable that 
incorporates both positive and negative correlations between the five CEO employment history 
variables. I present the loadings of the CEO employment history variables on the principal 
components in Panel A of Table 16. Among the five extracted components, the first component 
has an eigenvalue above four and explains more than 80% of the variations.  None of the other 
components have an eigenvalue more than one and each of them explains less than 5% of the 
total variation. #Employers, #Employers per year and Employer Change Recency load positively 
on the first component and Firm (Industry) Experience Diversification load negatively on the 
first component. Therefore, CEOs with high values for the first component are mobile CEOs that 
change employers more frequently and have more diversified experience.  
I repeat the firm policies and risk analysis using the first component as a proxy for CEO 
employment history. Results are presented in Panel B of Table 16. Similar to results in prior 
sections, CEOs with high values for the first component increase Leverage, invest less in Capital 
Expenditures and more in advertising. They also invest more in R&D in homogeneous 
industries. As a result of riskier firm policies, these CEOs increase their firms’ Total Risk, 
especially Firm-specific Risk. 
The results presented so far suggest that CEOs with different employment histories adapt 
firm policies with different risk levels. In particular, CEOs with more employer changes and 
more diversified firm (industry) experience take on higher levels of debt, invest more in 
advertising and less in capital expenditures. Mobile CEOs also invest more in R&D in 
homogenous industries. As result, mobile CEOs’ firms have higher firm risk. These results are 
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robust to estimating a system of simultaneous regressions and using a principal component to 
capture the positive and negative correlations in the five CEO employment history variables. 
 
6 CEO Employment History and Firm Performance 
The results in the previous section support the hypothesis that CEOs with different 
employment histories undertake different firm policies. In this section, I examine if the 
differences in firm policies and risk affect shareholders’ wealth and lead to inefficiencies in firm 
performance. In section 6.1, I examine announcement returns for CEO turnovers. In section 6.2, I 
study whether subsequent firm performance differs for CEOs with different employment 
histories. 
6.1 Event Study Results for shareholders 
From the original 1,144 CEOs, I find announcement dates for 901 CEOs. To compare 
turnover announcement returns for CEOs who have worked for different numbers of employers, 
I separate these 901 CEOs into four groups based on the quartiles of #Employers. The first group 
includes CEOs who have worked for only one employer. The fourth group includes CEOs who 
have worked for at least five employers. I compare how announcement returns differ for CEOs in 
the first and fourth groups. I report t-statistics for the market model CARs based on Patell 
(1976). I also report a nonparametric generalized sign statistic to test whether percentage of 
positive returns differs significantly from the estimation period. The event study results are 
presented in Table 16.  CARs based on value-weighted market index are report for two event 
windows [-1, 1] and [-3, 1]. Day -1 is the day before the day of CEO turnover. Day 1 is one day 
after the date of CEO turnover announcement. The second event window is used to control for 
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possible information leakage. I obtain similar results when use equally-weighted market index in 
the market model. 
For all types of turnovers, the average announcement CARs for 175 CEOs who have worked 
for only one employer (first group) is negative and significantly different from zero for the event 
window [-3, 1]. For 185 CEOs who have worked for at least five employers (fourth group), the 
average announcement CAR is positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. To 
control for the insider/outsider effect, I classify CEOs into insiders or outsiders within the fourth 
group. For 80 insider CEOs who have worked for more than four employers, the average of 
announcement CARs is 0.91% for the event window [-3, 1] and 1.02% for the event window [-1, 
1]. Both CARs are statistically significant at the 10% level. For the 105 outsider CEOs that have 
worked in more than four firms, the CARs are positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  
If mobile CEOs are less risk averse and are more likely to bring changes to a firm, one would 
expect shareholders to react positively to appointments of mobile CEOs when the firm needs to 
change its prior strategies. Shareholders would expect a change in firm policies when the firm 
dismisses the prior CEO or when the firm has a poor prior performance. I follow Parrino (1997) 
to classify a turnover as forced when news stories indicate that the CEO has been ousted, there 
were conflicts between the CEO and the board, the CEO resigned following poor performance, 
the CEO resigned or retired following an SEC investigation or class action lawsuit, or the CEO 
resigns without an outside job appointment within six months and the CEO is below the age of 
60. For 175 turnovers in the first group, 11 are forced turnovers and 147 are unforced turnovers. 
The other 17 turnovers are results of sudden CEO death, mergers/acquisitions or spin-offs. For 
185 turnovers in the fourth group, 36 are forced turnovers and 122 are unforced turnovers. The 
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other 27 turnovers are results of sudden CEO death, mergers/acquisitions or spin-offs. I exclude 
turnovers that are results of sudden CEO death, mergers/acquisitions. The findings are similar to 
the results on all turnovers. For CEOs that have worked for only one firm, the average CAR is 
negative and statistically significant for the forced turnover subsample. When the firm dismisses 
their CEOs, shareholders anticipate a change in the firm’s strategy. The fact that the firm 
appoints a new CEO who has only worked in the current firm suggests a lower probability of 
changing in current policies or a lack of CEO candidates. In either case, one would expect the 
stock market to react negatively. On the other hand, investors react positively when the new 
CEO makes more employer changes. The positive stock price reaction holds for both forced 
turnovers and normal successions and for insider and outsider successions.  
When the firm’s prior performance is poor, shareholders would likely expect the firm to hire 
a CEO to change the firm’s prior policies. I separate the CEO turnover sample into two groups 
based on whether their firms’ prior stock returns are above or below the industry median. In 
Table 17, when the firm has good prior performance, the CARs are not statistically different 
from zero for firms that appoint a non-mobile CEO and firms that appoint a mobile CEO. 
However, the percentage of firms with negative CARs is higher in the sample of firms that 
appoint a mobile CEO as the new CEO. When the firm’s prior performance is below industry 
median, shareholders react positively when the firm appoints a mobile CEO and negatively when 
the firm appoints a CEO that has only worked for the current firm. The positive shareholder 
reaction for mobile CEOs is robust for both insider- and outsider- successions. The results 
support the argument that shareholders react positively for the appointment of a mobile CEO 
when the firm has a need to change its prior policies.  
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The results from the event study provide evidence that shareholders view the appointment of 
a CEO that changes employers multiple times as a positive signal for the firm’s future. This 
result has two possible interpretations. One interpretation is that shareholders react positively 
when the new CEO is less risk averse, which reduces agency costs created by differences in 
attitudes toward risk between shareholders and managers. Another explanation is that 
shareholders react positively because they believe CEOs who worked for multiple firms differ in 
other characteristics, such as education, age, and functional backgrounds. To separate these two 
effects, I regress the announcement CARs on CEO employment history and other CEO 
characteristics. I also include firm size, prior performance, year dummies and industry dummies 
as additional control variables.  
The results from the cross-sectional CARs’ regressions are presented in Table 18. The 
dependent variable in Table 18 is the cumulative abnormal return based on the event window of 
[-3, 1]. I use weighted least square (WLS) to estimate the coefficients. The weights in WLS are 
the inverse of the standard deviation of the market model residuals. #Employers relates 
positively to the CARs, but this relation is not statistically significant at the conventional level. 
To control for the possibility that the relation between #Employers and CARs are not strictly 
monotonic, I then substitute #Employers by the quartile rank based on #Employers. The top 
quartile, CEOs that have worked for at least five employers, has a quartile rank value of 4. The 
bottom quartile, which includes CEOs that have worked for only one employer, has a quartile 
rank value of 1. The coefficient on the quartile rank is positive and statistically significant. None 
of the other CEO characteristics appear to relate to the CARs. This finding suggests that the 
positive shareholder reaction obtained in event studies are driven by the CEO’s employment 
history, not by other CEO characteristics. The CARs relate negatively to the firm’s prior 
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performance. I repeat the CARs regression in the subsample of insider successions and obtain 
similar results. Forced turnovers, however, are associated with negative CARs in the insider 
subsample. Because CEOs with no employer change are all insiders, this finding is consistent 
with the event study result that shareholders react negatively to the appointment of CEOs with no 
employer change when the turnover is forced. 
 
6.2 Long Run Accounting and Stock Performance 
In this section, I examine whether CEOs who change employers more perform differently 
than CEOs with fewer employer changes. As in event studies, I separate CEOs into four groups 
based on the quartiles of the number of employers they have worked for. The first group has 
CEOs that have only worked for one employer and the fourth group includes CEOs that have 
worked for at least five employers. I present the changes in industry-median-adjusted 
performance from a year before the CEO turnover to three years after the CEO turnover. 
Differences in changes in performance between group 1 and group 4 are included at the right 
side of the table. The statistical significances are based on p-values from t-tests for differences in 
means and from non-parametric signed rank test for differences in distribution. Appendix A 
includes the construction for the five performance variables. Table 1 presents summary statistics 
for these performance variables. The average (median) return on equity for my sample is 0.130 
(0.130). Industry-median-adjusted ROE has a mean of 0.064 and a median of 0.050. The average 
(median) operating return on assets is 0.100 (0.100) and industry-median-adjusted values are 
0.060 (0.041). Annual stock returns and industry-median-adjusted annual stock returns have 
means of 10.4% and 8.2%, respectively. Industry medians are computed on the basis of Fama 
and French 48 industry as described in Fama and French (1997).  
56   
  
Table 19 presents results for industry-median-adjusted performance changes from the year 
before the year of CEO turnover to three years after CEO turnover. To test my hypotheses, I 
focus on the differences in changes in performance between group 1 and group 4. Group 1 
includes CEOs who have worked for only one employer and group 4 includes CEOs who have 
worked for at least five employers. From the year before the CEO turnover to a year after the 
CEO turnover (t=-1 to t=1), there are no difference between group 1 and group 4 in OROA, 
ROE, and Tobin’s Q. However, CEOs that have worked for at least five employers increase 
annual stock returns more than CEOs who have worked for only one employer. This result holds 
when changes in performance are measured from the year before CEO turnover to two years 
after CEO turnovers (t=-1 to t=2). In the third year after CEO turnovers, there is no difference in 
changes in stock returns. CEOs who have worked for at least five employers have better sales 
growth than CEOs who have worked for only one employer for all three years after the year of 
CEO turnover. The difference is statistically significant for the third year after the CEO turnover. 
Risky firm policies should result in greater variance in outcome. I test whether the cross-
sectional variance in firm performance is greater for the group of CEOs who have worked for at 
least five employers than the group of CEOs who have worked for only one firm. I present p-
values from the F-test on the equality of variances in the last column of Table 19. Except for 
sales growth in the second year, cross-sectional variance in firm performance is consistently 
higher for the group of CEOs who have worked for at least five firms. I next study variances of 
these performance variables for all post-turnover firm years. Panel B of Table 19 presents p-
values from the Levene's Test for homogeneity of variance. Consistent with the findings in Panel 
A, the variance in performance is different for CEOs that have worked for different numbers of 
employers. The group of CEOs that have worked for at least five firms have much higher 
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variance in their performance measures than the group of CEOs that have only worked for one 
employer.  
In sum, CEOs with more employer changes have better sales growth and stock performance 
than CEOs with no employer change. However, there are no differences in accounting 
performance for CEOs with different numbers of employer changes. CEOs that change 
employers more also have higher volatility in their performance. 
 
7 Impact on Bondholders 
Results from the analysis on firm policies, risk and performance suggest that mobile CEOs 
implement riskier firm policies and increase a firm’s idiosyncratic risk. Shareholder reacts 
positively to the appointments of mobile CEOs, but the overall accounting performances are not 
different for CEOs with different numbers of employer changes. These findings merit a question:  
Is there a wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders? If the answer is yes, one would 
expect bondholders to react negatively to the appointments of mobile CEOs and the firm’s cost 
of debt should increase after the firm hires a mobile CEO. In section 7.1, I examine bondholders’ 
reaction to appointments of mobile CEOs using the bond trading data from Mergent Fixed 
Income Securities Database (FISD). In section 7.2, I examine how costs of debt change for firms 
that hire mobile CEOs. 
7.1 Event Study for Bondholders 
Mergent FISD database has a bond transaction dataset that includes daily bond transactions 
from 1995 to 2005 by insurance firms reported in Schedule D of the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) regulatory filings. For 837 turnovers in my sample that 
happen between 1995 and 2005, 588 of them have transaction data in Mergent’s bond transaction 
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database. After excluding bonds that have variable rates, are putable or convertible, the fixed 
coupon bond sample contains 449 firms. I follow Maxwell and Stephens (2003) to calculate 
abnormal bond returns around CEO turnover announcements. To be included in the event study 
for bondholders, I require a bond to have transaction data for the month of the CEO turnover 
(232 firms dropped) and for four months prior to the CEO turnover (96 firms dropped). This 
requirement reduced the sample from 449 firms to only 121 firms.  
Monthly bond returns are calculated as price plus accrued interest. If there are multiple 
transactions for a given bond in a given month, I calculate a monthly value-weighted average 
bond return using the par amounts of each transaction as weights.  To account for changes in 
term structure, I calculated monthly bond return premium as the bond’s monthly return minus the 
return on a Treasury security with a closest time to maturity.  I then compute the mean expected 
bond return premium as the average monthly bond return premium for months -4 to -2. Month -4 
is the fourth month prior to the CEO turnover month and month -2 is the second month prior to 
the CEO turnover month. The abnormal monthly bond returns are then computed as the 
difference between the actual and the expected bond return premiums. If there is more than one 
bond outstanding for a firm, I compute a weighted-average abnormal return on bonds for the firm 
using outstanding par values for each bond as weights.  
Table 20 presents results on announcement bond returns. In additional to abnormal bond 
return premiums, I also report abnormal yield to maturity, abnormal spread, and abnormal bond 
returns. Out of the 121 turnovers, 34 firms hire CEOs that have worked for only one employer 
and 24 firms hire CEOs that have worked for at least five employers. Consistent with my 
hypothesis, bondholders react negatively when the firm appoints a mobile CEO and positively 
when the firm appoints a CEO that has never changed employers. However, these differences are 
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not statistically significant. The signs from the event study for bondholders are consistent with 
my hypothesis, but the small sample size limits my ability to draw strong conclusions.  
 
7.2 Impact on the Cost of Debt 
I next examine how the cost of debt changes after a firm appoints a mobile CEO. I measure a 
firm’s cost of debt using the fiscal-year-end bond yield spread and the S&P long-term bond 
rating. Bond yield spreads are estimated from the Mergent’s bond transaction database. S&P 
long-term debt rating is from the Compustat Fundamental Annual database. I present summary 
statistics for these two variables in 7.2.1. I report results on bond yield spread in Section 7.2.2 
and results on credit rating in Section 7.2.3. 
7.2.1 Summary Statistics for the Cost of Debt Variables 
I follow a standard procedure in the literature (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003, Elton et al. 2001, 
and Prevost et al. 2008) to estimate a bond’s yield spread. Based on the Mergent’s bond 
transaction database, I first identify a bond transaction date that is closest to the firm’s fiscal year 
end. I then calculate the yield to maturity for every bond transaction price on that date. I estimate 
the yield spread for a bond as the bond’s yield to maturity minus the yield to maturity on a 
Treasury security with the closest time to maturity. If there are multiple transactions for a given 
bond in a given day, I calculate a daily value-weighted average yield spread using the par 
amounts of each transaction as weights. I follow the same procedure to compute bond duration 
and convexity. To be included in the bond spread analysis, the firm must have bond yield data 
for the year prior to the year of CEO turnover. The final sample for bond yield study includes 
210 firms and 718 firm years.  
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Standard & Poor’s rates a firm’s long-term debt from D (the lowest grade) to AAA (the 
highest grade). I translate rating letters into numbers with AAA represents 1 and D represents 19. 
After excluding firms with negative book equity, the lowest rating in my sample is 16 (B-). Out 
of the original 5,139 firm years, 2,866 firm years have bond rating data. After requiring the firm 
to have bond rating data in the year prior to the year of CEO turnover, the sample size for bond 
rating analysis reduces to 1,998 firm years.  
Table 21 presents summary statistics for bond spread and rating variables. The average bond 
rating for 1,998 firm years are 8.6 and the median bond rating is 9 (BBB). The average (median) 
bond spread for 718 firm years is 0.022 (0.015). I present a distribution of the sample firms in 
different rating categories in Panel B of Table 21. All my sample firms have a rating above B-. 
About 69% of my sample firms have investment grade (BBB-) and above.  
7.2.2 CEO Employment History and Bond yield Spread 
To examine the impact of CEO employment history on a firm’s cost of debt, I use IV/2SLS 
estimation approach to estimate the following model: 
Bond Yield Spread= b1CEO Employment History Proxy+ b2Pre-turnover Yield Spread + b3Duration + 
                                      b3Convexity + b4Firm Control Variables + b3 CEO Control Variables   + Industry         
                             Dummies + Year Dummies + e                                                         (3) 
In addition to the control variables used in firm policy analysis, I also include bond duration 
and convexity as additional controls for bond structure. 
 Instrumental variables are the same as those in firm policy analysis. Table 22 present 
regression results on bond yield spreads. The coefficients on #Employers, #Employers per year, 
and Employer Change Recency are positive. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% 
level for #Employers. Firm and Industry Experience Diversification relate negatively to yield 
spreads. The coefficient on Industry Experience Diversification is statistically significant at the 
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10% level. If the firm’s bond rating is already low, the new CEO would be less likely to further 
increase the firm’s financial risk. I repeat the analysis for a subsample of firms with crediting 
rating at BBB- and above. Results, in Panel B of Table 22, are stronger than those reported for 
the whole sample. Coefficients on the five employment history variables are all statistically 
significant at the 10% level. These findings are consistent with the argument that the cost of debt 
increases after the firm appoints a mobile CEO.  
7.2.3 CEO Employment History and Credit Rating 
To examine the relation between CEO employment history and the change in a firm’s credit 
rating, I estimation the following model: 
S&P Credit Rating =  b1CEO Employment History Proxy+ b2Pre-turnover Credit Rating + b3Firm  
        Control Variables + b4 CEO Control Variables   + Industry and Year Dummies + e          (4) 
To support the hypothesis that mobile CEOs increase a firm’s cost of debt, I expect b1 to be 
positive when the CEO employment history is measured as #Employers, #Employers per year 
and Employer Change Recency and to be negative when the CEO employment history is 
measured as diversification levels of the CEO’s firm or industry experience. I present results on 
S&P credit ratings in Table 23. Coefficients on the five employment history variables all have 
the predicted signs, but none of these coefficients are statistically significant at the conventional 
levels.  
If a firm’s default risk is already significant, even a mobile CEO would be reluctant to further 
increase firm risk. Therefore, one would not expect mobile CEOs to downgrade bond rating for 
firms that already have a low bond rating. I repeat the bond rating regression in a subsample of 
firms with a rating of BBB- or above. Because agencies are slow to change a firm’s bond rating 
(e.g., Contor, 2001, and Baker and Mansi 2002), I also exclude observations from the first year 
after a CEO turnover in the analysis. Panel B of Table 23 present results for this subsample. 
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CEOs that change employers more frequently and have more diversified experience increase the 
credit rating number, which implies that these CEOs decrease their firms’ bond ratings. This 
result is consistent with the proposition that mobile CEOs increase the firm’s cost of debt. 
However, how diversified is the CEO’s industry experience does not influence the firm’s bond 
rating.  
In summary, the analysis on bondholders indicates that the cost of debt increases after a firm 
hires a mobile CEO, especially for firms with investment-grade bond ratings. The findings that 
mobile CEOs increase financial leverage, firm-specific risk, shareholders’ wealth, and the cost of 
debt suggest that the risk-shifting from shareholders to bondholders is one source of shareholder 
value increase.  
 
8 Conclusion 
In the announcements of CEO appointments, firms often give a detailed employment history 
of the new CEO, which suggests that employment history conveys useful information to 
shareholders. I argue that CEO employment history reflects a CEO’s propensity to bear risk and 
hypothesize that CEOs who change employers more frequently and have more diversified firm 
or industry experience implement riskier firm policies.  
Using a sample of S&P 1500 CEOs, I find that when firm risk is high, firm-specific human 
capital is less important, the board is smaller and has fewer insiders, the prior CEO was 
dismissed and the prior CEO has a shorter tenure, firms hire mobile CEOs that change employers 
more and have more diversified experience. The firm is more likely to hire a CEO with 
diversified industry experience when the firm experiences negative industry or firm-level shocks 
prior to the CEO turnover. Mobile CEOs increase financial leverage, invest more in advertising 
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and less in capital expenditures. They also invest more in R&D in homogenous industries where 
the firm-specific knowledge is less important and invest less in R&D in less homogenous 
industries where the firm-specific knowledge is more important. As a result of riskier firm 
policies, mobile CEOs increase the firm’s total risk. But the increase in the firm’s total risk 
comes from increase in firm-specific risk, not market risk.  
I also find that stockholders react positively to appointments of CEOs who have changed 
employers multiple times. For the appointments of CEOs with no employer change, the turnover 
announcement returns are negative for forced turnovers and not different from zero for unforced 
turnovers. Shareholders also react positively to appointments of mobile CEOs when the firm’s 
prior performance is poor. CEOs who have worked for at least five employers also achieve better 
long-run stock performance and higher sales growth for their firms. However, for three years 
following the CEO turnover, I find no difference in accounting performance for CEOs with 
different employment histories. Taken together, these results suggest that lower CEO risk 
aversion and the potential risk-shifting from shareholders to bondholders are sources of 
shareholder value increases. In support of the risk-shifting argument, I find mobile CEOs 
increase their firm’s cost of debt, especially in firms with low default risk.  
My results provide evidence that CEO employment history relates to risk-taking in firm 
policies. This paper adds to a growing literature that finds evidence on how managerial styles 
and risk preferences affect firm policies and performance (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; 
Kaplan et al., 2008; Graham et al., 2008; Malmendier and Tate, 2005 and 2007). The results in 
this paper suggest that CEO employment history is an observable characteristic that reveals the 
risk-taking propensity of CEOs. This relation between risk-taking traits and employment history 
has implications for future research. For instance, can employment history help boards of 
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directors identify better CEO-firm matches? Or design better incentive compensation packages? 
The answers to these questions could provide additional useful information to both decision 
makers and researchers. 
65   
 
 
Appendix A&B: 
 
Appendix A: Variable Constructions for firm- and industry-level variables. 
 
Appendix B: Robustness Tables 
 
B.1 Alternative Model Specifications 
(1). Alternative Dependent Variables 
Table B.1.1: Use industry-median-adjusted policies as dependent variables 
Table B.1.2: Use change in policies as dependent variables  
Table B.1.3: Use Book Leverage as the dependent variable 
Table B.1.4: Use Intangible Ratio as the dependent variable 
 Table B.1.5: Use Four-factor model betas as dependent variables 
(2). Alternative CEO Employment History Measures 
Table B.1.6: Using values in the year of CEO turnover for CEO employment history 
measures (The values for these variables will not change for every firm year) 
Table B.1.7: Including an interaction term between CEO employment history and a 
dummy variable that equals one if the respective pre-turnover firm policy is above industry 
median. 
(3). Control Variables 
Table B.1.8: Subsample with Board Size and Insider Ratio Information 
Table B.1.9: Include a insider dummy 
Table B.1.10: Industry Dummies, no Herfindhal Index 
B.2 Alternative Estimation Methods 
Table B.2.1: OLS Results 
Table B.2.2: Between effects  
Table B.2.3: Heckman Selection Model when the dependent variable is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the CEO has worked for more than five employers and zero otherwise 
Table B.2.4: Subsamples of the first-five (three) years’ policy of CEOs that have been the 
CEO for five (three) or more years 
Table B.2.5: Comparison of long-run performance using a matched sample 
B.3 Results for other CEO employment history variables.  
These results are discussed in the text, but only presented for #Employer. This section 
include the results for other four CEO employment history variables 
 Table B.3.1: Univariate Comparison for Pre-turnover firm policies 
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Appendix A: Firm and Industry Variable Construction 
Firm Policies: 
• Leverage equals the book value of long-term debt (Compustat item 9) plus debt in current 
liabilities (Compustat item 34) divided by long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities plus the 
market value of equity (Compustat item 25*Compustat item 199). 
• R&D Intensity is the ratio of R&D expenditures (Compustat item 46) to total assets 
(Compustat item 6).  
• Advertising Intensity is measured as advertising expenses (Compustat item 45) divided 
by total assets (Compustat item 6). 
• Capital Expenditures, CAPEX, is defined as capital expenditure (Compustat item 128) 
divided by total assets (Compustat item 6).   
• Total Risk is the standard deviation of daily stock returns multiplied by the square root of 
254 trading days. 
• Firm-specific risk (Market) is measured as the annualized standard deviation of the 
residuals from a market model regression of daily returns on the CRSP value-weighted index 
multiplied by 2541/2. To compute this firm-specific risk measure, I require a firm to have at least 
30 days of returns for that fiscal year. 
• Firm specific risk (FF+Momentum) is the annualized standard deviation of the residuals 
from a regression of daily stock returns on the three Fama-French factors plus a momentum 
factor. 
• Market risk is the beta on the market index from the market model regression used to 
obtain firm-specific risk (Market). 
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Executive Compensation Variables: 
• CEO Current Compensation is computed as salary plus bonus divided by total 
compensation (Execucomp item tdc2) 
• CEO Compensation Delta is the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth with respect to a 1% 
change in stock price. CEO’s portfolio Delta is computed as the weighted average of the delta of 
the CEO’s stock and the delta of CEO’s options. Delta of the CEO’s stock = %Shareowned by 
the CEO*0.01*stock price. Delta of a CEO’s options is computed as in Core and Guay (2002), 
Guay (1999), and Coles et al. (2006).  
• CEO Compensation Vega is defined as the sensitivity of the option value with respect to 
a 0.01 change in stock volatility. I use a CEO’s option Vega as the CEO’s portfolio Vega. A 
CEO’s option Vega = Vega of new options granted + Vega of all exercisable options held + 
Vega of all unexercised options held.  Each individual Vega in the equation is computed as in 
Core and Guay (2002), Guay (1999), and Coles et al. (2006). Risk free rate used in Vega and 
Delta computation is from the ten-year treasury bills constant maturity series available from the 
Federal Reserve Bank’s official website. My results are robust if I use the rates of five-year or 
seven-year treasury bills as the risk free rates. 
 
Cost of Debt Variables: 
• S&P Credit Rating: S&P long-term debt rating is from the Compustat Fundamental 
Annual database. I translate rating letters into numbers as follows: 
S&P Credit Rating Letter Rating 
AAA 1 
AA+ 2 
AA 3 
AA- 4 
A+ 5 
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A 6 
A- 7 
BBB+ 8 
BBB 9 
BBB- 10 
BB+ 11 
BB 12 
BB- 13 
B+ 14 
B 15 
B- 16 
CCC+ 17 
CC 18 
D 19 
 
• Bond Yield Spread is the bond’s yield to maturity minus the yield to maturity on a 
Treasury security with a closest time to maturity. To compute a bond’s yield to maturity, I first 
identify a bond transaction date that is closest to the firm’s fiscal year end. I then calculate the 
yield to maturity for every bond transaction price on that date. If there are multiple transactions 
for a given bond in a given day, I calculate a daily value-weighted average yield spread using the 
par amounts of each transaction as weights. 
 
Firm Performance Variables: 
• Operating Return on Assets (OROA) is the ratio of operating income before deprecation 
and amortization (Compustat item 18 + Compustat item 14) divided by total assets (Compustat 
item 6). 
• Tobin’s Q is defined as total assets (Compustat item 6) plus the market value of 
shareholders’ equity (Compustat item 25*Compustat item 199) subtract the book value of 
shareholders’ equity (Compustat item 60) divided by total assets (Compustat item 6). 
72   
 
 
• Annual Stock Return is computed as the closing price at the end of the year (Compustat 
item 199) divided by the closing price at the end of the previous year subtracts one. 
• Return on Equity is computed as income available to common shareholders divided by 
book equity (Compustat item 60). Income available to common shareholders = Income before 
extraordinary items (Compustat item 18) – Preferred dividends (Compustat item 19) + Deferred 
Taxes (Compustat item 50) if available. 
• Sales growth is computed as current year’s sales divided by last year’s sales less one. 
• Industry median adjusted performances are computed as the firm’s performance measures 
subtract the corresponding industry medians. Industry classification is based on 48 Fama and 
French industries described in Fama and French (1997). 
 
Other Firm Variables: 
• Firm Age is the total number of years since the firm was founded. I obtain Firm Age from 
the Corporate Library database and fill the missing data by searching on the internet. 
• Firm Size is the natural log of total sales (Compustat item 12). 
• Activist Institutional Ownership is the ownership of the 18 activist institutional 
shareholders listed in Cremers and Nair (2005). 
• Pay directors equity-based compensation (0/1) equals one if the firm pays director equity-
based compensation and zero otherwise. 
• Capital Intensity is measured as the net value of property, plant and equipment 
(Compustat Item 8) divided by total assets (Compustat Item 6).  
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• Surplus Cash is computed as cash from assets-in-place to total assets. Cash from assets-
in-place is measured as net cash flow from operating activities (Compustat Item 308) subtracts 
depreciation and amortization (Compustat Item 125) plus R&D expense (Compustat Item 46). 
• Depreciation Ratio is defined as depreciation (Compustat Item 14) over total assets 
(Compustat Item 6). 
 
Industry Variables: 
• Industry Homogeneity is computed as in Parrino (1997). First, I create an equally 
weighted return index for the 2-digit SIC industry using CRSP monthly returns and regress the 
monthly return for each firm in the index on the equally weighted market index and industry 
index. Then, I take the partial correlation coefficient for the industry return index and average it 
across all firms in the industry to obtain the industry homogeneity proxy. I require a minimum of 
20 firms in a 2-digit SIC code. 
• Industry Concentration (Herfindahl Index) is defined as the sum of squared market share 
of each firm in that industry. Industry classification is based on 48 Fama and French industries 
described in Fama and French (1997). 
All industry level variables are computed on the basis of all Compustat firms. 
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Figure 1. Industry Distribution and the Number of Employers  
Figure 1 (a). Industry Distribution of CEOs (#Employer=1) and CEOs (#Employer>=5) 
This graph presents how CEOs that have worked for one employer and CEOs that have worked for at least five employers distribute across different industries. 
 
 
Figure 1 (b). Within Industry Distribution of CEOs (#Employer=1) and CEOs (#Employer>=5) 
This graph presents, within each industry, the percentage of CEOs that have worked for one employer and the percentage of CEOs that have worked for at least 
five employers. 
 Figure 2. Time Panel Distribution and the Number of Employers 
 
 
Figure 2 (a). Time Panel Distribution of CEOs (#Employer=1) and CEOs (#Employer>=5) 
 
This graph presents how CEOs that have worked for one employer and CEOs that have worked for at least five 
employers distribute across different time panels. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 (b). Within Time Panel Distribution of CEOs (#Employer=1) and CEOs (#Employer>=5) 
 
This graph presents, within each time panel, the percentage of CEOs that have worked for one employer and the 
percentage of CEOs that have worked for at least five employers. 
 
  
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for CEO characteristic of 1,144 CEOs as of 2005. Details for sample selection 
are in Section 3. #Employers is the number of employers the CEO has worked for since his first full-time job. 
#Employers per year is the number of employers the CEO has worked for divided by the CEO’s career length. 
Employer Change Recency is measured as the sum of distance of each employer change to the current employment. 
Firm (Industry) Experience diversification is measured as the sum of squared career shares of each firm (industry) 
for which the CEO has worked. The career share of every firm (industry) is computed as the number of years the 
CEO has worked for the firm (industry) divided by the CEO’s career length. Founder dummy equals one if the CEO 
is the founder or from the founder’s family. CEO tenure is the number of years the person has been the CEO for the 
current firm. #Functional Areas is the number of functional areas the CEO had worked in before becoming CEO of 
the current firm. Finance dummy equals one if the CEO has worked in the finance area before becoming CEO.  
 
Panel A: CEO Characteristics 
Variables Obs. Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. 
CEO Employment History Proxies   
# Employers 1,144 3.225 3.000 11.000 1.000 1.818 
# Employer Changes per year 1,144 0.106 0.094 0.385 0.020 0.062 
Employer Change Recency 1,144 1.129 0.833 6.765 0.000 1.096 
Firm Experience Diversification 1,144 0.555 0.506 1.000 0.104 0.257 
Industry Experience Diversification 1,144 0.708 0.702 1.000 0.145 0.254 
       
CEO Characteristics       
# Funcational Areas 1,144 2.782 3 5 1 0.980 
MBA (0/1)(%) 1,144 35.58%     
Founder (0/1)(%) 1,144 18.62%     
Has Finance Background (0/1)(%) 1,144 22.90%     
CEO Age 1,144 55.613 56 90 36 7.302 
CEO Tenure 1,144 7.698 5 54 0 7.915 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Comparison of CEO Characteristics for CEOs that have worked for different numbers of employers 
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4  
  # Employers=1 # Employers = 2 # Employers=3, 4 # Employers>4 Q4-Q1 
 Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean  Med.  
MBA (0/1)(%) 26.92%   34.95%   35.70%   42.25%   15.32%***    
Founder (0/1)(%) 29.12%  22.01%  16.71%  10.08%  -19.04%***   
Has Fin. Bkgd. 
(0/1)(%) 17.03%  24.92%  21.27%  27.13%  10.10%**   
# Functional Areas 2.473 3 2.650 3 2.828 3 3.089 3 0.617*** 0***
CEO Age 55.604 55 55.437 56 55.177 55 56.628 56 1.024 1 
CEO Tenure 8.967 6 9.578 7 8.733 6 7.574 5.5 -1.393* -1.5** 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Firm Policies in the Year Prior to CEO Turnover 
 
This table presents summary statistics for 714 CEOs and their firm policies in the year prior to the year of CEO 
turnover. Details for sample selection are in Section 4.1. #Employers is the number of employers the CEO has 
worked for since his first full-time job. #Employers per year is the number of employers the CEO has worked for 
divided by the CEO’s career length. Employer Change Recency is measured as the sum of squared distance of each 
employer change to the current employment. Firm (Industry) Experience diversification is measured as the sum of 
squared career shares of each firm (industry) for which the CEO has worked. The career share of every firm 
(industry) is computed as the number of years the CEO has worked for the firm (industry) divided by the CEO’s 
career length. Prior CEO tenure is the number of years the prior CEO has been the CEO for the firm. Prior CEO Is 
Chairman (0/1) dummy equals one if the prior CEO was also the chairman of the boar. Board Size is the number of 
board directors in the firm. Board Insiders (%) is the percentage of insiders in the board. Positive (Negative) 
Industry Shock dummy equals one if the total sales in the firm’s industry increase (decrease) 10% or more. Positive 
(Negative) Firm Shock dummy equals one if the firm’s sales growth is 10% more (less) than the industry’s median 
sales growth. See Appendix A for firm and industry level variable definitions.  
 
Variables Obs. Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. 
Prior CEO Characteristics       
Prior CEO Tenure 714 8.926 7 50 0 8.602 
Prior CEO Is Chairman (0/1) (%) 714 74.93%     
Forced Turnover (0/1) (%) 714 13.59%     
       
Current CEO Employment History in the year of Turnover  
# Employers 714 3.190 3 11 1 1.816 
# Employer Changes per year 714 0.121 0.108 0.417 0.023 0.070 
Employer Change Recency 714 1.308 1.000 6.935 0 1.195 
Firm Experience Diversification 714 0.569 0.513 1 0.104 0.264 
Industry Experience Diversification 714 0.706 0.692 1 0.157 0.256 
       
Firm Policies in the year prior to CEO turnover   
Leverage 714 0.194 0.153 0.768 0.000 0.183 
R&D Expenditures/Total Assets 714 0.030 0.005 0.250 0.000 0.048 
Advertising/Total Assets 714 0.013 0.000 0.170 0.000 0.030 
Capital Expenditure 706 0.058 0.046 0.287 0.004 0.048 
Total Risk (Daily Stock Return Std.) 714 0.452 0.404 1.098 0.153 0.191 
Firm Specific Risk (CAPM) 714 0.410 0.366 1.007 0.133 0.177 
Firm Specific Risk (Four Factor) 714 0.395 0.351 1.096 0.103 0.171 
Market Risk (CAPM) 714 0.989 0.897 2.674 0.033 0.556 
       
Other Firm Control Variables in the year prior to CEO turnover 
ln(Sales) 714 7.457 7.330 12.170 2.622 1.507 
Firm Age 714 57.122 47 164 3 39.252 
Herfindhal Index 714 0.064 0.045 0.830 0.011 0.080 
Industry Homogeneity 694 0.193 0.169 0.488 0.075 0.088 
Activist  Institutional Holding  714 0.029 0.026 0.092 0.000 0.014 
Pay director equity based 
compensation (0/1) (%) 714 79.97%     
Board Size 714 9.496 9 26 4 2.695 
Board Insiders (%) 714 26.20% 23.08% 88.89% 0.00% 13.66% 
       
 
       
  
 
Table 2 Continued.       
Variables Obs. Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std.
CEO Compensation Delta (M$) 714 0.576 0.211 6.394 0.000 1.069 
CEO Compensation Vega (M$) 714 0.238 0.086 2.497 0.000 0.416 
CEO Cash Compensation 714 0.627 0.687 1.000 0.021 0.323 
Operating Return on Assets (OROA) 714 0.090 0.096 0.316 -0.332 0.091 
Industry Median Adjusted OROA 714 0.059 0.044 0.457 -0.332 0.114 
Annual Stock Return (RET) 714 0.042 0.003 2.046 -0.729 0.460 
Ind. Med. Adj. Annual Stock Return 714 0.047 -0.006 1.974 -0.708 0.440 
Tobin's Q 714 2.125 1.617 8.727 0.785 1.503 
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q 714 0.540 0.155 6.671 -1.470 1.387 
Positive Industry Shock (0/1) (%) 714 36.69%     
Negative Industry Shock (0/1) (%) 714 7.14%     
Positive Firm Shock (%) 714 20.31%     
Negative Firm Shock (%) 714 22.13%     
 Table 3. Differences in Pre-turnover Firm Policies for CEOs that have worked for different numbers of employers 
 
This table presents differences in prior CEO characteristics and firm policies in the year prior to the year of CEO turnover for 714 CEOs in the CEO-firm match 
analysis. Refer to Tables 1 and 2 and Appendix A for variable definitions. Q1 includes CEOs in the bottom quartile and Q4 includes CEOs in the top quartile. 
Q4-Q1 is the difference in means (medians) between the top and the bottom quartiles. The differences in means and medians for the bottom and top quartiles are 
presented at the right side of the table. The statistical significance for difference in means is based on t-test and for difference in medians is based on the 
nonparametric signed rank test. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  # Employers=1 # Employers = 2 # Employers = 3,4 # Employers>=5 Q4-Q1
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean   Median   
Prior CEO Characteristics   
Prior CEO Tenure 11.455 7 9.973 8 8.221 7 6.851 5 -4.604 ** -2 **
Prior CEO Is Chairman 80.49%  80.65%  70.49%  70.81%  -9.68% *   
Forced Turnover 5.69%  8.60%  15.16%  22.98%  17.29% **   
Board Characteristics             
Board Insiders (%) 27.19% 25.00% 26.06% 23.08% 26.93% 25.00% 24.50% 20.00% -2.68% * -5.00% *
Board Size 10.894 11 9.651 9 9.029 9 8.957 9 -1.938 ** -2 **
Firm Characteristics             
Firm Size 7.989 7.838 7.556 7.467 7.145 7.044 7.153 6.871 -0.835 *** -0.967 **
Firm Age 75.724 79 54.097 44 53.082 40.5 52.528 40 -23.196 ** -39 **
Leverage 0.214 0.173 0.171 0.113 0.206 0.177 0.189 0.149 -0.026  -0.024 **
R&D Exp./Total Assets 0.020 0.004 0.031 0.007 0.031 0.006 0.036 0.003 0.016 *** 0.000  
Advertising/Total Assets 0.013 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.004  0.000  
Capital Expenditure 0.063 0.051 0.061 0.048 0.057 0.043 0.055 0.042 -0.008  -0.009 **
Operating Return on Assets 0.099 0.102 0.111 0.111 0.084 0.090 0.069 0.090 -0.031 *** -0.012 **
Industry Adjusted OROA 0.054 0.035 0.077 0.054 0.057 0.042 0.045 0.038 -0.009  0.003  
Annual Stock Return 0.045 0.044 0.098 0.052 0.040 -0.040 -0.022 -0.053 -0.068  -0.097 **
Ind. Med. Adj. Ann. Stock. Ret. 0.064 0.035 0.076 0.036 0.046 -0.033 0.000 -0.075 -0.064  -0.111 **
Firm Risk Measures             
Total Risk (Daily Stock Std.) 0.374 0.346 0.429 0.387 0.477 0.435 0.501 0.450 0.128 *** 0.104 **
Market Risk 0.807 0.769 1.000 0.917 0.997 0.906 1.103 0.980 0.296 *** 0.211 **
Firm Specific Risk (CAPM) 0.339 0.314 0.385 0.357 0.436 0.386 0.452 0.399 0.113 *** 0.085 **
Firm Specific Risk (4 Factors) 0.328 0.305 0.371 0.338 0.420 0.373 0.437 0.382 0.110 *** 0.077 **
Shocks             
Positive Industry Shock (%) 33.33%  39.78%  40.57%  29.81%  -3.52%    
Negative Industry Shock (%) 7.32%  7.53%  6.97%  6.83%  -0.48%    
Industry Shocks (0/1) (%) 40.65%  47.31%  47.54%  36.65%  -4.00%    
Positive Firm Shock (0/1) (%) 16.26%  18.82%  22.54%  21.74%  5.48%    
Negative Firm Shock (0/1) (%) 14.63%  19.89%  22.54%  29.81%  15.18% **   
Firm Shocks (0/1) (%) 30.89%   38.71%   45.08%   51.55%   20.66% **   
 Table 4. The CEO-Firm Match 
 
This table presents OLS results for the CEO-firm match for 714 CEO turnovers. Details for the CEO turnover 
sample are in Section 4.1. The dependent variables are listed at the top of each column. Refer to Tables 1 and 2 and 
Appendix A for variable definitions. I report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 # Employers 
# Employer 
Changes  
per year 
Firm 
Experience 
Recency 
Firm 
Experience 
Diversification 
Industry 
Experience 
Diversification 
Firm Characteristics in the year prior to CEO turnover 
Total Risk (Daily Stock 
Return Std.) 
1.491*** 0.050*** 1.008*** -0.070 -0.034 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.333) (0.635) 
Leverage -0.007 0.002 0.071 -0.001 0.022 
 (0.987) (0.892) (0.804) (0.989) (0.731) 
ln(Total Sales) -0.163*** -0.008*** -0.077* 0.026*** 0.014 
 (0.009) (0.001) (0.061) (0.005) (0.119) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.138 -0.006* -0.148** 0.043*** 0.024 
 (0.156) (0.086) (0.021) (0.003) (0.103) 
Ind. Median Adjusted OROA -0.281 -0.012 -0.359 0.029 0.125 
 (0.667) (0.624) (0.404) (0.768) (0.197) 
Ind. Median Adj. Stock Ret. -0.122 -0.004 -0.227** 0.003 0.037 
 (0.430) (0.452) (0.026) (0.890) (0.102) 
Tobin's Q 0.019 0.000 0.008 -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.745) (0.880) (0.828) (0.519) (0.419) 
R&D Exp./Total Assets -3.174** -0.109* -1.865* 0.590** 0.295 
 (0.045) (0.065) (0.073) (0.012) (0.208) 
CEO Cash Compensation 0.164 0.001 0.203 -0.006 -0.026 
 (0.437) (0.916) (0.145) (0.836) (0.412) 
Compensation Delta 0.088 0.004 0.046 -0.012 -0.014 
 (0.301) (0.233) (0.416) (0.355) (0.268) 
Compensation Vega -0.054 0.001 -0.075 -0.006 -0.009 
 (0.818) (0.950) (0.624) (0.852) (0.793) 
Herfindhal Index -0.596 -0.017 -0.121 0.202* -0.045 
 (0.457) (0.567) (0.819) (0.090) (0.708) 
Negative Ind. Shocks (0/1) 0.234 0.009 0.110 -0.038 -0.056* 
 (0.235) (0.225) (0.397) (0.193) (0.056) 
Board Characteristics at the year prior to CEO turnover 
Board Size -0.071** -0.002* -0.056*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 
 (0.023) (0.053) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) 
Pay directors equity based 0.195 0.008 0.071 -0.031 -0.017 
 (0.252) (0.192) (0.527) (0.215) (0.492) 
Insider Directors (%) -1.259** -0.038* -1.152*** 0.151* 0.239*** 
 (0.019) (0.060) (0.001) (0.057) (0.002) 
Act. Institutional Holding (%) -6.760 -0.259 -3.395 1.342* 0.894 
 (0.176) (0.163) (0.303) (0.068) (0.223) 
Prior CEO Characteristics      
Prior CEO is Chairman (0/1) -0.112 -0.004 -0.058 -0.007 0.011 
 (0.472) (0.489) (0.569) (0.760) (0.637) 
Prior CEO Tenure -0.015* -0.001* -0.012** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.074) (0.084) (0.035) (0.129) (0.117) 
Forced Turnover (0/1) 0.689*** 0.024*** 0.503*** -0.033 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.241) (0.952) 
      
      
  
 
Table 4 Continued.      
Current CEO Characteristics      
CEO Age 1.990*** -0.128*** 1.150*** -0.230*** -0.195*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.008) 
MBA (0/1) 0.230* 0.010** 0.148* -0.034* -0.034* 
 (0.077) (0.031) (0.084) (0.075) (0.079) 
Founder (0/1) -0.705*** -0.028*** -0.575*** 0.128*** 0.060 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.117) 
# Functional Areas 0.266*** 0.009*** 0.126*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Has Finance Background (0/1) 0.291** 0.010* 0.103 -0.060*** -0.102*** 
 (0.049) (0.061) (0.290) (0.006) (0.000) 
Constant -3.278 0.674*** -2.080 1.087*** 1.159*** 
 (0.118) (0.000) (0.132) (0.001) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 714 714 714 714 714 
R-squared 0.229 0.272 0.245 0.200 0.157 
      
 Table 5. Summary Statistics for Post-turnover Firm Characteristics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for CEO and firm characteristic of 917 CEOs and 5,139 post-turnover firm 
years from 1992 to 2007. Details for sample selection are in Section 3. #Employers is the number of employers the 
CEO has worked for since his first full-time job. #Employers per year is the number of employers the CEO has 
worked for divided by the CEO’s career length. Employer Change Recency is measured as the sum of squared 
distance of each employer change to the current employment. Firm (Industry) Experience diversification is 
measured as the sum of squared career shares of each firm (industry) for which the CEO has worked. The career 
share of every firm (industry) is computed as the number of years the CEO has worked for the firm (industry) 
divided by the CEO’s career length. CEO tenure is the number of years the person has been the CEO for the current 
firm. Panel A presents summary statistics for CEO characteristics and Panel B presents summary statistics for firm 
characteristics. Panel C presents the correlations between the five CEO employment history proxies. See Appendix 
A for firm and industry level variable definitions. All firm-level variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  
 
Panel A: CEO Characteristics 
Variables Obs. Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. 
CEO Employment History Proxies   
# Employers 5,139 2.981 3 11 1 1.772 
# Employer Changes per year 5,139 0.100 0.087 0.400 0.021 0.060 
Employer Change Recency 5,139 1.017 0.724 6.875 0.000 1.065 
Firm Experience Diversification 5,139 0.580 0.528 1.000 0.099 0.272 
Industry Experience Diversification 5,139 0.715 0.715 1.000 0.144 0.257 
       
CEO Characteristics       
# Functional Areas 5,139 2.728 3 5 0 0.945 
MBA (0/1)(%) 5,139 36.31%         
Founder (0/1)(%) 5,139 13.87%         
Has Finance Background (0/1)(%) 5,139 24.30%         
CEO Age 5,139 53.845 54 87 34 6.888 
CEO Tenure 5,139 5.766 4 44 0 5.015 
 
 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Variables Obs. Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. 
Firm Policies       
Leverage 5,139 0.177 0.138 0.768 0.000 0.168 
Net Capital Expenditure 5,139 0.029 0.002 0.250 0.000 0.049 
R&D Expenditures/Total Assets 5,139 0.013 0.000 0.170 0.000 0.027 
Advertising/Total Assets 5,126 0.054 0.039 0.287 0.004 0.048 
Total risk (Daily Stock Return Std.) 5,113 0.384 0.346 1.098 0.153 0.171 
Firm-specific Risk (CAPM) 5,113 0.343 0.305 1.007 0.133 0.159 
Firm-specific Risk (Four Factor) 5,113 0.330 0.293 1.367 0.085 0.156 
Market Risk (CAPM) 5,113 1.087 1.019 2.674 0.033 0.522 
  
 
Table 5 Continued. 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics (Continued)  
Variables Obs. Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. 
Other Firm and CEO Control Variables      
ln(Sales) 5,139 7.481 7.366 12.716 1.800 1.521 
Firm Age 5,139 58.709 50 164 3 38.354 
Capital Intensity 5,139 0.283 0.220 0.884 0.016 0.216 
Herfindhal Index 5,139 0.060 0.047 0.830 0.011 0.064 
Industry Homogeneity 4,912 0.206 0.175 0.488 0.075 0.098 
Activist  Institutional Holding  5,139 0.030 0.028 0.092 0.000 0.013 
Depreciation/Total Assets 5,139 0.043 0.039 0.144 0.006 0.024 
Surplus Cash 5,074 0.093 0.079 0.927 -0.639 0.091 
Pay director equity based 
compensation (%) 5,139 69.20% 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.462 
CEO Compensation Delta (M$) 5,139 0.535 0.205 6.394 0.000 0.987 
CEO Compensation Vega (M$) 5,139 0.281 0.109 2.497 0.000 0.465 
CEO Cash Compensation 5,139 0.547 0.534 1.000 0.021 0.325 
       
Firm Performance       
Return on Equity (ROE) 5,139 0.129 0.130 1.418 -1.198 0.229 
Industry Median Adjusted ROE 5,139 0.064 0.050 1.305 -1.244 0.229 
Operating Return on Assets (ROA) 5,139 0.100 0.100 0.316 -0.332 0.076 
Industry Median Adjusted OROA 5,139 0.060 0.041 0.457 -0.332 0.104 
Annual Stock Return (RET) 5,139 0.104 0.056 2.046 -0.729 0.420 
Industry Median Adjusted RET 5,139 0.083 0.030 1.974 -0.708 0.397 
Sales Growth 5,139 0.124 0.092 1.285 -0.441 0.215 
Industry Median Adjusted Sales 
Growth 5,139 0.025 0.000 1.148 -0.503 0.200 
Tobin’s Q 5,139 2.018 1.630 8.727 0.785 1.240 
Industry Median Adjusted Q 5,139 0.374 0.065 6.671 -1.470 1.148 
 
 
Panel C. Correlations for CEO Employment History Variables (5,139 Obs) 
 
 # Employers 
# Employer  
Changes per year 
Employer  
Change Recency 
Firm Exp.  
Diversification 
# Employers 1    
# Employer Changes per year 0.834 1   
Employer Change Recency 0.893 0.776 1  
Firm Exp. Diversification -0.820 -0.713 -0.757 1 
Industry Exp. Diversification -0.623 -0.533 -0.568 0.718 
 Table 6. Differences in Post-turnover Firm Policies for CEOs with different employment histories 
 
This table presents differences in post-turnover firm policies for CEOs that have worked for different numbers of employers. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A 
for variable definitions. Q1 includes CEOs in the bottom quartile and Q4 includes CEOs in the top quartile. Q4-Q1 is the difference in means (medians) between 
the top and the bottom quartiles. Panel A presents differences in post-turnover firm policies. Panel B presents differences in industry-median-adjusted changes in 
firm policies when firm policies prior to the CEO turnover are lower than the corresponding industry medians. Panel C presents differences in industry-median-
adjusted changes in firm policies when firm policies prior to the CEO turnover are higher than the corresponding industry medians. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Differences in Post-Turnover Firm Policies  
  # Employers=1 # Employers = 2 # Employers = 3, 4 # Employers>=5 Q4-Q1 
 Obs. Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median  
Market Leverage 5,139 0.187 0.148 0.172 0.128 0.168 0.135 0.186 0.139 -0.001 -0.009* 
R&D Exp./Total Assets 5,139 0.015 0.000 0.031 0.006 0.036 0.008 0.030 0.000 0.015*** 0.000***
Advertising/Total Assets 5,139 0.015 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Capital Expenditure 5,126 0.060 0.045 0.054 0.041 0.052 0.036 0.053 0.035 -0.008*** -0.010***
Total Risk (Daily Stock Std.) 5,113 0.342 0.312 0.373 0.338 0.402 0.361 0.417 0.368 0.075*** 0.056***
Market Risk 5,113 0.987 0.946 1.070 0.987 1.145 1.078 1.129 1.070 0.142*** 0.124***
Firm-specific Risk (CAPM) 5,113 0.303 0.271 0.331 0.295 0.358 0.320 0.376 0.330 0.073*** 0.059***
Firm-specific Risk (4 Factors) 5,113 0.292 0.261 0.319 0.283 0.345 0.308 0.364 0.319 0.072*** 0.058***
            
 Panel B: Differences in Industry-Median-Adjusted Changes in Firm Policies (Prior Policy <=Industry Median) 
  # Employers=1 # Employers = 2 # Employers = 3, 4 # Employers>=5 Q4-Q1 
 Obs. Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median  
Market Leverage 2,729 0.078 0.054 0.066 0.051 0.063 0.041 0.094 0.063 0.016** 0.009***
R&D Exp./Total Assets 3,229 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Advertising/Total Assets 3,593 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.003*** 0.000***
Capital Expenditure 2,052 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.018 0.011 0.015 0.007 0.004* -0.004** 
Total Risk (Daily Stock Std.) 3,779 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.000* 
Market Risk (CAPM) 1,753 -0.017 -0.028 0.007 -0.006 0.034 0.014 0.005 -0.010 0.022 0.017 
Firm-specific Risk (CAPM) 3,885 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001** 0.001** 
Firm-specific Risk (4 Factors) 3,908 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001* 0.001** 
            
  
 
Table 6 Continued.            
 Panel C. Differences in Industry-Median-Adjusted Changes in Firm Policies (Prior Policy > Industry Median)
  # Employers=1 # Employers = 2 # Employers = 3, 4 # Employers>=5 Q4-Q1 
 Obs. Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median  
Market Leverage 2,097 -0.055 -0.054 -0.057 -0.032 -0.077 -0.067 -0.135 -0.092 -0.080 -0.039 
R&D Exp./Total Assets 1,910 -0.006 -0.003 -0.010 -0.003 -0.022 -0.005 -0.029 -0.010 -0.023*** -0.007***
Advertising/Total Assets 1,546 -0.007 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.006*** 0.000** 
Capital Expenditure 3,024 -0.014 -0.013 -0.023 -0.015 -0.024 -0.016 -0.018 -0.014 -0.005* -0.002* 
Total Risk (Daily Stock Std.) 914 -0.010 -0.007 -0.013 -0.010 -0.016 -0.011 -0.010 -0.008 0.000 -0.001 
Market Risk (CAPM) 1,940 -0.089 -0.202 0.013 -0.031 0.013 -0.031 -0.161 -0.158 -0.072 0.044 
Firm-specific Risk (CAPM) 808 -0.009 -0.006 -0.012 -0.012 -0.016 -0.011 -0.009 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 
Firm-specific Risk (4 Factors) 785 -0.009 -0.007 -0.012 -0.012 -0.015 -0.011 -0.009 -0.007 -0.001  -0.001  
 Table 7. CEO-Firm Matching – First-stage Regression Results 
 
This table presents first-stage OLS results for the debt policy regression on the sample of 4,826 post-turnover firm 
years from 1992 to 2007. The dependent variables are listed at the top of each column. Refer to Table 1 and 
Appendix A for variable definitions. Instrumental variables are the unemployment rate for the year when the CEO 
started his first full-time job, non-business career dummy that equals one if the CEO had academic or government 
jobs, and # Years working in the current firm’s industry is the number of year the CEO has worked in his current 
firm’s industry. I report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 # Employers 
# Employer 
Changes per 
year 
Firm 
Experience 
Recency 
Firm 
Experience 
Diversification 
Industry 
Experience 
Diversification 
Instrumental Variables:      
Unemployment Rate -0.026 0.001*** -0.010 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.107) (0.009) (0.299) (0.540) (0.594) 
Has Non-business Career (0/1) 0.125* 0.001 0.258*** -0.086*** -0.094*** 
 (0.079) (0.539) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
#Years working in the current 
firm's industry 
-0.069*** -0.002*** -0.044*** 0.012*** 0.018*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Leverage 0.793*** 0.029*** 0.566*** -0.121*** -0.050*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) -0.185*** -0.007*** -0.087*** 0.029*** 0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Firm Age -0.244*** -0.010*** -0.162*** 0.066*** 0.010** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) 
Operating Return on Assets -0.640* -0.026** -0.408** 0.111** -0.045 
 (0.058) (0.020) (0.044) (0.022) (0.230) 
Tobin’s Q -0.038 -0.001 -0.028** -0.003 0.007*** 
 (0.102) (0.188) (0.047) (0.448) (0.009) 
R&D Exp./Total Assets -1.820** -0.038** -0.146 0.143* -0.014 
 (0.023) (0.039) (0.656) (0.069) (0.824) 
Capital Intensity -0.606*** -0.019*** -0.204*** -0.002 0.042*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.917) (0.004) 
Depreciation/Total Assets 6.901*** 0.211*** 3.730*** -0.314* 0.108 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) (0.390) 
Pay directors equity based 
compensation (0/1) 
0.066 0.002 0.040 -0.013 -0.006 
(0.253) (0.337) (0.248) (0.112) (0.390) 
Activist Institutional Hldg. (%) -2.275 -0.090 -1.498 0.302 0.314* 
 (0.177) (0.110) (0.137) (0.211) (0.096) 
CEO Cash Compensation 0.073 0.000 0.053 0.021** -0.005 
 (0.316) (0.892) (0.228) (0.044) (0.561) 
Compensation Delta -0.004 -0.001 0.022 0.004 0.003 
 (0.912) (0.235) (0.241) (0.378) (0.355) 
Compensation Vega 0.235*** 0.012*** 0.097** -0.051*** -0.016** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.048) 
Herfindhal Index -2.272*** -0.069*** -0.835*** 0.382*** 0.060* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.091) 
      
      
  
 
Table 7 Continued.      
CEO Characteristics      
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) -0.124*** -0.005*** -0.231*** 0.012** -0.026*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.000) 
Ln (CEO Age) 3.560*** -0.017** 2.232*** -0.504*** -0.580*** 
 (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MBA (0/1) 0.141*** 0.008*** 0.035 -0.028*** -0.029*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.175) (0.000) (0.000) 
Founder (0/1) -0.769*** -0.027*** -0.414*** 0.174*** 0.077*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# Functional Areas 0.139*** 0.004*** 0.040*** -0.009*** -0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.008) (0.000) 
Has Finance Background (0/1) 0.105** 0.005*** 0.040 -0.016** -0.040*** 
 (0.034) (0.004) (0.180) (0.023) (0.000) 
Constant -7.613*** 0.285*** -5.613*** 1.875*** 2.589*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4826 4826 4826 4826 4826 
R-squared 0.364 0.384 0.386 0.472 0.634 
      
  
 
Table 8. CEO Employment History and Financing Policy 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for the financing policy on the sample of 4,826 firm years. The dependent 
variable is Leverage. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable definitions. Pre-turnover Leverage is the firm’s 
Leverage in the year before the year of CEO turnover. Instrumental variables are the unemployment rate for the year 
when the CEO started his first full-time job, non-business career dummy that equals one if the CEO had academic or 
government jobs, and the number of years the CEO has worked in his current firm’s industry. I report p-values of 
Hansen’s J-test and first-stage F-stat at the bottom of the table. The values of the five CEO employment history 
proxies in the IV/2SLS estimations are predicted values. The predicted signs for the CEO employment history 
proxies are presented in parenthesis at the beginning of each row. I report p-values based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Variables       
# Employers (+) 0.012**     
  (0.025)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  0.376**    
   (0.033)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   0.020**   
    (0.021)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    -0.071**  
     (0.020)  
Industry Experience Diversification (-)     -0.051** 
      (0.019) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Leverage  0.258*** 0.257*** 0.253*** 0.261*** 0.264*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales)  0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age  -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 
  (0.444) (0.505) (0.434) (0.658) (0.329) 
Operating Return on Assets  -0.576*** -0.573*** -0.574*** -0.575*** -0.583*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Exp./Total Assets  -0.345*** -0.354*** -0.355*** -0.344*** -0.338*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital Intensity  0.123*** 0.119*** 0.118*** 0.114*** 0.111*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Depreciation/Total Assets  -0.117 -0.101 -0.110 -0.055 -0.037 
  (0.524) (0.584) (0.544) (0.760) (0.836) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011* 
 (0.117) (0.104) (0.124) (0.113) (0.092) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  -0.274 -0.266 -0.268 -0.271 -0.270 
  (0.294) (0.304) (0.303) (0.297) (0.291) 
CEO Cash Compensation  0.016** 0.017** 0.016** 0.018** 0.016** 
  (0.033) (0.024) (0.037) (0.017) (0.028) 
CEO Compensation Delta  -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 
  (0.133) (0.157) (0.105) (0.165) (0.141) 
CEO Compensation Vega  -0.020** -0.021** -0.019** -0.021** -0.018* 
  (0.041) (0.033) (0.049) (0.032) (0.055) 
Herfindhal Index  0.339*** 0.332*** 0.319*** 0.350*** 0.335*** 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) 
       
  
 
Table 8 Continued.       
CEO Characteristics       
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  0.005 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.002 
  (0.362) (0.344) (0.178) (0.445) (0.667) 
CEO Age  -0.080** -0.022 -0.081** -0.071** -0.060** 
  (0.016) (0.512) (0.015) (0.024) (0.046) 
MBA (0/1)  0.014* 0.013* 0.015** 0.014* 0.015** 
  (0.068) (0.094) (0.043) (0.070) (0.050) 
Founder (0/1)  0.016 0.016 0.015 0.018 0.009 
  (0.284) (0.290) (0.301) (0.231) (0.502) 
# Functional Areas  -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.625) (0.658) (0.792) (0.792) (0.820) 
Has Finance Background (0/1)  0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.010 
  (0.237) (0.259) (0.229) (0.211) (0.286) 
Constant  0.285** 0.057 0.305** 0.318** 0.297** 
  (0.050) (0.723) (0.036) (0.034) (0.039) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4826 4826 4826 4826 4826 
Adjusted R-squared  0.572 0.570 0.570 0.572 0.578 
       
Hansen's J-test (p-value)  0.535 0.406 0.684 0.673 0.643 
First-stage Instrumental Variables' Joint 
Significance (F-stat) 50.95 52.53 53.45 87.27 266.64 
 
 
  
 
Table 9. CEO Employment History and Capital Expenditures 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for investments in capital expenditures on a sample of 5,029 firm years. The 
dependent variable is capital expenditures divided by total assets. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Pre-turnover Capital Exp. is the firm’s capital expenditure/total assets in the year before the CEO 
turnover year. Instrumental variables are the unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his first full-time 
job, non-business career dummy that equals one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the number of 
years the CEO has worked in his current firm’s industry. I report p-values of Hansen’s J-test and first-stage F-stat at 
the bottom of the table. The values of the five CEO employment history proxies in the IV/2SLS estimations are 
predicted values. The predicted signs for the CEO employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at the 
beginning of each row. I report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Variables      
# Employers (-) -0.004***     
  (0.005)     
# Employer Changes per year (-)  -0.120***    
   (0.005)    
Employer Change Recency (-)   -0.006***   
    (0.007)   
Firm Experience Diversification (+)    0.020***  
     (0.006)  
Industry Experience Diversification (+)     0.015*** 
      (0.005) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Capital Exp.  0.302*** 0.301*** 0.303*** 0.304*** 0.308*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales)  -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* 
  (0.024) (0.023) (0.031) (0.027) (0.087) 
Firm Age  0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
  (0.771) (0.886) (0.749) (0.988) (0.532) 
Surplus Cash  0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.022** 0.023*** 
  (0.018) (0.025) (0.020) (0.011) (0.006) 
Tobin’s Q  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D Exp./Total Assets  -0.039* -0.037 -0.036 -0.041* -0.042* 
  (0.083) (0.107) (0.107) (0.070) (0.055) 
Advertising/Total Assets  0.017 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.013 
  (0.635) (0.661) (0.638) (0.631) (0.714) 
Leverage  -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013* 
  (0.117) (0.128) (0.116) (0.101) (0.080) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.779) (0.754) (0.743) (0.787) (0.710) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  -0.060 -0.063 -0.058 -0.057 -0.058 
  (0.342) (0.323) (0.360) (0.364) (0.342) 
CEO Cash Compensation  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004* -0.003 
  (0.153) (0.133) (0.162) (0.088) (0.134) 
CEO Compensation Delta  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.371) (0.333) (0.426) (0.247) (0.302) 
CEO Compensation Vega  -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.771) (0.901) (0.686) (0.941) (0.685) 
Herfindhal Index  -0.038 -0.036 -0.032 -0.042 -0.037 
  (0.319) (0.342) (0.383) (0.257) (0.319) 
       
  
 
Table 9 Continued.       
CEO Characteristics       
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  -0.004** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.003* 
  (0.015) (0.013) (0.006) (0.020) (0.051) 
CEO Age  -0.011 -0.029*** -0.011 -0.014 -0.017** 
  (0.232) (0.001) (0.230) (0.110) (0.042) 
MBA (0/1)  -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.319) (0.416) (0.207) (0.266) (0.195) 
Founder (0/1)  -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 
  (0.183) (0.164) (0.221) (0.174) (0.410) 
# Functional Areas  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.555) (0.527) (0.387) (0.369) (0.349) 
Has Finance Background (0/1)  -0.005* -0.004 -0.005* -0.005* -0.004 
  (0.099) (0.117) (0.095) (0.089) (0.134) 
Constant  0.131*** 0.204*** 0.126*** 0.123*** 0.128*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  5029 5029 5029 5029 5029 
Adjusted R-squared  0.513 0.510 0.514 0.521 0.530 
       
Hansen's J-test (p-value)  0.858 0.749 0.746 0.690 0.685 
First-stage Instrumental Variables' Joint 
Significance (F-stat) 55.57 56.18 59.58 93.51 289.69 
  
 
 Table 10. CEO Employment History and R&D Intensity 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for R&D intensity on a sample of 4912 firm years. The dependent variable is 
R&D intensity. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable definitions. Pre-turnover R&D Intensity is the firm’s 
R&D Intensity in the year before the CEO turnover year. Instrumental variables are the unemployment rate for the 
year when the CEO started his first full-time job, non-business career dummy that equals one if the CEO had 
academic or government jobs, and the number of years the CEO has worked in his current firm’s industry. The 
instrumental variable for CEO employment history*Industry Homogeneity in the R&D regression is the 
unemployment rate described above multiplied by industry homogeneity. I report p-values of Hansen’s J-test and 
first-stage F-stat at the bottom of the table. The values of the five CEO employment history proxies in the IV/2SLS 
estimations are predicted values. I report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CEO Employment History Variables      
# Employers -0.013**     
 (0.016)     
# Employer Changes per year  -0.191**    
  (0.021)    
Employer Change Recency   -0.031*   
   (0.063)   
Firm Experience Diversification    0.092**  
    (0.042)  
Industry Experience Diversification     0.025** 
     (0.027) 
CEO Emp. History * Industry 
Homogeneity 
0.054** 0.557 0.146* -0.403* -0.081 
(0.039) (0.115) (0.094) (0.071) (0.119) 
Firm Characteristics      
Pre-turnover R&D Intensity 0.556*** 0.549*** 0.570*** 0.557*** 0.539*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Homogeneity -0.163** -0.049 -0.153 0.231* 0.067* 
 (0.048) (0.239) (0.108) (0.063) (0.073) 
ln(Total Sales) -0.002** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001* -0.002** 
 (0.043) (0.007) (0.224) (0.089) (0.011) 
Firm Age -0.003** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003*** 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.041) (0.033) (0.008) 
Surplus Cash 0.120*** 0.123*** 0.117*** 0.121*** 0.127*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.703) (0.668) (0.824) (0.755) (0.652) 
Advertising/Total Assets -0.031 -0.020 -0.039 -0.024 -0.018 
 (0.423) (0.584) (0.340) (0.548) (0.609) 
CAPEXP/Total Assets -0.005 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.004 
 (0.773) (0.548) (0.613) (0.592) (0.817) 
Leverage 0.006 0.009** -0.000 0.005 0.009** 
 (0.296) (0.035) (0.980) (0.388) (0.027) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.156) (0.137) (0.293) (0.191) (0.119) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%) 0.063 0.053 0.066 0.080* 0.064 
 (0.156) (0.221) (0.170) (0.078) (0.130) 
CEO Cash Compensation 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
CEO Compensation Delta -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.744) (0.244) (0.863) (0.831) (0.180) 
CEO Compensation Vega 0.003 0.005** 0.002 0.003 0.004** 
 (0.203) (0.017) (0.456) (0.213) (0.038) 
Herfindhal Index -0.006 -0.007 0.018 -0.014 -0.012 
 (0.821) (0.764) (0.643) (0.582) (0.618) 
  
 
Table 10 Continued  
CEO Characteristics      
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.768) (0.901) (0.822) (0.835) (0.506) 
CEO Age -0.012 -0.024*** -0.013 -0.019** -0.016** 
 (0.107) (0.001) (0.108) (0.019) (0.014) 
MBA (0/1) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.211) (0.189) (0.463) (0.250) (0.351) 
Founder (0/1) -0.005 -0.007** -0.003 -0.004 -0.005* 
 (0.168) (0.023) (0.445) (0.351) (0.058) 
# Functional Areas 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.382) (0.426) (0.515) (0.393) (0.514) 
Has Finance Background (0/1) -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.106*** 0.143*** 0.099*** 0.032 0.066** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.453) (0.020) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4912 4912 4912 4912 4912 
Adjusted R-squared 0.745 0.763 0.702 0.729 0.771 
      
Hansen's J-test (p-value) 0.379 0.255 0.547 0.591 0.268 
First-stage Joint Sig. for CEO Emp. 
History Variable (F-stat) 40.65 54.26 43.25 66.26 207.32 
First-stage Joint Sig. for CEO Emp. 
His. * Ind. Homogeneity  (F-Stat) 27.07 42.16 32.18 53.29 139.54 
 
 
  
 
Table 11. CEO Employment History and Advertising Intensity 
 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for investments in advertising for 5,074 firm years. The dependent variable is 
advertising divided by total assets. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable definitions. Pre-turnover Adv. 
Intensity is the firm’s advertising intensity in the year before the CEO turnover year. Instrumental variables are the 
unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his first full-time job, non-business career dummy that equals 
one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the number of years the CEO has worked in his current firm’s 
industry. I report p-values of Hansen’s J-test and first-stage F-stat at the bottom of the table. The values of the five 
CEO employment history proxies in the IV/2SLS estimations are predicted values. The predicted signs for the CEO 
employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at the beginning of each row. I report p-values based on 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Proxies       
# Employers (+) 0.001*     
  (0.072)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  0.041*    
   (0.076)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   0.002*   
    (0.080)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    -0.007*  
     (0.085)  
Industry Experience Diversification (-)     -0.004 
      (0.126) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Adv. Intensity  0.543*** 0.544*** 0.543*** 0.543*** 0.544*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales)  0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.000 
  (0.067) (0.062) (0.086) (0.084) (0.181) 
Firm Age  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
  (0.344) (0.284) (0.357) (0.256) (0.501) 
Surplus Cash  -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 
  (0.251) (0.266) (0.263) (0.250) (0.228) 
Tobin’s Q  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
R&D Exp./Total Assets  0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
  (0.764) (0.790) (0.818) (0.778) (0.773) 
CAPEXP/Total Assets  0.017* 0.016* 0.016* 0.017* 0.017* 
  (0.083) (0.089) (0.093) (0.080) (0.080) 
Leverage  -0.006* -0.007* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* 
  (0.057) (0.056) (0.058) (0.060) (0.066) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002* 
 (0.107) (0.101) (0.104) (0.105) (0.091) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 
  (0.747) (0.769) (0.740) (0.730) (0.727) 
CEO Cash Compensation  0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.002** 
  (0.036) (0.032) (0.039) (0.025) (0.034) 
CEO Compensation Delta  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.221) (0.219) (0.234) (0.193) (0.195) 
CEO Compensation Vega  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.261) (0.232) (0.290) (0.236) (0.294) 
Herfindhal Index  0.028 0.027 0.026 0.029 0.027 
  (0.202) (0.214) (0.236) (0.173) (0.208) 
  
 
Table 11 Continued.       
CEO Characteristics       
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001** 
  (0.131) (0.155) (0.277) (0.086) (0.039) 
CEO Age  -0.004 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.421) (0.563) (0.429) (0.551) (0.795) 
MBA (0/1)  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.387) (0.328) (0.477) (0.407) (0.483) 
Founder (0/1)  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.365) (0.409) (0.312) (0.372) (0.168) 
# Functional Areas  -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.327) (0.330) (0.397) (0.396) (0.418) 
Has Finance Background (0/1)  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.437) (0.413) (0.440) (0.439) (0.396) 
Constant  0.008 -0.017 0.009 0.010 0.007 
  (0.682) (0.404) (0.636) (0.601) (0.711) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  5074 5074 5074 5074 5074 
Adjusted R-squared  0.633 0.632 0.634 0.635 0.636 
       
Hansen's J-test (p-value)  0.632 0.639 0.582 0.711 0.592 
First-stage Instrumental Variables' Joint 
Significance (F-stat) 47.88 47.28 46.68 70.08 212.5 
 
 
  
 
Table 12. Simultaneous Equations: CEO Employment History, Leverage, and Investment Policies 
 
This table presents 3SLS results for a system of five equations. The dependent variables are listed at the top of each 
column. Refer to Section 5.3.5 for details on the five equations. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Pre-turnover firm policies are the respective firm policies in the year before the CEO turnover year. The 
predicted signs for the CEO employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at the top of each row. Panel A 
presents results on the whole sample and Panel B presents results on a subsample of firms with an industry 
homogeneity value of 0.26 and above. I report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Whole Sample (4,696 Obs.) 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D/Total Assets Adv./Total Assets # Employers 
CEO Employment History Proxies     
 (+) (-) (+) (+)  
# Employers 0.011*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.001***  
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  
Firm Policies      
CAPEXP  -1.839***  -0.075*** 0.094*** -11.531*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D/Total Assets  -0.517*** -0.108***  0.008 4.550*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.418) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets  -0.143 0.046 0.010  3.091** 
 (0.243) (0.137) (0.666)  (0.015) 
Leverage  0.011 0.061*** -0.001 2.498*** 
  (0.146) (0.000) (0.822) (0.000) 
Firm Characteristics      
Pre-turnover Policy 0.309*** 0.316*** 0.584*** 0.550***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Unemployment Rate     -0.027* 
     (0.072) 
Has Non-business Career 
(0/1) 
    0.181*** 
    (0.007) 
#Years working in the 
current firm's industry 
    -0.066*** 
    (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.019*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.001** -0.284*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.011** -0.002** -0.004*** 0.002*** -0.209*** 
 (0.013) (0.031) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.545***    2.403*** 
(0.000)    (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.037*** 0.133*** -0.007  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.216)  
Tobin's Q -0.011*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.017 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.531) 
      
  
 
Table 12 Continued.      
Firm Characteristics (Continued)     
Capital Intensity 0.379***     
 (0.000)     
Depreciation/Total 
Assets 
2.307***     
(0.000)     
Pay Directors Equity 
Based Compensation 
0.016*** -0.001 0.001 0.002*** -0.031 
(0.003) (0.624) (0.426) (0.005) (0.601) 
Act. Institutional Hldg. 
(%) 
-0.244 -0.055 0.077** -0.004 -1.879 
(0.127) (0.181) (0.011) (0.841) (0.267) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
0.009 -0.003* 0.003** 0.002** -0.055 
(0.206) (0.055) (0.014) (0.013) (0.459) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.003 -0.002** -0.001 0.001*** 0.003 
(0.415) (0.047) (0.201) (0.009) (0.923) 
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
-0.022*** 0.000 0.006*** -0.002* 0.222*** 
(0.003) (0.836) (0.000) (0.060) (0.004) 
Herfindhal Index 0.203 -0.061* -0.070*** 0.022 -1.174 
 (0.150) (0.090) (0.008) (0.221) (0.426) 
CEO Characteristics      
Ln(Ceo Tenure+1) 0.008** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.119*** 
 (0.031) (0.006) (0.316) (0.000) (0.001) 
CEO Age -0.105*** -0.009* -0.012*** 0.001 3.322*** 
 (0.000) (0.056) (0.001) (0.550) (0.000) 
MBA (0/1) 0.017*** -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.121*** 
 (0.000) (0.145) (0.975) (0.175) (0.007) 
Founder (0/1) 0.020*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.908*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.000) (0.118) (0.000) 
# Functional Areas -0.004 -0.001* 0.001 -0.000 0.150*** 
 (0.122) (0.067) (0.139) (0.570) (0.000) 
Has Fin. Background 
(0/1) 
0.020*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.053 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.204) (0.313) 
Constant 0.262** 0.108*** 0.095*** -0.023* -7.184*** 
 (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.059) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4696 4696 4696 4696 4696 
R-squared 0.482 0.529 0.756 0.638 0.344 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 12 Continued. 
 
Panel B: Subsample: Homogenous Industries (Industry Homogeneity>=0.26) 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D/Total Assets Adv./Total Assets # Employers 
CEO Employment History Proxies     
 (+) (-) (+) (+)  
# Employers 0.013* -0.006*** 0.000* 0.006***  
 (0.083) (0.001) (0.069) (0.000)  
Firm Policies      
R&D/Total Assets 0.404  -0.015*** 0.133*** -7.377*** 
 (0.322)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets -0.085 -0.617***  0.082 -7.615* 
 (0.839) (0.000)  (0.106) (0.093) 
CAPEXP -0.660*** 0.064 -0.019**  8.971*** 
 (0.003) (0.348) (0.018)  (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 0.894 
  (0.767) (0.727) (0.535) (0.160) 
Firm Characteristics      
Pre-turnover Policy 0.342*** 0.372*** 0.828*** 0.752***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Unemployment Rate     -0.115*** 
     (0.000) 
Has Non-business Career 
(0/1) 
    0.090 
    (0.405) 
# Years working in the 
current firm’s industry 
    -0.055*** 
    (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.035*** -0.009*** -0.000 0.003*** -0.408*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.651) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.030*** -0.001 0.000 0.004*** -0.101 
 (0.000) (0.550) (0.555) (0.000) (0.174) 
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.951***    1.717 
(0.000)    (0.110) 
Surplus Cash  0.043** 0.007*** -0.032**  
  (0.030) (0.003) (0.010)  
Tobin's Q -0.030*** 0.004* 0.000 0.002** -0.187*** 
 (0.000) (0.056) (0.681) (0.012) (0.004) 
Capital Intensity 0.077**     
 (0.041)     
Depreciation/Total 
Assets 
0.396     
(0.328)     
Pay Directors Equity 
Based Compensation 
0.015 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.075 
(0.172) (0.612) (0.805) (0.405) (0.532) 
  
 
Table 12 Continued.      
Firm Characteristics (Continued)     
Act. Institutional Hldg. 
(%) 
-0.484* 0.008 0.023** 0.058 -4.338 
(0.098) (0.932) (0.032) (0.107) (0.175) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
0.048*** -0.013*** 0.000 0.005*** -0.509*** 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.544) (0.001) (0.000) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.004 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.069 
(0.527) (0.716) (0.469) (0.490) (0.262) 
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
-0.049*** 0.006 -0.002*** -0.002 0.362*** 
(0.000) (0.104) (0.000) (0.141) (0.007) 
Herfindhal Index 0.694*** -0.114* -0.011 0.084*** -1.382 
 (0.000) (0.052) (0.116) (0.000) (0.488) 
CEO Characteristics      
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) -0.010 0.000 -0.000 0.002*** -0.133* 
 (0.112) (0.935) (0.468) (0.002) (0.050) 
CEO Age -0.060 -0.029** -0.003** 0.005 1.138** 
 (0.104) (0.011) (0.016) (0.272) (0.012) 
MBA (0/1) 0.030*** -0.004 -0.001*** 0.002** -0.109 
 (0.000) (0.132) (0.000) (0.044) (0.229) 
Founder (0/1) 0.025 -0.017*** 0.000 0.011*** -1.247*** 
 (0.155) (0.000) (0.443) (0.000) (0.000) 
# Functional Areas -0.012*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** 0.185*** 
 (0.004) (0.949) (0.169) (0.000) (0.000) 
Has Fin. Background 
(0/1) 
0.022** -0.006** -0.000 0.002** 0.149 
(0.013) (0.035) (0.567) (0.034) (0.126) 
Constant 0.324 0.217*** 0.013* -0.100*** 4.048* 
 (0.131) (0.001) (0.077) (0.000) (0.094) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1365 1365 1365 1365 1365 
R-squared 0.648 0.593 0.892 0.672 0.424 
  
 
Table 13.  CEO Employment History and Total Risk 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for total firm risk for a sample of 4693 firm years. The dependent variable is the 
annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Instrumental variables are the unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his first full-time job, non-
business career dummy that equals one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the number of years the 
CEO has worked in his current firm’s industry. Pre-turnover Total Risk is the firm’s total risk in the year before the 
CEO turnover year. I report p-values of Hansen’s J-test and first-stage F-stat at the bottom of the table. The values 
of the five CEO employment history proxies in the IV/2SLS estimations are predicted values. The predicted signs 
for the CEO employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at the beginning of each row. I report p-values 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Proxies       
# Employers (+) 0.006*     
  (0.062)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  0.171*    
   (0.094)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   0.009*   
    (0.061)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    -0.023  
     (0.179)  
Industry Experience Diversification (-)     -0.017 
      (0.324) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Total Risk  0.191*** 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.195*** 0.197*** 
(Daily Stock Ret. Std.)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales)  -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age  -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Operating Return on Assets  -0.292*** -0.290*** -0.291*** -0.289*** -0.292*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Exp./Total Assets  0.476*** 0.473*** 0.474*** 0.478*** 0.478*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Advertising/Total Assets  0.154 0.159 0.153 0.151 0.156 
  (0.171) (0.157) (0.170) (0.182) (0.167) 
CAPEXP/Total Assets  0.289*** 0.286*** 0.287*** 0.287*** 0.289*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.205) (0.199) (0.200) (0.189) (0.184) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  -0.134 -0.131 -0.134 -0.127 -0.125 
  (0.515) (0.525) (0.513) (0.536) (0.542) 
CEO Cash Compensation  -0.014** -0.013** -0.014** -0.013* -0.014** 
  (0.040) (0.047) (0.039) (0.055) (0.045) 
CEO Compensation Delta  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (0.574) (0.546) (0.610) (0.546) (0.560) 
CEO Compensation Vega  -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 
  (0.148) (0.132) (0.165) (0.155) (0.182) 
Herfindhal Index  0.357*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 0.359*** 0.352*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
  
 
Table 13 Continued.       
CEO Characteristics       
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.881) (0.862) (0.678) (0.950) (0.853) 
CEO Age  -0.055** -0.029 -0.055** -0.047* -0.043* 
  (0.031) (0.297) (0.030) (0.062) (0.087) 
MBA (0/1)  -0.010* -0.010* -0.009* -0.009 -0.009 
  (0.079) (0.073) (0.099) (0.103) (0.117) 
Founder (0/1)  0.024** 0.023** 0.023** 0.022** 0.019* 
  (0.033) (0.036) (0.035) (0.045) (0.065) 
# Functional Areas  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  (0.370) (0.349) (0.282) (0.265) (0.256) 
Has Finance Background (0/1)  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.885) (0.909) (0.862) (0.852) (0.931) 
Constant  0.615*** 0.510*** 0.622*** 0.610*** 0.602*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4693 4693 4693 4693 4693 
Adjusted R-squared  0.635 0.635 0.636 0.635 0.635 
       
Hansen's J-test (p-value)  0.158 0.135 0.154 0.112 0.105 
First-stage Instrumental Variables' Joint 
Significance (F-stat) 62.51 57.51 68.76 89.04 108.99 
  
 
Table 14.  CEO Employment History and Firm-specific Risk 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for firm-specific risk for a sample of 4,693 firm years. The dependent variable in 
Panel A is firm-specific risk based on the market model. The dependent variable in Panel B is firm-specific risk 
based on the four-factor model. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable definitions. Instrumental variables are 
the unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his first full-time job, non-business career dummy that 
equals one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the number of years the CEO has worked in his 
current firm’s industry. Pre-turnover Specific Risk is the firm’s specific risk in the year before the CEO turnover 
year. I report p-values of Hansen’s J-test and first-stage F-stat at the bottom of the table. The values of the five CEO 
employment history proxies in the IV/2SLS estimations are predicted values. The predicted signs for the CEO 
employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at the beginning of each row. I report p-values based on 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Firm-Specific Risk (CAPM)
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Proxies       
# Employers (+) 0.007**     
  (0.016)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  0.206**    
   (0.025)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   0.010**   
    (0.015)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    -0.029*  
     (0.063)  
Industry Experience Diversification (-)     -0.022 
      (0.146) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Firm-specific Risk  0.197*** 0.197*** 0.198*** 0.202*** 0.205*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales)  -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age  -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q  0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.004* 0.005* 
  (0.068) (0.071) (0.069) (0.084) (0.073) 
Operating Return on Assets  -0.237*** -0.235*** -0.236*** -0.235*** -0.238*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Exp./Total Assets  0.414*** 0.411*** 0.410*** 0.416*** 0.417*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Advertising/Total Assets  0.177* 0.183* 0.176* 0.174 0.178* 
  (0.098) (0.087) (0.098) (0.107) (0.094) 
CAPEXP/Total Assets  0.245*** 0.243*** 0.243*** 0.245*** 0.248*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  0.075*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.078*** 0.080*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (0.225) (0.216) (0.220) (0.203) (0.197) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  -0.288 -0.284 -0.287 -0.280 -0.278 
  (0.144) (0.148) (0.140) (0.154) (0.156) 
CEO Cash Compensation  -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 
  (0.159) (0.190) (0.152) (0.224) (0.174) 
CEO Compensation Delta  -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.991) (0.960) (0.933) (0.953) (0.972) 
CEO Compensation Vega  -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 
  (0.145) (0.119) (0.168) (0.147) (0.183) 
Herfindhal Index  0.310*** 0.307*** 0.307*** 0.313*** 0.304*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  
 
Table 14 Continued.       
CEO Characteristics       
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 -0.004 
  (0.714) (0.752) (0.987) (0.517) (0.407) 
CEO Age  -0.056** -0.024 -0.056** -0.048** -0.043* 
  (0.018) (0.334) (0.017) (0.041) (0.064) 
MBA (0/1)  -0.010* -0.010* -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* 
  (0.060) (0.050) (0.082) (0.080) (0.092) 
Founder (0/1)  0.021** 0.021** 0.020** 0.020** 0.017* 
  (0.032) (0.035) (0.037) (0.044) (0.076) 
# Functional Areas  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (0.512) (0.487) (0.379) (0.359) (0.351) 
Has Finance Background (0/1)  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 
  (0.829) (0.862) (0.799) (0.791) (0.908) 
Constant  0.612*** 0.488*** 0.620*** 0.611*** 0.602*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4693 4693 4693 4693 4693 
Adjusted R-squared  0.655 0.655 0.656 0.654 0.655 
       
Hansen's J-test (p-value)  0.136 0.111 0.132 0.115 0.107 
First-stage Instrumental Variables' Joint 
Significance (F-stat) 62.49 57.68 69.78 90.23 113.54 
 
Panel B: Firm-specific Risk (Four-Factor Model) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Proxies       
# Employers (+) 0.007***     
  (0.010)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  0.226**    
   (0.011)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   0.011***   
    (0.007)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    -0.033**  
     (0.031)  
Industry Experience Diversification (-)     -0.026* 
      (0.081) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Firm-specific Risk (4-  0.158*** 0.193*** 0.194*** 0.199*** 0.202*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales)  -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age  -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
  (0.113) (0.123) (0.121) (0.146) (0.126) 
Operating Return on Assets  -0.218*** -0.215*** -0.216*** -0.214*** -0.218*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Exp./Total Assets  0.375*** 0.383*** 0.383*** 0.389*** 0.390*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Advertising/Total Assets  0.169 0.190* 0.182* 0.179* 0.183* 
  (0.106) (0.072) (0.081) (0.092) (0.079) 
  
 
Table 14 Continued.       
Firm Characteristics (Continued)       
CAPEXP/Total Assets  0.218*** 0.225*** 0.225*** 0.227*** 0.231*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  0.071*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (0.157) (0.194) (0.197) (0.182) (0.177) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  -0.298 -0.295 -0.299 -0.291 -0.289 
  (0.119) (0.125) (0.118) (0.130) (0.132) 
CEO Cash Compensation  -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 
  (0.353) (0.285) (0.228) (0.337) (0.260) 
CEO Compensation Delta  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.875) (0.936) (0.818) (0.944) (0.924) 
CEO Compensation Vega  -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 
  (0.178) (0.144) (0.214) (0.181) (0.229) 
Herfindhal Index  0.292*** 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.296*** 0.286*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
CEO Characteristics       
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  -0.004 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 -0.004 
  (0.300) (0.670) (0.915) (0.421) (0.311) 
CEO Age  -0.060*** -0.022 -0.056** -0.048** -0.043* 
  (0.008) (0.362) (0.012) (0.033) (0.055) 
MBA (0/1)  -0.010** -0.010** -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* 
  (0.035) (0.038) (0.069) (0.065) (0.075) 
Founder (0/1)  0.019** 0.021** 0.020** 0.020** 0.016* 
  (0.038) (0.032) (0.036) (0.040) (0.076) 
# Functional Areas  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (0.601) (0.667) (0.523) (0.502) (0.496) 
Has Finance Background (0/1)  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
  (0.877) (0.896) (0.823) (0.818) (0.960) 
Constant  0.641*** 0.472*** 0.616*** 0.607*** 0.598*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4693 4693 4693 4693 4693 
Adjusted R-squared  0.654 0.652 0.654 0.652 0.653 
       
Hansen's J-test (p-value)  0.166 0.134 0.161 0.125 0.117 
First-stage Instrumental Variables' Joint 
Significance (F-stat) 62.04 57.79 69.96 90.34 113.58 
  
 
Table 15.  CEO Employment History and Market Risk 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for a firm’s market risk for a sample of 4,693 firm years. The dependent variable 
in Panel A is the market beta from the CAPM model, in Panel B is the unlevered market beta from the CAPM 
model, in Panel C is the size beta from the 4-factor model, in Panel D is the book-to-market beta from the 4-factor 
model, and in Panel E is the momentum beta from the 4-factor model. Panel F and G present the analysis for 
segments. The dependent variable in Panel F is the Herfindhal concentration of segment sales, operating income, 
capital expenditures and assets. Panel F presents the multinomial regression results for the likelihoods of adding or 
reducing a segment or a segment with a new SIC code. The base category is when there is no change in the number 
of segment. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable definitions. Instrumental variables are the unemployment 
rate for the year when the CEO started his first full-time job, non-business career dummy that equals one if the CEO 
had academic or government jobs, and the number of years the CEO has worked in his current firm’s industry. Pre-
turnover Market Risk is the firm’s market risk in the year before the CEO turnover year. I report p-values of 
Hansen’s J-test and first-stage F-stat at the bottom of the table. The values of the five CEO employment history 
proxies in the IV/2SLS estimations are predicted values. The predicted signs for the CEO employment history 
proxies are presented in parenthesis at the beginning of each row. I report p-values based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Market Beta from the CAPM Model 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Proxies       
# Employers (+) 0.001     
  (0.924)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  -0.063    
   (0.878)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   -0.005   
    (0.707)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    0.033  
     (0.645)  
Industry Experience (-)     0.047 
      (0.511) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Market Risk  0.263*** 0.263*** 0.263*** 0.263*** 0.263*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales)  -0.023** -0.023** -0.024** -0.024** -0.024*** 
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010) 
Firm Age  -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.055*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Tobin’s Q  0.031** 0.031** 0.030** 0.030** 0.030** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Operating Return on Assets  -0.586*** -0.586*** -0.586*** -0.586*** -0.580*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Exp./Total Assets  0.972*** 0.972*** 0.970*** 0.971*** 0.972*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Advertising/Total Assets  -1.403*** -1.405*** -1.393*** -1.389*** -1.387*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CAPEXP/Total Assets  0.289 0.289 0.287 0.286 0.266 
  (0.159) (0.159) (0.160) (0.162) (0.206) 
Leverage  0.006 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.011 
  (0.939) (0.942) (0.918) (0.905) (0.885) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.980) (0.978) (0.990) (0.999) (0.985) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  1.668** 1.669** 1.669** 1.671** 1.674** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
CEO Cash Compensation  -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.109*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Compensation Delta  0.037* 0.037* 0.037* 0.037* 0.037* 
  (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) 
   
  
 
Table 15 Continued.       
CEO Characteristics       
CEO Compensation Vega  -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.140*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Herfindhal Index  -0.284** -0.284** -0.288** -0.291** -0.286** 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) 
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 
  (0.646) (0.640) (0.677) (0.684) (0.694) 
CEO Age  -0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.009 
  (0.980) (0.973) (0.974) (0.958) (0.930) 
MBA (0/1)  -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 
  (0.544) (0.543) (0.566) (0.571) (0.601) 
Founder (0/1)  0.008 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.002 
  (0.835) (0.829) (0.882) (0.924) (0.948) 
# Functional Areas  0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
  (0.120) (0.119) (0.113) (0.112) (0.105) 
Has Finance Background (0/1)  -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.033 -0.032 
  (0.164) (0.163) (0.169) (0.170) (0.188) 
Constant  1.264*** 1.237*** 1.252*** 1.241*** 1.220*** 
  (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4689 4689 4689 4689 4689 
Adjusted R-squared  0.358 0.358 0.358 0.358 0.358 
       
Hansen's J-test (p-value)  0.632 0.632 0.635 0.644 0.666 
First-stage Instrumental Variables' Joint 
Significance (F-stat) 56.41 53.02 53.07 86.85 117.140 
 
 
Panel B: Market Beta from the CAPM Model (Unlevered) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Proxies       
# Employers (+) -0.026*     
  (0.057)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  -0.802*    
   (0.071)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   -0.043**   
    (0.048)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    0.152**  
     (0.045)  
Industry Experience (-)     0.111** 
      (0.043) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Market Risk  0.167*** 0.166*** 0.167*** 0.162*** 0.163*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales)  -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.048*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age  -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.054*** -0.047*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Tobin’s Q  0.077*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Operating Return on Assets  0.157 0.150 0.156 0.151 0.170 
  (0.250) (0.271) (0.259) (0.275) (0.215) 
  
 
Table 15 Continued   
Firm Characteristics (Continued)       
R&D Exp./Total Assets  1.597*** 1.616*** 1.617*** 1.598*** 1.579*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Advertising/Total Assets  0.026 0.005 0.037 0.056 0.017 
  (0.944) (0.989) (0.922) (0.881) (0.963) 
CAPEXP  0.247 0.256 0.252 0.233 0.219
  (0.217) (0.203) (0.211) (0.245) (0.274) 
Leverage  0.003 0.004 0.010 -0.004 -0.019 
  (0.963) (0.944) (0.876) (0.943) (0.735) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.676) (0.654) (0.686) (0.674) (0.626) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  1.301** 1.288** 1.308** 1.283** 1.269** 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.036) (0.038) 
CEO Cash Compensation  -0.105*** -0.107*** -0.104*** -0.110*** -0.106*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Compensation Delta  0.022 0.021 0.023 0.021 0.021 
  (0.173) (0.194) (0.150) (0.201) (0.181) 
CEO Compensation Vega  -0.043 -0.039 -0.045 -0.039 -0.044 
  (0.148) (0.196) (0.128) (0.195) (0.126) 
Herfindhal Index  0.143 0.155 0.153 0.119 0.165 
  (0.710) (0.687) (0.689) (0.754) (0.664) 
CEO Characteristics       
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  -0.013 -0.015 -0.021 -0.011 -0.007 
  (0.342) (0.314) (0.178) (0.415) (0.598) 
CEO Age  0.123 0.001 0.125 0.105 0.083 
  (0.170) (0.993) (0.164) (0.223) (0.318) 
MBA (0/1)  -0.012 -0.010 -0.015 -0.012 -0.014 
  (0.513) (0.598) (0.413) (0.503) (0.423) 
Founder (0/1)  0.023 0.023 0.025 0.019 0.038 
  (0.487) (0.490) (0.454) (0.581) (0.205) 
# Functional Areas  0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.007 
  (0.368) (0.385) (0.481) (0.474) (0.482) 
Has Finance Background (0/1)  -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.009 
  (0.536) (0.571) (0.507) (0.518) (0.665) 
Constant  0.557 1.045** 0.536 0.493 0.538 
  (0.120) (0.012) (0.139) (0.170) (0.126) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4693 4693 4693 4693 4693 
Adjusted R-squared  0.503 0.503 0.503 0.503 0.508 
       
Hansen's J-test (p-value)  0.729 0.614 0.821 0.852 0.834 
First-stage Instrumental Variables' Joint 
Significance (F-stat) 55.35 57.21 59.62 92.43 274.54 
 
  
 
Table 15 Continued. 
Panel C: The Size Beta from the Four-Factor Model 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Variables      
# Employers (+) -0.017     
  (0.287)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  -0.508    
   (0.333)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   -0.028   
    (0.276)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    0.098  
     (0.281)  
Industry Experience (-)     0.071 
      (0.282) 
       
(Control Variables: See Table B.1.5 of Appendix B)    
 
 
 
Panel D: The Book-to-Market Beta from the Four-Factor Model 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Variables      
# Employers (+) 0.032*     
  (0.083)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  1.098*    
   (0.062)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   0.047   
    (0.110)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    -0.162  
     (0.124)  
Industry Experience (-)     -0.120 
      (0.115) 
       
(Control Variables: See Table B.1.5 of Appendix B)  
 
 
 
Panel E: The Momentum Beta from the Four-Factor Model 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Variables      
# Employers (+) 0.010     
  (0.408)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  0.351    
   (0.377)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   0.019   
    (0.332)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    -0.074  
     (0.284)  
Industry Experience (-)     -0.053 
      (0.295) 
       
(Control Variables: See Table B.1.5 of Appendix B)   
   
  
 
Table 15 Continued. 
Panel F. CEO Employment History and Segment Herfindhal Index 
 Sales 
Operating 
Income CAPEX Assets Sales 
Operating 
Income CAPEX Assets 
#Employers -0.022*** -0.115** -0.017** -0.014*     
 (0.003) (0.047) (0.031) (0.071)     
Industry Experience 
Diversification 
    0.064* 0.482** 0.090** 0.066 
    (0.060) (0.023) (0.030) (0.115) 
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover HHI 0.576*** 0.110 0.570*** 0.576*** 0.568*** 0.109 0.566*** 0.569*** 
 (0.000) (0.186) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.195) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) -0.039*** -0.094** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.074** -0.032*** -0.032***
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age 0.004 -0.042 -0.012 -0.003 0.007 -0.031 -0.011 -0.002 
 (0.720) (0.537) (0.278) (0.800) (0.519) (0.635) (0.314) (0.860) 
Surplus Cash 0.050 -2.023*** -0.026 0.057 0.069 -1.933*** -0.014 0.068 
 (0.405) (0.000) (0.631) (0.378) (0.258) (0.001) (0.797) (0.291) 
Tobin's Q 0.009* -0.070 0.006 0.005 0.009* -0.069 0.007 0.005 
 (0.082) (0.101) (0.174) (0.309) (0.089) (0.105) (0.137) (0.309) 
R&D/Total Assets 0.189 5.873*** 0.279 0.561*** 0.178 5.753*** 0.264 0.553*** 
 (0.330) (0.001) (0.135) (0.001) (0.358) (0.001) (0.159) (0.001) 
 0.269 0.415 0.281 0.315 0.244 0.324 0.270 
 (0.210) (0.723) (0.197) (0.123) (0.261) (0.774) (0.217) (0.127) 
CAPEXP 0.005 1.154 0.323** 0.071 0.016 1.156 0.301** 0.060 
 (0.972) (0.233) (0.018) (0.637) (0.914) (0.230) (0.029) (0.692) 
Leverage 0.021 0.149 0.039 0.008 0.009 0.126 0.035 0.003 
 (0.635) (0.698) (0.401) (0.863) (0.832) (0.742) (0.444) (0.950) 
Pay Directors Equity 
Based Compensation 
0.001 0.060 -0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.056 -0.000 0.003 
(0.955) (0.557) (0.974) (0.793) (0.926) (0.586) (0.974) (0.843) 
Activist Institutional 
Holding (%) 
-0.426 -1.299 -0.377 -0.661* -0.417 -1.327 -0.382 -0.660* 
(0.230) (0.650) (0.347) (0.077) (0.243) (0.644) (0.343) (0.082) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
-0.029* 0.113 -0.032** -0.018 -0.027* 0.116 -0.030** -0.017 
(0.051) (0.349) (0.030) (0.219) (0.065) (0.336) (0.043) (0.255) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.004 -0.064 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.066 -0.006 -0.007 
(0.658) (0.126) (0.595) (0.402) (0.609) (0.115) (0.592) (0.386) 
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
0.045** -0.006 0.023 0.036* 0.042** -0.018 0.022 0.035* 
(0.016) (0.952) (0.334) (0.083) (0.023) (0.849) (0.350) (0.084) 
Herfindhal Index -0.437** -0.543 0.052 -0.588** -0.443** -0.590 0.041 -0.596** 
 (0.039) (0.415) (0.686) (0.028) (0.033) (0.362) (0.744) (0.024) 
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) -0.050*** -0.148 -0.034*** -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.113 -0.030*** -0.042***
 (0.000) (0.125) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.217) (0.004) (0.000) 
CEO Age 0.049 -0.210 0.017 0.061 0.003 -0.405 -0.005 0.039 
 (0.386) (0.667) (0.780) (0.296) (0.957) (0.364) (0.939) (0.487) 
MBA (0/1) -0.006 0.182* -0.004 0.001 -0.010 0.163* -0.004 0.001 
 (0.667) (0.060) (0.753) (0.913) (0.429) (0.081) (0.741) (0.952) 
Founder (0/1) 0.016 0.059 -0.005 0.022 0.030 0.114 0.000 0.028 
 (0.495) (0.799) (0.818) (0.354) (0.160) (0.596) (0.989) (0.218) 
# Functional Areas 0.014** 0.099 0.010 0.013* 0.011* 0.089 0.009 0.012* 
 (0.042) (0.141) (0.146) (0.063) (0.096) (0.188) (0.179) (0.078)
  
 
Table 15 Continued         
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
-0.009 -0.102 -0.010 0.003 -0.008 -0.091 -0.006 0.006 
(0.571) (0.388) (0.551) (0.840) (0.612) (0.437) (0.723) (0.711) 
Constant 0.092 2.247 0.507** 0.095 0.144 2.350 0.479* 0.089 
 (0.716) (0.185) (0.038) (0.747) (0.571) (0.156) (0.052) (0.762) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4869 4137 4036 4363 4869 4137 4036 4363 
R-squared 0.525 0.068 0.544 0.554 0.528 0.070 0.548 0.554 
Hansen's J-test (p-value) 0.556 0.252 0.632 0.345 0.498 0.373 0.619 0.233 
First-stage F-stat for 
Principal Comp. One 83.69 40.5 74.08 77.65 299.17 253.38 188.47 204.94 
 
 
Panel G. CEO Employment History and the likelihoods of Add or Reduce a Segment 
 
Reduce 
SIC Code 
Add 
SIC Code
Reduce 
Segment 
Add 
Segment
Reduce  
SIC Code 
Add 
SIC Code 
Reduce 
Segment 
Add 
Segment 
#Employers 0.048 0.198*** 0.058 0.186***     
 (0.414) (0.000) (0.361) (0.000)     
Industry Experience 
Diversification 
    -0.991** -1.476*** -1.174** -1.053***
    (0.031) (0.000) (0.010) (0.001) 
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover #Seg/Sic 1.293*** -0.298** 1.143*** -0.110 1.286*** -0.308** 1.140*** -0.123 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.162) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.115) 
ln(Total Sales) -0.198** 0.506*** -0.318*** 0.357*** -0.183* 0.485*** -0.299*** 0.330*** 
 (0.049) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.073) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) 
Firm Age 0.073 -0.010 -0.179 -0.041 0.126 0.002 -0.128 -0.041 
 (0.661) (0.944) (0.311) (0.739) (0.456) (0.987) (0.466) (0.737) 
Surplus Cash 1.108 -2.440** 0.642 -1.366* 1.062 -2.626** 0.672 -1.549* 
 (0.356) (0.028) (0.603) (0.094) (0.376) (0.020) (0.582) (0.063) 
Tobin's Q -0.244** -0.186 -0.278** -0.190** -0.254** -0.180 -0.289** -0.181** 
 (0.020) (0.127) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.159) (0.011) (0.030) 
R&D/Total Assets -5.180 -0.446 -3.225 1.999 -4.894 -0.561 -2.931 1.997 
 (0.147) (0.865) (0.399) (0.312) (0.166) (0.835) (0.436) (0.319) 
 4.438 -4.867 0.962 -4.518 4.173 -5.078 0.780 
 (0.273) (0.201) (0.797) (0.118) (0.300) (0.174) (0.833) (0.117) 
CAPEXP -5.186** -4.991** -4.398* -1.286 -4.577* -4.415* -3.715 -1.160 
 (0.035) (0.044) (0.099) (0.507) (0.063) (0.068) (0.166) (0.554) 
Leverage -0.530 -0.774 -0.053 0.280 -0.611 -0.804 -0.180 0.312 
 (0.469) (0.214) (0.944) (0.593) (0.406) (0.197) (0.812) (0.552) 
Pay Directors Equity 
Based Compensation 
0.493* 0.109 0.274 0.093 0.475 0.111 0.266 0.097 
(0.091) (0.608) (0.328) (0.580) (0.103) (0.596) (0.345) (0.559) 
Activist Institutional 
Holding (%) 
-3.760 -2.850 -6.157 0.409 -3.452 -2.908 -5.672 0.137 
(0.614) (0.645) (0.423) (0.939) (0.640) (0.638) (0.453) (0.980) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
-0.173 0.157 -0.674*** 0.069 -0.184 0.155 -0.702*** 0.059 
(0.582) (0.502) (0.010) (0.705) (0.553) (0.522) (0.006) (0.754) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.156 0.054 -0.205 -0.004 -0.148 0.057 -0.187 -0.001 
(0.546) (0.655) (0.334) (0.968) (0.572) (0.654) (0.387) (0.993) 
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Firm Characteristics (Continued)       
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
0.208 -0.175 0.323 -0.190 0.158 -0.189 0.234 -0.190 
(0.660) (0.485) (0.362) (0.417) (0.740) (0.449) (0.514) (0.416) 
Herfindhal Index 0.197 4.289 2.068 3.339 0.017 3.685 1.906 2.701 
 (0.935) (0.217) (0.321) (0.262) (0.994) (0.327) (0.359) (0.379) 
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) 0.515*** 0.930*** 0.400** 0.962*** 0.523*** 0.894*** 0.409** 0.903*** 
 (0.007) (0.000) (0.035) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000) 
CEO Age 0.324 -0.654 1.199 -0.170 0.217 -0.457 1.078 0.123 
 (0.731) (0.393) (0.225) (0.801) (0.821) (0.545) (0.274) (0.850) 
MBA (0/1) -0.507** -0.018 -0.179 0.030 -0.539** -0.040 -0.208 0.031 
 (0.037) (0.925) (0.469) (0.849) (0.028) (0.833) (0.392) (0.842) 
Founder (0/1) -0.532 -0.403 0.035 -0.292 -0.458 -0.380 0.141 -0.327 
 (0.217) (0.223) (0.930) (0.293) (0.287) (0.251) (0.727) (0.243) 
# Functional Areas 0.180 -0.051 -0.012 -0.143* 0.168 -0.039 -0.028 -0.130 
 (0.173) (0.629) (0.927) (0.097) (0.202) (0.704) (0.822) (0.129) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
-0.272 -0.339 -0.086 0.095 -0.319 -0.429* -0.141 0.053 
(0.311) (0.131) (0.768) (0.592) (0.234) (0.057) (0.629) (0.768) 
Constant -6.812* -2.635 -6.457* -4.286 -5.851 -1.721 -5.304 -3.919 
 (0.058) (0.415) (0.088) (0.135) (0.111) (0.597) (0.163) (0.170) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4873 4873 4873 4873 4873 4873 4873 4873 
Pseudo R2 0.271 0.271 0.241 0.241 0.273 0.273 0.241 0.241 
  
 
Table 16. The Principal Component of CEO Employment History Variables, Firm Policies and Risk 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for firm policies and risk using the first component from the principal 
component analysis to proxy for CEO employment history. The dependent variables are listed at the top of each 
column. Refer to Section 5.5 for details on the five equations. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Pre-turnover firm policies are the respective firm policies in the year before the CEO turnover year. 
Instrumental variables for the principal component are the unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his 
first full-time job, non-business career dummy that equals one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the 
number of years the CEO has worked in his current firm’s industry. The instrumental variable for CEO employment 
history*Industry Homogeneity in the R&D regression is the unemployment rate described above multiplied by 
industry homogeneity. The predicted signs for the CEO employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at 
the top of each column. Panel A presents loadings of the five CEO employment history proxies on the five principal 
components. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Principal Components Analysis of CEO Employment History Variables 
Variables Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5
# Employers 0.476 0.253 0.136 -0.029 0.831 
# Employer Changes per year 0.456 0.338 0.278 -0.644 -0.432 
Employer Change Recency 0.457 0.281 0.134 0.759 -0.343 
Firm Experience Diversification -0.456 0.169 0.866 0.092 0.072 
Industry Experience Diversification -0.385 0.845 -0.369 -0.005 0.024 
Eigenvalues 4.036 0.525 0.192 0.179 0.069 
Cumulative Proportions 80.71% 91.21% 95.04% 98.63% 100.00% 
 
Panel B. Firm Policies, Risk, and The First Principal Component 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D Adv. 
Total Risk
(Ann. Stock 
Return Std.)
Market 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk  
(4- Factor)
 (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
Principal Component 1 0.009** -0.003*** -0.005*** 0.001* 0.004* -0.011 0.004** 0.005** 
 (0.024) (0.005) (0.007) (0.092) (0.093) (0.257) (0.034) (0.015) 
Prin. Comp. 1 * Ind.  
Homogeneity 
 0.017*      
 (0.060)      
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover Policy 0.309*** 0.304*** 0.545*** 0.544*** 0.193*** 0.188*** 0.200*** 0.197*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.021*** -0.002** -0.002** 0.001* -0.019*** -0.032*** -0.019*** -0.019***
 (0.000) (0.034) (0.012) (0.094) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.005 0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.020*** -0.065*** -0.016*** -0.016***
 (0.501) (0.768) (0.004) (0.349) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.576***    -0.291*** -0.620*** -0.236*** -0.216***
(0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.021** 0.124*** -0.011     
  (0.013) (0.000) (0.248)     
Tobin's Q -0.022*** 0.003*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.008*** 0.057*** 0.005* 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.714) (0.009) (0.007) (0.000) (0.072) (0.126) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.358*** -0.039*  0.004 0.476*** 1.053*** 0.414*** 0.387*** 
 (0.000) (0.078)  (0.783) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets 0.016 -0.020  0.154 -0.116 0.177* 0.182* 
  (0.656) (0.582)  (0.172) (0.756) (0.098) (0.082) 
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Firm Characteristics (Continued)       
CAPEXP   -0.005 0.017* 0.289*** 0.550** 0.246*** 0.228*** 
   (0.746) (0.082) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.012 0.009** -0.006* 0.071*** 0.061 0.077*** 0.076*** 
  (0.104) (0.047) (0.059) (0.001) (0.420) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Homogeneity  0.005      
   (0.677)      
Capital Intensity 0.116***        
 (0.000)        
Depr./Total Assets -0.073        
 (0.692)        
Pay Directors Equity 
Based Compensation 
0.012* -0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.008 
(0.096) (0.752) (0.140) (0.100) (0.196) (0.909) (0.212) (0.191) 
Activist Institutional 
Holding (%) 
-0.242 -0.059 0.058 -0.013 -0.130 1.554** -0.283 -0.294 
(0.348) (0.346) (0.161) (0.739) (0.527) (0.025) (0.149) (0.125) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
0.016** -0.003 0.006*** 0.002** -0.014** -0.100*** -0.008 -0.006 
(0.027) (0.129) (0.004) (0.032) (0.045) (0.000) (0.179) (0.268) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.021 0.000 -0.000 
(0.110) (0.324) (0.221) (0.209) (0.563) (0.199) (0.987) (0.906) 
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
-0.018* -0.001 0.004** -0.002 -0.011 -0.074** -0.010 -0.009 
(0.059) (0.788) (0.028) (0.264) (0.153) (0.020) (0.148) (0.185) 
Herfindhal Index 0.353*** -0.037 -0.011 0.027 0.356*** 0.440 0.308*** 0.291*** 
 (0.004) (0.319) (0.636) (0.205) (0.001) (0.306) (0.002) (0.003) 
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) 0.003 -0.004** -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.578) (0.016) (0.908) (0.104) (0.936) (0.856) (0.649) (0.557) 
CEO Age -0.067** -0.016* -0.015** -0.002 -0.047* 0.064 -0.046** -0.046** 
 (0.031) (0.059) (0.024) (0.683) (0.065) (0.457) (0.047) (0.039) 
MBA (0/1) 0.014* -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.009* 0.008 -0.009* -0.009* 
 (0.068) (0.262) (0.330) (0.420) (0.091) (0.691) (0.070) (0.056) 
Founder (0/1) 0.015 -0.004 -0.005* -0.002 0.022** 0.047 0.020** 0.019** 
 (0.298) (0.224) (0.072) (0.301) (0.041) (0.177) (0.041) (0.039) 
# Functional Areas -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.001 
 (0.661) (0.421) (0.467) (0.377) (0.300) (0.489) (0.412) (0.571) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
0.009 -0.004 -0.005*** -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.001 
(0.299) (0.106) (0.001) (0.420) (0.898) (0.907) (0.848) (0.882) 
Constant 0.233* 0.139*** 0.086*** 0.004 0.597*** 0.914** 0.592*** 0.587*** 
 (0.092) (0.000) (0.002) (0.814) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4826 5029 4914 5074 4693 4693 4693 4693 
R-squared 0.572 0.521 0.767 0.635 0.636 0.450 0.656 0.654 
Hansen's J-test (p-value) 0.617 0.744 0.125 0.524 0.129 0.380 0.111 0.117 
First-stage F-stat for 
Principal Comp. One 99.93 110.23 45.53 82.57 94.71 84.22 96.33 96.57 
First-stage F-stat for Principal Comp. One * 
Industry Homogeneity 34.72      
  
 
Table 17. The Number Employers and CEO Turnover Announcement Returns for Stockholders. 
 
This table presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the announcement of CEO turnovers. Average CARS are presented for CEOs that have 
worked for one employer (#Employers=1) and for CEOs that have worked for five employers (#Employers>=5). I follow Parrino (1997) to classify a CEO 
turnover as forced or unforced. I exclude CEO turnovers that are results of CEO sudden death, merger and acquisitions and Spin-offs. I present results for two 
event windows: day -3 to day 1 and day -1 to day 1. The CARs are based on the market model using value weighted market index. Statistical significances are 
based on Patell Z statistic. Insiders are CEOs who have worked in the firm before assuming the CEO title of the firm. Outsiders are CEOs did not work in the 
firm before assuming the CEO title of the firm. I indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels with ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 
     Insiders Outsiders 
 Event Window Obs. CAR (%) Positive (%) Obs. CAR (%) Positive (%) Obs. CAR (%) Positive (%) 
All Turnovers           
# Employers =1 t=-3 to t=+1 175 -0.15% 48.00%       
 t=-1 to t=+1 175 -0.01% 49.14%       
# Employers >4 t=-3 to t=+1 185 1.57%*** 54.59%* 80 0.91%* 58.75%* 105 2.07%*** 59.05%** 
 t=-1 to t=+1 185 1.13%*** 54.05%* 80 1.02%** 55.00% 105 1.21%** 56.19%* 
Forced Turnovers           
# Employers =1 t=-3 to t=+1 11 -6.86%*** 27.27%*       
 t=-1 to t=+1 11 -2.81%* 27.27%*       
# Employers >4 t=-3 to t=+1 36 1.17% 59.46%* 7 0.03% 42.86% 29 2.55%** 65.52%** 
 t=-1 to t=+1 36 1.18%* 56.76%* 7 2.22%** 71.43%* 29 1.31% 55.17% 
Normal Succession           
# Employers =1 t=-3 to t=+1 147 0.20% 49.66%       
 t=-1 to t=+1 147 0.03% 49.66%       
# Employers>4 t=-3 to t=+1 122 1.46%** 51.64% 63 1.22%* 52.38% 59 1.71%** 61.02%* 
 t=-1 to t=+1 122 1.15%*** 53.28% 63 0.97%* 55.56% 59 1.35%** 54.24% 
Prior one-year industry-adjusted stock return is positive      
# Employers =1 t=-3 to t=+1 90 0.56% 54.44%       
 t=-1 to t=+1 90 0.13% 50.00%       
# Employers >4 t=-3 to t=+1 75 0.50% 45.33% 40 0.57% 42.50% 35 0.42% 48.57% 
 t=-1 to t=+1 75 -0.09% 41.33%* 40 -0.02% 47.50% 35 -0.18% 34.29** 
Prior one-year industry-adjusted stock return is negative      
# Employers =1 t=-3 to t=+1 80 -0.78%** 41.25%       
 t=-1 to t=+1 80 -0.13% 48%       
# Employers >4 t=-3 to t=+1 106 2.23%*** 60.38%*** 38 1.59%** 55% 68 2.59%*** 63.24%*** 
  t=-1 to t=+1 106 1.94%*** 63.21%*** 38 1.82%*** 63.16%** 68 2.01%*** 63.24%*** 
           
  
 
 Table 18. CEO Employment History and the Event Study CARs 
This table presents WLS results for the cross-sectional regression of CARs on CEO employment history and other 
CEO characteristics. The weights in WLS are the inverse of the standard deviation of the market model residuals. 
The dependent variable is the CAR from the event window [-3, 1]. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable 
definitions. The CARs are based on the market model using value weighted market index. I follow Parrino (1997) to 
classify a CEO turnover as forced or unforced. I exclude CEO turnovers that are results of CEO sudden death, 
merger and acquisitions and Spin-offs.  Insiders are CEOs who have worked in the firm before assuming the CEO 
title of the firm. I report p-values based on robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 All Turnovers 
Insider  
Successions  All Turnovers 
Insider  
Successions 
# Employers 0.002 0.003*   
 (0.122) (0.066)   
#Employers Quartiles   0.004** 0.004* 
   (0.043) (0.089) 
Ln(Total Sales) -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.361) (0.267) (0.437) (0.281) 
Lag(Operating Return on Assets) -0.060** -0.012 -0.059** -0.013 
 (0.035) (0.700) (0.035) (0.672) 
Ln(CEO Age) 0.004 0.019 0.005 0.020 
 (0.800) (0.267) (0.772) (0.255) 
MBA (0/1) 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.613) (0.862) (0.693) (0.899) 
# Functional Areas -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.505) (0.951) (0.462) (0.967) 
Has Finance Background (0/1) -0.003 -0.008 -0.003 -0.008* 
 (0.531) (0.109) (0.512) (0.100) 
Forced Turnover (0/1) -0.003 -0.030*** -0.004 -0.029*** 
 (0.618) (0.002) (0.591) (0.002) 
Constant -0.183 -0.078 -0.189 -0.080 
 (0.219) (0.498) (0.203) (0.487) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 865 633 865 633 
R-squared 0.108 0.136 0.110 0.136 
  
 
Table 19. The Number of Employers and Long-run Performance 
The table presents change in industry-median-adjusted accounting/stock performance following CEO turnovers. Panel A reports comparison on long-run 
performance for three years following CEO turnovers. Panel B reports comparison on variances of post-turnover performance for CEOs that have worked for 
different numbers of employers. For variable definitions, refer to Appendix A and Table 1. I report changes in performance for year -1 to +1, year -1 to +2, year -
1 to +3. Year 0 is the year of CEO turnover. # Employers is the number of employer the CEO has worked for. Survival ratio is the number of CEOs who remain 
as CEOs for the year of interest divided by the total number of CEOs in that group at year 1. Year 1 is one year after the year of CEO turn over. Statistical 
significances are based on p-values of t-tests for differences in means and of signed rank test for differences in medians. I indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A. #Employers and Long-run Industry-median Adjusted Changes in Performance 
 Number of Employers=1  Number of Employers>=5  Differences 
 Obs. Mean Median  Obs. Mean Median  Mean Median 
Variance 
(p-value) 
  Year t=-1 to t=1 
OROA 127 -0.003 -0.001  164 0.005 0.000  0.007 0.001 0.000 
Annual Stock Return 127 -0.035 -0.041  160 0.047 0.089*  0.082* 0.129** 0.000 
Return on Equity 127 0.006 -0.001  164 0.029 0.003  0.023 0.004 0.000 
Tobin’s Q 127 0.004 -0.160*  160 -0.097 -0.121  -0.102 0.039 0.000 
Sales Growth 127 -0.040 -0.022*  163 0.006 0.001  0.046* 0.023 0.043 
  Year t=-1 to t=2 
OROA 126 -0.002 0.001  148 0.002 -0.005  0.003 -0.006 0.000 
Annual Stock Return 126 -0.007 0.024  144 0.122* 0.062*  0.129* 0.038* 0.000 
Return on Equity 126 -0.006 -0.004  148 0.037 -0.002  0.043 0.001 0.000 
Tobin’s Q 126 -0.201* -0.090*  144 -0.257 -0.120  -0.056 -0.030 0.000 
Sales Growth 126 -0.044* -0.011  147 0.003 0.020  0.047 0.031* 0.190 
  Year t=-1 to t=3 
OROA 124 -0.002 0.000  130 0.004 -0.001  0.006 -0.001 0.000 
Annual Stock Return 124 0.037 0.030  126 0.095* 0.093*  0.058 0.063 0.000 
Return on Equity 124 0.001 -0.005  130 0.029 0.007  0.028 0.012 0.000 
Tobin’s Q 124 -0.067 -0.105  126 -0.142 -0.279  -0.075 -0.174 0.000 
Sales Growth 124 -0.035 -0.024  129 0.023 0.037  0.058* 0.061** 0.025 
 
 
  
 
Table 19 Continued. 
Panel B. #Employers and Variance in Post-turnover Industry Median Adjusted Changes in Performance 
      All Categories #Employers=1 Vs. #Employers>=5 
 # Employers=1 # Employers>=5 
Differences  
in Means 
Levene's Test for 
Homogeneity of 
Variance 
Differences  
in Means 
Levene's Test for 
Homogeneity of 
Variance 
 Obs. Mean Std. Obs. Mean Std. F-stat p-value F-stat p-value F-stat p-value F-stat p-value 
OROA 1125 -0.002 0.081 993 0.010 0.123 4.29 0.000 29.34 0.000 6.20 0.013 72.35 0.000 
Annual Stock Return 1079 -0.026 0.517 924 0.091 0.665 10.28 0.000 14.96 0.000 19.68 0.000 25.61 0.000 
Return on Equity 1125 0.013 0.244 986 0.022 0.426 2.45 0.061 19.29 0.000 0.36 0.547 53.17 0.000 
Tobin’s Q 1088 0.126 3.112 924 -0.351 3.811 3.39 0.017 2.86 0.036 9.54 0.002 4.62 0.032 
Sales Growth 1098 -0.034 0.266 967 0.002 0.335 2.59 0.051 19.38 0.000 7.54 0.006 16.29 0.000 
  
 
Table 20. The Number Employers and CEO Turnover Announcement Returns for Bondholders 
This table presents the mean abnormal announcement bond returns for the month of CEO turnovers. I compute the 
abnormal bond returns as the actual bond returns for the month of CEO turnover minus the expected bond returns 
based the average of bond returns from month -4 to month -2. Abnormal bond return premium is the actual bond 
return premium for the month of CEO turnover minus the expected bond return premium based on the average of 
bond returns from month -4 to month -2. Bond return premium is the raw bond return subtracts the maturity-
matched return on Treasury bonds. Abnormal Yield to Maturity is the actual YTM in the month of CEO turnover 
minus the expected YTM which is computed as the average of YTM from month -4 to month -2. Abnormal Bond 
Spread is the actual bond spread minus the expected bond spread, which is the average of bond spread form month -
4 to month -2. Bond spread is computed as the bond’s YTM subtracts the maturity-matched yield on Treasury 
bonds. I indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
  # Emp. =1 # Emp. =2 # Emp. =3, 4 # Emp.>=5 Differences 
in Means  Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Abnormal YTM 34 -0.74%* 32 -0.02% 31 -0.15% 24 0.18% 0.66% 
Abnormal Bond Spread 34 -0.36% 32 0.15% 31 0.03% 24 0.26% 0.62% 
Abnormal Bond Return 34 0.21% 32 -0.09% 31 1.63% 24 -0.41% -0.62% 
Abnormal Bond Return 
Premium 34 0.59% 32 0.08% 31 1.81% 24 -0.33% -0.92% 
  
 
Table 21. Summary Statistics for the Cost of Debt 
This table presents summary statistics for the two costs of debt variables for firms with bond spreads and rating data 
available. I compute Bond spread as the bond’s YTM subtracts the maturity-matched yield on Treasury bonds. The 
dependent variable is the S&P credit rating number. Rating of AAA has a value of 1 for the rating number variable 
and CCC- has a value of 17 for the rating number variable. I present the distribution of firms in each bond rating in 
Panel B. Appendix A contains information on how credit rating letters are converted to rating numbers. The detailed 
computation for bond spread is in Section 7.2.  
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics for Bond Spread and Credit Rating 
Variables Obs. Mean Median Max. Min. Std. 
S&P Credit Rating (Whole Sample) 2,866 9.006 9 16 1 3.035 
S&P Credit Rating (Sample for 
Regression) 1,998 8.596 9 16 1 3.147 
Bond Spread (Whole Sample) 1,292 0.023 0.016 0.112 -0.002 0.019 
Bond Spread (Sample for Regression) 718 0.022 0.015 0.112 -0.002 0.020 
 
 
 
Panel B. The distribution of observations in Credit Rating Categories 
  
Bond Rating 
Bond 
Rating 
Number Obs. % of Obs. Cumulative % 
AAA 1 42 1.47% 1.47% 
AA+ 2 12 0.42% 1.88% 
AA 3 70 2.44% 4.33% 
AA- 4 77 2.69% 7.01% 
A+ 5 160 5.58% 12.60% 
A 6 254 8.86% 21.46% 
A- 7 255 8.90% 30.36% 
BBB+ 8 291 10.15% 40.51% 
BBB 9 474 16.54% 57.05% 
BBB- 10 342 11.93% 68.98% 
BB+ 11 223 7.78% 76.76% 
BB 12 256 8.93% 85.69% 
BB- 13 238 8.30% 94.00% 
B+ 14 113 3.94% 97.94% 
B 15 42 1.47% 99.41% 
B- 16 17 0.59% 100.00% 
Total  2,866 100.00%  
  
 
Table 22. CEO Employment History and the Bond Spread 
 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for a firm’s bond spread on a sample of 718 firm years. The dependent variable 
is the bond spread, which is measured as the bond’s YTM subtracts the maturity-matched yield on Treasury bonds. 
The detailed computation for bond spread is in Section 7.2. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Instrumental variables are the unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his first full-time 
job, non-business career dummy that equals one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the number of 
years the CEO has worked in his current firm’s industry. Pre-turnover bond spread is the firm’s bond spread in the 
year before the CEO turnover year. I report p-values of Hansen’s J-test and first-stage F-stat at the bottom of the 
table. The values of the five CEO employment history proxies in the IV/2SLS estimations are predicted values. The 
predicted signs for the CEO employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at the beginning of each row. I 
report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Whole Sample (718 Obs.) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Variables      
# Employers (+) 0.002*     
  (0.098)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  0.049    
   (0.141)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   0.003   
    (0.134)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    -0.007  
     (0.182)  
Industry Experience 
Diversification (-)     -0.006* 
      (0.092) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Spread  0.202*** 0.205*** 0.196*** 0.218*** 0.223*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Duration  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) 
Convexity  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
  (0.050) (0.044) (0.037) (0.028) (0.033) 
ln(Total Sales)  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.515) (0.542) (0.568) (0.623) (0.586) 
Annual Stock Return  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.397) (0.445) (0.338) (0.383) (0.414) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
  (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) 
Leverage  0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.971) (0.906) (0.973) (0.938) (0.927) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  0.046 0.039 0.036 0.039 0.025 
  (0.646) (0.693) (0.724) (0.694) (0.799) 
CEO Cash Compensation  0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
CEO Compensation Delta  0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.254) (0.204) (0.413) (0.314) (0.309) 
  
 
Table 22 Continued.       
Firm Characteristics (Continued)       
CEO Compensation Vega  -0.005 -0.005* -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.110) (0.090) (0.156) (0.149) (0.131) 
Herfindhal Index  0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.881) (0.891) (0.926) (0.954) (0.959) 
CEO Characteristics       
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
  (0.317) (0.308) (0.290) (0.242) (0.200) 
CEO Age  -0.012 -0.003 -0.012 -0.010 -0.009 
  (0.223) (0.815) (0.218) (0.317) (0.354) 
MBA (0/1)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.926) (0.971) (0.928) (0.924) (0.936) 
Founder (0/1)  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (0.513) (0.511) (0.630) (0.516) (0.555) 
# Functional Areas  -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.796) (0.825) (0.991) (0.999) (0.984) 
Has Finance Background (0/1)  0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004 
  (0.086) (0.078) (0.088) (0.082) (0.129) 
Constant  0.078* 0.043 0.081* 0.081* 0.080* 
  (0.070) (0.446) (0.055) (0.060) (0.060) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  718 718 718 718 718 
Adjusted R-squared  0.389 0.391 0.391 0.398 0.405 
       
Hansen’s J-test (p-value)  0.353 0.297 0.262 0.259 0.338 
First-stage Instrumental Variables’ Joint 
Significance (F-stat) 11.42 12.64 11.32 20.77 76.77 
 
 
 
Panel B: A subsample of firms with Bond Ratings of BBB- and Better (527 Obs.) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Variables      
# Employers (+) 0.002**     
  (0.033)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  0.051**    
   (0.033)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   0.003*   
    (0.056)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    -0.009**  
     (0.047)  
Industry Experience 
Diversification (-)     -0.007* 
      (0.057) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Spread  0.217** 0.207* 0.213** 0.216** 0.198** 
  (0.044) (0.056) (0.041) (0.033) (0.049) 
Duration  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
  (0.100) (0.103) (0.088) (0.057) (0.096) 
  
 
Table 22 Continued.       
Firm Characteristics (Continued)       
Convexity  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
  (0.195) (0.197) (0.137) (0.095) (0.132) 
ln(Total Sales)  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002*** 
  (0.168) (0.154) (0.101) (0.107) (0.010) 
Firm Age  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.567) (0.568) (0.585) (0.443) (0.566) 
Annual Stock Return  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.496) (0.549) (0.378) (0.439) (0.444) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
  (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.015) (0.026) 
Leverage  0.012*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 0.002 0.003 0.003* 0.002 0.002 
 (0.121) (0.113) (0.092) (0.199) (0.220) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  -0.005 0.000 -0.010 -0.001 0.006 
  (0.949) (0.997) (0.897) (0.991) (0.928) 
CEO Cash Compensation  0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO Compensation Delta  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
  (0.280) (0.252) (0.380) (0.245) (0.327) 
CEO Compensation Vega  -0.004 -0.004* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.119) (0.095) (0.169) (0.161) (0.168) 
Herfindhal Index  0.020 0.022 0.020 0.025 0.021 
  (0.385) (0.325) (0.393) (0.264) (0.370) 
CEO Characteristics       
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.552) (0.586) (0.478) (0.529) (0.443) 
CEO Age  0.001 0.010 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.923) (0.226) (0.968) (0.940) (0.892) 
MBA (0/1)  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (0.278) (0.283) (0.320) (0.372) (0.311) 
Founder (0/1)  0.005 0.006* 0.005* 0.006 0.005 
  (0.125) (0.099) (0.093) (0.106) (0.118) 
# Functional Areas  -0.002** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
  (0.026) (0.037) (0.055) (0.079) (0.061) 
Has Finance Background (0/1)  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
  (0.101) (0.112) (0.134) (0.143) (0.247) 
Constant  -0.006 -0.043 -0.000 0.005 0.008 
  (0.849) (0.254) (0.992) (0.883) (0.811) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  527 527 527 527 527 
Adjusted R-squared  0.365 0.359 0.368 0.364 0.372 
       
Hansen's J-test (p-value)  0.269 0.300 0.189 0.247 0.172 
First-stage Instrumental Variables' Joint 
Significance (F-stat) 13.82 13.02 13.35 19.45 69.1 
 
 
  
 
Table 23. CEO Employment History and the S&P Credit Ratings 
 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for a firm’s bond ratings on a sample of 1,998 firm years. The dependent 
variable is the S&P credit rating number. Rating of AAA has a value of 1 for the rating number variable and B- has 
a value of 16 for the rating number variable. Appendix A contains information on how credit rating letters are 
converted to rating numbers. Also refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable definitions. Instrumental variables 
are the unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his first full-time job, non-business career dummy that 
equals one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the number of years the CEO has worked in his 
current firm’s industry. Pre-turnover credit rating is the firm’s credit rating in the year before the CEO turnover year. 
I report p-values of Hansen’s J-test and first-stage F-stat at the bottom of the table. The values of the five CEO 
employment history proxies in the IV/2SLS estimations are predicted values. The predicted signs for the CEO 
employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at the beginning of each row. I report p-values based on 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Whole Sample (1,998 Obs) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Variables      
# Employers (+) 0.096     
  (0.115)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  2.979    
   (0.129)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   0.144   
    (0.143)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    -0.468  
     (0.200)  
Industry Experience 
Diversification 
(-)     -0.353 
     (0.388) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Ratings  0.646*** 0.644*** 0.646*** 0.650*** 0.655*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales)  -0.420*** -0.421*** -0.425*** -0.423*** -0.432*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age  -0.047 -0.042 -0.037 -0.023 -0.034 
  (0.696) (0.722) (0.754) (0.844) (0.772) 
Annual Stock Return  0.352*** 0.350*** 0.343*** 0.353*** 0.354*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.057** -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.057** -0.056** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) 
Leverage  2.033** 2.033** 2.053** 2.061** 2.082** 
  (0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.037) (0.035) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 0.047 0.051 0.053 0.060 0.062 
 (0.750) (0.731) (0.719) (0.682) (0.671) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  -1.427 -1.236 -1.435 -1.642 -2.024 
  (0.807) (0.832) (0.807) (0.779) (0.735) 
CEO Cash Compensation  0.348** 0.348** 0.341* 0.355** 0.356** 
  (0.048) (0.049) (0.053) (0.043) (0.043) 
CEO Compensation Delta  -0.179 -0.178 -0.191 -0.187 -0.182 
  (0.275) (0.278) (0.239) (0.242) (0.261) 
CEO Compensation Vega  -0.219 -0.226 -0.203 -0.212 -0.213 
  (0.402) (0.388) (0.436) (0.412) (0.414) 
Herfindhal Index  -0.285 -0.292 -0.309 -0.371 -0.429 
  (0.795) (0.790) (0.779) (0.741) (0.700) 
  
 
Table 23 Continued       
CEO Characteristics       
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  -0.119 -0.124 -0.101 -0.120 -0.124 
  (0.475) (0.457) (0.537) (0.459) (0.449) 
CEO Age  -0.351 0.113 -0.369 -0.333 -0.335 
  (0.672) (0.894) (0.657) (0.688) (0.689) 
MBA (0/1)  0.236 0.231 0.237 0.239 0.247 
  (0.214) (0.226) (0.214) (0.211) (0.199) 
Founder (0/1)  0.585 0.604 0.580 0.594 0.539 
  (0.147) (0.131) (0.150) (0.142) (0.189) 
# Functional Areas  -0.055 -0.049 -0.036 -0.038 -0.035 
  (0.552) (0.596) (0.684) (0.670) (0.701) 
Has Finance Background (0/1)  0.177 0.171 0.179 0.176 0.164 
  (0.339) (0.355) (0.333) (0.339) (0.369) 
Constant  7.252** 5.424 7.354** 7.579** 7.538** 
  (0.026) (0.112) (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 
Adjusted R-squared  0.768 0.767 0.769 0.768 0.767 
       
Hansen's J-test (p-value)  0.137 0.135 0.128 0.116 0.108 
First-stage Instrumental Variables' Joint 
Significance (F-stat) 88.97 82.32 93.96 107.09 107.04 
 
Panel B: A subsample of firms with Bond Ratings of BBB- and Better (1,204 Obs) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Variabels      
# Employers (+) 0.137**     
  (0.024)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  4.386**    
   (0.028)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   0.209**   
    (0.037)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    -0.610*  
     (0.078)  
Industry Experience 
Diversification (-)     -0.514 
      (0.173) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Ratings  0.600*** 0.597*** 0.605*** 0.609*** 0.615*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales)  -0.263*** -0.265*** -0.260*** -0.262*** -0.271*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Firm Age  0.175 0.178 0.175 0.202 0.180 
  (0.175) (0.169) (0.170) (0.121) (0.182) 
Annual Stock Return  0.358*** 0.363*** 0.356*** 0.344*** 0.336*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.065*** -0.064*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
  
 
Table 23 Continued.       
Firm Characteristics (Continued)       
Leverage  0.691 0.703 0.719 0.746 0.770 
  (0.460) (0.453) (0.437) (0.419) (0.409) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 0.183 0.195 0.191 0.184 0.177 
 (0.253) (0.226) (0.227) (0.241) (0.269) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  3.636 3.995 3.842 3.487 4.036 
  (0.593) (0.559) (0.580) (0.608) (0.560) 
CEO Cash Compensation  -0.157 -0.160 -0.155 -0.144 -0.134 
  (0.442) (0.435) (0.439) (0.474) (0.508) 
CEO Compensation Delta  -0.308*** -0.309*** -0.325*** -0.314*** -0.314*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
CEO Compensation Vega  0.099 0.090 0.111 0.104 0.105 
  (0.631) (0.662) (0.593) (0.613) (0.613) 
Herfindhal Index  2.155 2.235 1.993 1.927 1.871 
  (0.162) (0.149) (0.184) (0.219) (0.228) 
CEO Characteristics       
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  -0.117 -0.124 -0.072 -0.112 -0.120 
  (0.608) (0.586) (0.745) (0.612) (0.592) 
CEO Age  -1.044 -0.376 -1.124 -1.027 -1.068 
  (0.226) (0.677) (0.192) (0.236) (0.231) 
MBA (0/1)  0.326* 0.328* 0.328* 0.330* 0.349** 
  (0.064) (0.063) (0.066) (0.062) (0.050) 
Founder (0/1)  0.579 0.622 0.606 0.618 0.597 
  (0.142) (0.110) (0.132) (0.123) (0.156) 
# Functional Areas  -0.026 -0.022 0.001 0.010 0.009 
  (0.776) (0.815) (0.992) (0.913) (0.917) 
Has Finance Background (0/1)  0.071 0.057 0.068 0.070 0.046 
  (0.708) (0.764) (0.718) (0.712) (0.808) 
Constant  8.686*** 6.031* 9.006*** 9.053*** 9.186*** 
  (0.005) (0.064) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1204 1204 1204 1204 1204 
Adjusted R-squared  0.704 0.703 0.706 0.704 0.700 
       
Hansen's J-test (p-value)  0.269 0.244 0.213 0.144 0.118 
First-stage Instrumental Variables' Joint 
Significance (F-stat) 72.51 61.40 79.38 99.29 109.27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix B: Robustness Tables 
 
B.1 Alternative Model Specifications 
(1). Alternative Dependent Variables 
Table B.1.1: Use industry-median-adjusted policies as dependent variables 
Table B.1.2: Use change in policies as dependent variables  
Table B.1.3: Use Book Leverage as the dependent variable 
Table B.1.4: Use Intangible Ratio as the dependent variable 
 Table B.1.5: Use Four-factor model betas as dependent variables 
(2). Alternative CEO Employment History Measures 
Table B.1.6: Using values in the year of CEO turnover for CEO employment history 
measures (The values for these variables will not change for every firm year) 
Table B.1.7: Including an interaction term between CEO employment history and a 
dummy variable that equals one if the respective pre-turnover firm policy is above industry 
median. 
(3). Control Variables 
Table B.1.8: Subsample with Board Size and Insider Ratio Information 
Table B.1.9: Include a insider dummy 
Table B.1.10: Industry Dummies, no Herfindhal Index 
B.2 Alternative Estimation Methods 
Table B.2.1: OLS Results 
Table B.2.2: Between effects  
Table B.2.3: Heckman Selection Model when the dependent variable is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the CEO has worked for more than five employers and zero otherwise 
Table B.2.4: Subsamples of the first-five (three) years’ policy of CEOs that have been the 
CEO for five (three) or more years 
Table B.2.5: Comparison of long-run performance using a matched sample 
B.3 Results for other CEO employment history variables.  
These results are discussed in the text, but only presented for #Employer. This section 
include the results for other four CEO employment history variables 
 Table B.3.1: Univariate Comparison for Pre-turnover firm policies 
 
 
  
 
Table B.1.1: Use Industry-median-adjusted Policies as Dependent Variables 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for post-turnover industry-median-adjusted firm policies and risk. The 
dependent variables are listed at the top of each column. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Pre-turnover firm policies are the respective firm policies in the year before the CEO turnover year. Instrumental 
variables for #Employers are the unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his first fulltime job, non-
business career dummy that equals one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the number of years the 
CEO has worked in his current firm’s industry. The instrumental variable for CEO employment history*Industry 
Homogeneity in the R&D regression is the unemployment rate described above multiplied by industry homogeneity. 
The predicted signs for the CEO employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at the top of each column. 
I report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis.***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D Adv. 
Total Risk
(Daily 
Stock Ret. 
Std.) 
Market 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(4- Factor)
 (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
#Employers 0.009* -0.004*** -0.016** 0.001* 0.005 -0.012 0.006* 0.007** 
 (0.086) (0.005) (0.013) (0.057) (0.128) (0.287) (0.052) (0.029) 
#Employers * Ind.  
Homogeneity 
 0.070**      
 (0.027)      
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover Policy 0.313*** 0.306*** 0.496*** 0.537*** 0.183*** 0.177*** 0.184*** 0.182*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.022*** -0.003*** -0.002** 0.001 -0.018*** -0.036*** -0.019*** -0.018***
 (0.000) (0.009) (0.016) (0.169) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.005 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.022*** -0.059*** -0.020*** -0.019***
 (0.469) (0.767) (0.001) (0.152) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.565***    -0.199*** -0.622*** -0.154*** -0.138***
(0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.018** 0.146*** -0.010     
  (0.049) (0.000) (0.299)     
Tobin's Q -0.018*** 0.002*** -0.001 0.001** 0.003 0.045*** -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.437) (0.014) (0.322) (0.000) (0.872) (0.726) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.319*** -0.040*  0.003 0.265*** 0.802*** 0.237*** 0.220*** 
 (0.000) (0.075)  (0.829) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Adv./Total Assets  0.029 -0.037  0.165 0.135 0.197 0.199 
  (0.414) (0.321)  (0.281) (0.671) (0.217) (0.206) 
CAPEXP   -0.021 0.012 0.127* 0.214 0.123* 0.112* 
   (0.319) (0.197) (0.054) (0.254) (0.059) (0.079) 
Leverage  -0.008 0.007 -0.005 0.082*** 0.094 0.086*** 0.085*** 
  (0.273) (0.278) (0.125) (0.001) (0.171) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Homogeneity    -0.228**     
   (0.022)      
Capital Intensity 0.117***        
 (0.000)        
Depr./Total Assets -0.148        
 (0.419)        
Pay Directors Equity 
Based Compensation 
0.007 -0.001 0.003* 0.002* 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.006 
(0.286) (0.735) (0.095) (0.079) (0.404) (0.759) (0.458) (0.415) 
         
  
 
Table B.1.1 Continued         
Firm Characteristics (Continued) 
Activist Institutional 
Holding (%) 
-0.155 -0.103 0.088* -0.019 -0.278 1.407** -0.393* -0.406** 
(0.543) (0.115) (0.093) (0.643) (0.171) (0.023) (0.058) (0.045) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
0.006 -0.003 0.008*** 0.003*** -0.003 -0.055** -0.002 -0.001 
(0.428) (0.117) (0.001) (0.007) (0.695) (0.023) (0.828) (0.846) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.007* -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.023 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.085) (0.489) (0.953) (0.118) (0.665) (0.104) (0.359) (0.335) 
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
-0.026*** -0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.009 -0.063** -0.008 -0.006 
(0.006) (0.746) (0.181) (0.348) (0.332) (0.021) (0.372) (0.439) 
Herfindhal Index 0.745*** -0.033 0.016 -0.003 0.225 0.001 0.157 0.153 
 (0.000) (0.391) (0.647) (0.885) (0.129) (0.998) (0.246) (0.253) 
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.508) (0.222) (0.348) (0.570) (0.260) (0.569) (0.193) (0.187) 
CEO Age -0.060* -0.012 -0.023*** -0.005 -0.041 0.061 -0.045* -0.047* 
 (0.075) (0.168) (0.006) (0.268) (0.123) (0.439) (0.086) (0.067) 
MBA (0/1) 0.016** -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.010* -0.012 -0.009 -0.009* 
 (0.035) (0.696) (0.215) (0.346) (0.093) (0.507) (0.104) (0.091) 
Founder (0/1) 0.015 -0.006 -0.003 -0.000 0.018 0.037 0.016 0.016 
 (0.295) (0.103) (0.372) (0.812) (0.109) (0.290) (0.118) (0.117) 
# Functional Areas -0.003 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.011 0.003 0.002 
 (0.460) (0.820) (0.556) (0.343) (0.160) (0.247) (0.290) (0.404) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
0.014 -0.004 -0.007*** -0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
(0.125) (0.127) (0.003) (0.494) (0.702) (0.919) (0.817) (0.851) 
Constant 0.053 0.108** 0.172*** 0.017 0.144 0.437 0.165 0.175* 
 (0.679) (0.019) (0.000) (0.361) (0.193) (0.193) (0.124) (0.095) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4826 5029 4914 5074 4693 4693 4693 4693 
R-squared 0.500 0.272 0.628 0.574 0.516 0.230 0.534 0.537 
Hansen's J-test (p-value) 0.618 0.643 0.772 0.645 0.129 0.659 0.217 0.25 
First Stage F-stat for 
#Employers 
49.86 52.75 39.93 47.94 62.19 75.3 61.12 61.11 
First Stage F-stat for #Employers * Industry
Homogeneity 
26.85 
     
 
 
  
 
Table B.1.2: Use Changes in Policies as the Dependent Variables 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for changes in firm policies and risk. The dependent variables are listed at the 
top of each column. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable definitions. Pre-turnover firm policies are the 
respective firm policies in the year before the CEO turnover year. Instrumental variables for #Employers are the 
unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his first fulltime job, non-business career dummy that equals 
one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the number of years the CEO has worked in his current firm’s 
industry. The instrumental variable for CEO employment history*Industry Homogeneity in the R&D regression is 
the unemployment rate described above multiplied by industry homogeneity. The predicted signs for the CEO 
employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at the top of each column. I report p-values based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D Adv. 
Total Risk
(Daily 
Stock 
Return Std.)
Market 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk  
(4- Factor)
 (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
#Employers 0.012** -0.004*** -0.013** 0.001* 0.006* -0.008 0.007** 0.007*** 
 (0.028) (0.005) (0.016) (0.072) (0.063) (0.512) (0.016) (0.007) 
#Employers * Ind. 
Homogeneity  
 0.054**      
 (0.039)      
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover Policy -0.693*** -0.698*** -0.444*** -0.457*** -0.809*** -0.810*** -0.803*** -0.807***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.022*** -0.002** -0.002** 0.001* -0.018*** -0.030*** -0.019*** -0.018***
 (0.000) (0.024) (0.043) (0.067) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.005 0.001 -0.003** 0.001 -0.020*** -0.062*** -0.017*** -0.016***
 (0.481) (0.771) (0.011) (0.344) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.575***    -0.292*** -0.622*** -0.237*** -0.217***
(0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.020** 0.120*** -0.011     
  (0.018) (0.000) (0.251)     
Tobin's Q -0.022*** 0.003*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.008*** 0.057*** 0.005* 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.703) (0.008) (0.007) (0.000) (0.068) (0.119) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.356*** -0.039*  0.005 0.476*** 1.058*** 0.414*** 0.387*** 
 (0.000) (0.083)  (0.764) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets  0.017 -0.031  0.154 -0.127 0.177* 0.183* 
  (0.635) (0.423)  (0.171) (0.733) (0.098) (0.082) 
CAPEXP   -0.005 0.017* 0.289*** 0.559*** 0.245*** 0.227*** 
   (0.773) (0.083) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.012 0.006 -0.006* 0.070*** 0.051 0.075*** 0.075*** 
  (0.117) (0.296) (0.057) (0.001) (0.492) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Homogeneity   -0.163**      
   (0.048)      
Capital Intensity 0.122***        
 (0.000)        
Depr./Total Assets -0.109        
 (0.560)        
Pay Directors Equity 
Based Compensation 
0.011 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.008 
(0.105) (0.779) (0.156) (0.107) (0.205) (0.873) (0.225) (0.203) 
  
 
         
Table B.1.2 Continued         
Firm Characteristics (Continued) 
Activist Institutional 
Holding (%) 
-0.246 -0.060 0.063 -0.013 -0.134 1.520** -0.288 -0.299 
(0.343) (0.342) (0.156) (0.747) (0.515) (0.029) (0.144) (0.121) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
0.016** -0.003 0.007*** 0.002** -0.014** -0.100*** -0.008 -0.006 
(0.034) (0.153) (0.001) (0.036) (0.040) (0.000) (0.159) (0.238) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.007 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.022 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.106) (0.371) (0.744) (0.221) (0.574) (0.185) (0.991) (0.882) 
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
-0.018* -0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.011 -0.075** -0.010 -0.009 
(0.058) (0.771) (0.203) (0.261) (0.149) (0.018) (0.145) (0.183) 
Herfindhal Index 0.356*** -0.038 -0.006 0.028 0.357*** 0.397 0.310*** 0.292*** 
 (0.003) (0.319) (0.821) (0.202) (0.001) (0.361) (0.001) (0.002) 
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) 0.004 -0.004** -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.544) (0.015) (0.768) (0.131) (0.882) (0.861) (0.714) (0.619) 
CEO Age -0.083** -0.011 -0.012 -0.004 -0.055** 0.070 -0.056** -0.057** 
 (0.013) (0.232) (0.107) (0.421) (0.032) (0.427) (0.018) (0.013) 
MBA (0/1) 0.014* -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.010* 0.004 -0.010* -0.010** 
 (0.075) (0.319) (0.211) (0.387) (0.079) (0.853) (0.060) (0.048) 
Founder (0/1) 0.016 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 0.024** 0.056 0.021** 0.021** 
 (0.270) (0.183) (0.168) (0.365) (0.032) (0.114) (0.032) (0.030) 
# Functional Areas -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.001 
 (0.556) (0.555) (0.382) (0.327) (0.369) (0.544) (0.512) (0.694) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
0.010 -0.005* -0.006*** -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.290) (0.099) (0.001) (0.437) (0.884) (0.977) (0.829) (0.856) 
Constant 0.259* 0.131*** 0.106*** 0.008 0.615*** 0.620* 0.612*** 0.608*** 
 (0.066) (0.000) (0.001) (0.682) (0.000) (0.087) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4826 5029 4914 5074 4693 4693 4693 4693 
R-squared 0.584 0.550 0.367 0.437 0.752 0.580 0.760 0.761 
Hansen's J-test (p-value) 0.57 0.858 0.379 0.632 0.139 0.892 0.136 0.166 
First Stage F-stat for 
#Employers 
51.18 55.57 40.65 47.88 63.45 76.44 62.49 62.57 
First Stage F-stat for #Employers * Industry 
Homogeneity 
27.07 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table B.1.3. Use Book Leverage as the Dependent Variable 
 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for the financing policy. The dependent variable is the Book Leverage. Refer to 
Table 1 and Appendix A for variable definitions. Pre-turnover Leverage is the firm’s Leverage at the year before the 
year of CEO turnover. Instrumental variables are the unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his first 
fulltime job, non-business career dummy that equals one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the 
number of years the CEO has worked in his current firm’s industry. I report p-values of Hansen’s J-test and first 
stage F-stat at the bottom of the table. The values of the five CEO employment history proxies in the IV/2SLS 
estimations are predicted values. The predicted signs for the CEO employment history proxies are presented in 
parenthesis at the beginning of each row. I report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level 
in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Variables       
# Employers (+) 0.011**     
  (0.048)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  0.328*    
   (0.055)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   0.018**   
    (0.035)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    -0.064**  
     (0.034)  
Industry Experience Diversification (-)     -0.046** 
      (0.031) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Book Leverage  0.332*** 0.331*** 0.330*** 0.332*** 0.337*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales)  0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age  -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 
  (0.546) (0.618) (0.575) (0.778) (0.409) 
Operating Return on Assets  -0.597*** -0.594*** -0.593*** -0.600*** -0.608*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q  0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Exp./Total Assets  -0.549*** -0.557*** -0.559*** -0.559*** -0.554*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital Intensity  0.096*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Depreciation/Total Assets  0.247 0.260 0.248 0.296* 0.302* 
  (0.164) (0.145) (0.163) (0.094) (0.087) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.011 
 (0.140) (0.128) (0.146) (0.146) (0.110) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  -0.059 -0.050 -0.063 -0.065 -0.069 
  (0.795) (0.826) (0.782) (0.773) (0.758) 
CEO Cash Compensation  0.011 0.011 0.010 0.013 0.011 
  (0.182) (0.160) (0.209) (0.113) (0.168) 
CEO Compensation Delta  -0.010** -0.010** -0.011** -0.010** -0.010** 
  (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.017) (0.015) 
CEO Compensation Vega  -0.020* -0.021* -0.019* -0.022** -0.020* 
  (0.062) (0.051) (0.076) (0.043) (0.065) 
Herfindhal Index  0.184 0.179 0.167 0.195 0.182 
  (0.304) (0.315) (0.346) (0.287) (0.311) 
       
  
 
Table B.1.3 Continued.       
CEO Characteristics       
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  0.008 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.005 
  (0.203) (0.191) (0.109) (0.227) (0.380) 
CEO Age  -0.054 -0.003 -0.056 -0.048 -0.036 
  (0.152) (0.936) (0.136) (0.176) (0.273) 
MBA (0/1)  0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 
  (0.767) (0.857) (0.646) (0.767) (0.652) 
Founder (0/1)  0.016 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.011 
  (0.254) (0.248) (0.261) (0.205) (0.384) 
# Functional Areas  -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.578) (0.608) (0.712) (0.705) (0.729) 
Had Finance Background (0/1)  0.015* 0.014 0.015* 0.015* 0.013 
  (0.098) (0.113) (0.095) (0.098) (0.144) 
Constant  0.095 -0.108 0.118 0.127 0.099 
  (0.524) (0.487) (0.439) (0.408) (0.501) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  5141 5141 5141 5141 5141 
Adjusted R-squared  0.501 0.500 0.498 0.502 0.507 
       
Hansen's J-test (p-value)  0.271 0.242 0.365 0.36 0.354 
First Stage Instrumental Variables' Joint 50.95 51.02 52.3 55.28 85.42 
 
 
  
 
Table B.1.4.  CEO Employment History and the Intangibles Ratio 
 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for the firm’s investments in intangibles. The dependent variable is the 
intangibles ratio which is the intangibles reported by the firm divided by total assets. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix 
A for variable definitions. Pre-turnover Intangibles Ratio is the firm’s Intangible Ratio at the year before the year of 
CEO turnover. Instrumental variables are the unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his first fulltime 
job, non-business career dummy that equals one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the number of 
years the CEO has worked in his current firm’s industry. I report p-values of Hansen’s J-test and first stage F-stat at 
the bottom of the table. The values of the five CEO employment history proxies in the IV/2SLS estimations are 
predicted values. The predicted signs for the CEO employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at the 
beginning of each row. I report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CEO Employment History Variables   
# Employers (+) 0.010**     
  (0.030)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  0.294**    
   (0.044)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   0.016**   
    (0.022)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    -0.057**  
     (0.024)  
Industry Experience Diversification (-)     -0.042** 
      (0.021) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Leverage  0.518*** 0.519*** 0.518*** 0.516*** 0.518*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales)  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
  (0.697) (0.704) (0.597) (0.721) (0.313) 
Firm Age  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
  (0.734) (0.785) (0.766) (0.869) (0.642) 
Operating Return on Assets  0.072** 0.074** 0.073** 0.068** 0.062* 
  (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.032) (0.053) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Exp./Total Assets  -0.358*** -0.362*** -0.365*** -0.354*** -0.343*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Capital Intensity  -0.331** -0.325** -0.322** -0.328** -0.324** 
  (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) 
Depreciation/Total Assets  -0.498*** -0.501*** -0.503*** -0.494*** -0.486*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 0.040* 0.039* 0.041* 0.043* 0.047** 
 (0.077) (0.083) (0.073) (0.054) (0.034) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.514) (0.561) (0.530) (0.526) (0.551) 
CEO Cash Compensation  -0.004 0.007 -0.003 -0.013 -0.006 
  (0.984) (0.970) (0.988) (0.947) (0.976) 
CEO Compensation Delta  -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
CEO Compensation Vega  0.009** 0.009** 0.009* 0.010** 0.009** 
  (0.044) (0.039) (0.052) (0.037) (0.045) 
Herfindhal Index  0.019* 0.018 0.020* 0.018 0.021* 
  (0.085) (0.103) (0.067) (0.116) (0.064) 
   
       
  
 
Table B.1.4 Continued.       
CEO Characteristics   
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  0.015*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.013** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.018) 
CEO Age  -0.079*** -0.034 -0.082*** -0.072** -0.062** 
  (0.006) (0.258) (0.005) (0.010) (0.023) 
MBA (0/1)  -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 
  (0.176) (0.158) (0.212) (0.183) (0.227) 
Founder (0/1)  -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.011 
  (0.613) (0.624) (0.620) (0.695) (0.338) 
# Functional Areas  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.715) (0.754) (0.866) (0.793) (0.874) 
Has Finance Background (0/1)  -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 
  (0.547) (0.520) (0.545) (0.561) (0.429) 
Constant  0.421*** 0.240* 0.437*** 0.444*** 0.421*** 
  (0.001) (0.094) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4208 4208 4208 4208 4208 
Adjusted R-squared  0.509 0.510 0.509 0.513 0.514 
       
Hansen's J-test (p-value)  0.469 0.35 0.544 0.512 0.529 
First Stage Instrumental Variables' Joint 47.3 49.36 56.94 82.15 263.36 
 
 
  
 
Table B.1.5: CEO Employment History and Four-factor Betas 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for a firm’s market risk for a sample of 4,693 firm years. The dependent variable 
in Panel A is the size beta from the 4-factor model, in Panel B is the book-to-market beta from the 4-factor model, 
and in Panel C is the momentum beta from the 4-factor model. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Instrumental variables are the unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his first fulltime 
job, non-business career dummy that equals one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the number of 
years the CEO has worked in his current firm’s industry. Pre-turnover Betas are the firm’s four-factor betas in the 
year before the CEO turnover year. I report p-values of Hansen’s J-test and first stage F-stat at the bottom of the 
table. The values of the five CEO employment history proxies in the IV/2SLS estimations are predicted values. The 
predicted signs for the CEO employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at the beginning of each row. I 
report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: The Size Beta from the Four Factor Model 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Variables      
# Employers (+) -0.017     
  (0.287)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  -0.508    
   (0.333)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   -0.028   
    (0.276)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    0.098  
     (0.281)  
Industry Experience (-)     0.071 
      (0.282) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Size Beta  0.082*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales)  -0.215*** -0.215*** -0.215*** -0.215*** -0.212*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age  -0.047** -0.048** -0.047** -0.050** -0.046** 
  (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.032) (0.038) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Operating Return on Assets  -0.368** -0.373** -0.371** -0.372** -0.362** 
  (0.039) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.040) 
R&D Exp./Total Assets  0.120 0.128 0.130 0.110 0.104 
  (0.774) (0.760) (0.757) (0.794) (0.804) 
Advertising/Total Assets  0.465 0.449 0.469 0.481 0.455 
  (0.395) (0.406) (0.389) (0.377) (0.402) 
CAPEXP/Total Assets  -0.045 -0.038 -0.042 -0.053 -0.063 
  (0.869) (0.890) (0.879) (0.848) (0.821) 
Leverage  0.308*** 0.307*** 0.307*** 0.304*** 0.298*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 (0.899) (0.914) (0.896) (0.911) (0.930) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  0.679 0.668 0.679 0.666 0.661 
  (0.391) (0.397) (0.392) (0.401) (0.404) 
CEO Cash Compensation  0.038 0.037 0.039 0.035 0.038 
  (0.205) (0.223) (0.198) (0.247) (0.207) 
CEO Compensation Delta  -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.016 
  (0.274) (0.260) (0.288) (0.250) (0.255) 
CEO Compensation Vega  -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.093*** -0.089*** -0.093*** 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
Herfindhal Index  0.288 0.295 0.293 0.272 0.302 
  (0.553) (0.544) (0.544) (0.574) (0.533) 
   
  
 
Table 15 Continued.       
CEO Characteristics       
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  0.006 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.010 
  (0.770) (0.787) (0.948) (0.702) (0.606) 
CEO Age  0.165 0.086 0.167 0.153 0.138 
  (0.116) (0.450) (0.112) (0.138) (0.175) 
MBA (0/1)  -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.938) (0.975) (0.876) (0.932) (0.887) 
Founder (0/1)  -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.009 
  (0.983) (0.995) (0.995) (0.943) (0.832) 
# Functional Areas  0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 
  (0.144) (0.149) (0.169) (0.167) (0.172) 
Has Finance Background (0/1)  -0.039 -0.039 -0.040 -0.040 -0.037 
  (0.159) (0.167) (0.152) (0.155) (0.188) 
Constant  1.514*** 1.823*** 1.489*** 1.481*** 1.505*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4693 4693 4693 4693 4693 
Adjusted R-squared  0.458 0.458 0.459 0.459 0.459 
       
Hansen's J-test (p-value)  0.847 0.767 0.866 0.858 0.853 
First Stage Instrumental Variables' Joint 
Significance (F-stat) 54.48 55.31 58.49 90.61 259.94 
 
 
 
Panel B: The Book-to-Market Beta from the Four-Factor Model 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Variables      
# Employers (+) 0.032*     
  (0.083)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  1.098*    
   (0.062)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   0.047   
    (0.110)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    -0.162  
     (0.124)  
Industry Experience (-)     -0.120 
      (0.115) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Market Risk  0.123*** 0.123*** 0.124*** 0.122*** 0.123*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales)  -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.051*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Firm Age  0.095*** 0.098*** 0.094*** 0.099*** 0.092*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.086*** -0.085*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Operating Return on Assets  -0.132 -0.122 -0.125 -0.122 -0.141 
  (0.543) (0.572) (0.563) (0.571) (0.514) 
R&D Exp./Total Assets  -2.598*** -2.619*** -2.610*** -2.583*** -2.569*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
 
Table B.1.5 Continued       
Firm Characteristics (Continued)       
Advertising/Total Assets  -0.694 -0.673 -0.694 -0.712 -0.672 
  (0.132) (0.146) (0.137) (0.128) (0.140) 
CAPEXP/Total Assets  -0.641 -0.647 -0.652* -0.634 -0.617 
  (0.110) (0.107) (0.099) (0.107) (0.117) 
Leverage  0.281*** 0.278*** 0.285*** 0.293*** 0.302*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.877) (0.880) (0.886) (0.906) (0.934) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  1.800* 1.814* 1.806* 1.825* 1.836* 
  (0.084) (0.082) (0.080) (0.078) (0.074) 
       
CEO Cash Compensation  0.034 0.037 0.034 0.040 0.035 
  (0.396) (0.358) (0.402) (0.321) (0.380) 
CEO Compensation Delta  -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.984) (0.969) (0.933) (0.951) (0.964) 
CEO Compensation Vega  -0.069* -0.075* -0.066* -0.072* -0.066* 
  (0.078) (0.064) (0.093) (0.073) (0.086) 
Herfindhal Index  0.466 0.456 0.455 0.487 0.438 
  (0.541) (0.549) (0.553) (0.520) (0.564) 
CEO Characteristics       
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  0.003 0.006 0.010 -0.001 -0.005 
  (0.894) (0.814) (0.708) (0.969) (0.843) 
CEO Age  0.386*** 0.542*** 0.391*** 0.415*** 0.441*** 
  (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
MBA (0/1)  0.021 0.017 0.025 0.022 0.024 
  (0.471) (0.564) (0.388) (0.434) (0.389) 
Founder (0/1)  0.004 0.008 -0.002 0.003 -0.017 
  (0.941) (0.865) (0.972) (0.953) (0.718) 
# Functional Areas  0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  (0.973) (0.981) (0.823) (0.824) (0.807) 
Has Finance Background (0/1)  0.056* 0.054* 0.057* 0.057* 0.053 
  (0.086) (0.097) (0.079) (0.076) (0.105) 
Constant  -1.291** -1.940*** -1.261** -1.248** -1.284** 
  (0.039) (0.004) (0.048) (0.047) (0.039) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4693 4693 4693 4693 4693 
Adjusted R-squared  0.369 0.368 0.370 0.372 0.374 
       
Hansen's J-test (p-value)  0.414 0.504 0.343 0.304 0.309 
First Stage Instrumental Variables' Joint 
Significance (F-stat) 54.83 55.40 59.02 90.60 270.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Panel C: The Momentum Beta from the Four-Factor Model 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Employment History Variables      
# Employers (+) 0.010     
  (0.408)     
# Employer Changes per year (+)  0.351    
   (0.377)    
Employer Change Recency (+)   0.019   
    (0.332)   
Firm Experience Diversification (-)    -0.074  
     (0.284)  
Industry Experience (-)     -0.053 
      (0.295) 
Firm Characteristics       
Pre-turnover Market Risk  0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 
  (0.275) (0.271) (0.270) (0.275) (0.299) 
ln(Total Sales)  0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.006 
  (0.455) (0.438) (0.447) (0.415) (0.539) 
Firm Characteristics Continued       
Firm Age  0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001 
  (0.954) (0.905) (0.930) (0.808) (0.965) 
Tobin’s Q  0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Operating Return on Assets  1.279*** 1.282*** 1.280*** 1.281*** 1.273*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Exp./Total Assets  -0.805*** -0.811*** -0.812*** -0.798*** -0.794*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Advertising/Total Assets  -1.118*** -1.111*** -1.124*** -1.137*** -1.120*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CAPEXP/Total Assets  -0.023 -0.025 -0.023 -0.012 -0.004 
  (0.942) (0.937) (0.942) (0.970) (0.991) 
Leverage  -0.176** -0.177** -0.177** -0.176** -0.171** 
  (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) 
Pay Directors Equity Based 
Compensation (0/1) 
 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 (0.794) (0.793) (0.803) (0.800) (0.784) 
Activist Institutional Holding (%)  -2.355*** -2.350*** -2.358*** -2.351*** -2.348*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
CEO Cash Compensation  -0.201*** -0.200*** -0.201*** -0.199*** -0.201*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Compensation Delta  0.019 0.019* 0.018 0.019* 0.019* 
  (0.102) (0.096) (0.110) (0.090) (0.098) 
CEO Compensation Vega  -0.028 -0.030 -0.027 -0.030 -0.028 
  (0.347) (0.322) (0.352) (0.310) (0.348) 
Herfindhal Index  -0.573 -0.576 -0.575 -0.559 -0.581 
  (0.295) (0.292) (0.292) (0.310) (0.290) 
CEO Characteristics       
Ln(CEO Tenure+1)  -0.027* -0.026 -0.023 -0.027* -0.029* 
  (0.097) (0.113) (0.171) (0.087) (0.066) 
CEO Age  0.096 0.146 0.091 0.098 0.109 
  (0.293) (0.106) (0.316) (0.269) (0.210) 
MBA (0/1)  -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 
  (0.699) (0.655) (0.721) (0.668) (0.706) 
Founder (0/1)  0.068** 0.069** 0.069** 0.073** 0.064** 
  (0.040) (0.035) (0.036) (0.031) (0.039) 
  
 
       
Table B.1.5.Continued       
CEO Characteristics (Continued)       
# Functional Areas  -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
  (0.239) (0.236) (0.261) (0.255) (0.261) 
Has Finance Background (0/1)  0.075*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant  -0.282 -0.490 -0.263 -0.245 -0.260 
  (0.420) (0.220) (0.456) (0.488) (0.461) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4693 4693 4693 4693 4693 
Adjusted R-squared  0.191 0.191 0.192 0.191 0.191 
       
Hansen's J-test (p-value)  0.312 0.338 0.336 0.362 0.357 
First Stage Instrumental Variables' Joint 
Significance (F-stat) 54.39 55.17 58.16 90.96 269.95 
  
 
Table B.1.6: CEO Employment History in the Year of Turnover 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for firm policies and risk when CEO Employment History is measured in the 
year of turnover. The CEO Employment History variables stay constant for post-turnover years. The dependent 
variables are listed at the top of each column. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable definitions. Pre-turnover 
firm policies are the respective firm policies in the year before the CEO turnover year. Instrumental variables for 
#Employers are the unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his first fulltime job, non-business career 
dummy that equals one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the number of years the CEO has worked 
in his current firm’s industry. The instrumental variable for CEO employment history*Industry Homogeneity in the 
R&D regression is the unemployment rate described above multiplied by industry homogeneity. The predicted signs 
for the CEO employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at the top of each column. I report p-values 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 
5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: CEO Employment History Proxy: #Employers per year 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D Adv. 
Total Risk
(Daily 
Stock 
Return Std.)
Market 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk  
(4- Factor)
 (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
#Employers 0.305** -0.086** -0.094* 0.028* 0.141* -0.216 0.179** 0.193*** 
 (0.024) (0.010) (0.094) (0.092) (0.085) (0.470) (0.019) (0.009) 
#Employers * Ind. 
Homogeneity 
  0.225      
 (0.167)      
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover Policy 0.302*** 0.301*** 0.543*** 0.545*** 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.194*** 0.190*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.022*** -0.002** -0.002*** 0.001* -0.019*** -0.031*** -0.019*** -0.019***
 (0.000) (0.024) (0.006) (0.075) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.004 0.000 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.020*** -0.063*** -0.016*** -0.015***
 (0.589) (0.848) (0.003) (0.323) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.571***    -0.281*** -0.609*** -0.228*** -0.210***
(0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.018** 0.126*** -0.010     
  (0.038) (0.000) (0.279)     
Tobin's Q -0.022*** 0.003*** -0.001 0.001*** 0.007** 0.055*** 0.005* 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.543) (0.008) (0.012) (0.000) (0.084) (0.133) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.383*** -0.033  0.004 0.467*** 1.023*** 0.410*** 0.386*** 
 (0.000) (0.147)  (0.791) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets  0.013 -0.018  0.168 -0.127 0.189* 0.195* 
  (0.719) (0.611)  (0.135) (0.729) (0.080) (0.066) 
CAPEXP   -0.007 0.016* 0.284*** 0.564*** 0.240*** 0.221*** 
   (0.659) (0.085) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.012 0.010** -0.006* 0.070*** 0.049 0.075*** 0.075*** 
  (0.113) (0.022) (0.066) (0.001) (0.514) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Homogeneity   -0.023      
   (0.492)      
Capital Intensity 0.120***        
 (0.000)        
Depr./Total Assets -0.074        
 (0.695)        
Pay Directors Equity 
Based Compensation 
0.013* -0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.008 
(0.063) (0.553) (0.228) (0.077) (0.180) (0.880) (0.207) (0.184) 
  
 
         
Table B.1.6 Continued         
Firm Characteristics (Continued) 
Activist Institutional 
Holding (%) 
-0.215 -0.068 0.053 -0.011 -0.115 1.574** -0.280 -0.294 
(0.407) (0.292) (0.223) (0.785) (0.578) (0.024) (0.161) (0.133) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
0.017** -0.003 0.006*** 0.002** -0.013* -0.097*** -0.007 -0.006 
(0.022) (0.104) (0.003) (0.031) (0.059) (0.000) (0.206) (0.277) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.022 0.000 -0.000 
(0.137) (0.319) (0.164) (0.211) (0.523) (0.192) (0.948) (0.958) 
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
-0.020** -0.000 0.005** -0.002 -0.011 -0.071** -0.011 -0.010 
(0.049) (0.852) (0.011) (0.241) (0.151) (0.027) (0.123) (0.145) 
Herfindhal Index 0.358*** -0.039 -0.013 0.028 0.357*** 0.398 0.309*** 0.292*** 
 (0.003) (0.299) (0.554) (0.194) (0.001) (0.360) (0.002) (0.003) 
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) -0.007 -0.001 0.002 -0.002*** -0.004 0.002 -0.007 -0.007* 
 (0.294) (0.686) (0.121) (0.008) (0.433) (0.922) (0.144) (0.092) 
CEO Age -0.017 -0.030*** -0.023*** 0.003 -0.027 0.034 -0.021 -0.019 
 (0.637) (0.001) (0.002) (0.525) (0.329) (0.709) (0.419) (0.440) 
MBA (0/1) 0.013 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.010* 0.003 -0.010** -0.010** 
 (0.103) (0.357) (0.303) (0.384) (0.065) (0.886) (0.050) (0.041) 
Founder (0/1) 0.016 -0.005 -0.006** -0.002 0.023** 0.056 0.021** 0.020** 
 (0.266) (0.195) (0.047) (0.354) (0.038) (0.108) (0.038) (0.037) 
# Functional Areas -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.001 
 (0.680) (0.394) (0.495) (0.387) (0.296) (0.511) (0.460) (0.638) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
0.010 -0.005* -0.005*** -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
(0.264) (0.087) (0.001) (0.459) (0.875) (0.989) (0.826) (0.851) 
Constant 0.005 0.205*** 0.131*** -0.012 0.508*** 1.116** 0.467*** 0.461*** 
 (0.973) (0.000) (0.000) (0.595) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4826 5029 4914 5074 4693 4693 4693 4693 
R-squared 0.565 0.513 0.764 0.634 0.631 0.447 0.650 0.648 
Hansen's J-test (p-value) 0.653 0.489 0.112 0.531 0.14 0.749 0.138 0.174 
First Stage F-stat for 
#Employers 
57.16 55.04 53.48 50.21 62.59 79.63 55.98 59.09 
First Stage F-stat for #Employers * Industry 
Homogeneity 
47.41 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table B.1.6 Continued 
Panel B: CEO Employment History Proxy: Employer Change Recency 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D Adv. 
Total Risk
(Daily 
Stock 
Return Std.)
Market 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk  
(4- Factor)
 (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
#Employers 0.016** -0.005*** -0.022** 0.002* 0.008* -0.010 0.009** 0.010*** 
 (0.042) (0.006) (0.030) (0.080) (0.067) (0.511) (0.018) (0.008) 
#Employers * Ind. 
Homogeneity 
  0.099*      
 (0.053)      
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover Policy 0.306*** 0.301*** 0.560*** 0.544*** 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.197*** 0.193*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.021*** -0.002** -0.001* 0.001* -0.019*** -0.030*** -0.019*** -0.019***
 (0.000) (0.027) (0.082) (0.075) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.006 0.000 -0.003** 0.001 -0.020*** -0.062*** -0.017*** -0.016***
 (0.402) (0.815) (0.016) (0.348) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.576***    -0.284*** -0.605*** -0.231*** -0.214***
(0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.020** 0.121*** -0.011     
  (0.020) (0.000) (0.252)     
Tobin's Q -0.022*** 0.003*** -0.001 0.001*** 0.007** 0.055*** 0.005* 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.662) (0.009) (0.011) (0.000) (0.081) (0.129) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.376*** -0.035  0.004 0.468*** 1.019*** 0.411*** 0.387*** 
 (0.000) (0.123)  (0.814) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets  0.017 -0.031  0.156 -0.114 0.176* 0.182* 
  (0.641) (0.421)  (0.164) (0.756) (0.099) (0.083) 
CAPEXP   -0.006 0.016* 0.286*** 0.562*** 0.241*** 0.223*** 
   (0.731) (0.086) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.012 0.003 -0.007* 0.070*** 0.047 0.076*** 0.076*** 
  (0.123) (0.686) (0.055) (0.001) (0.529) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Homogeneity   -0.118*      
   (0.071)      
Capital Intensity 0.117***        
 (0.000)        
Depr./Total Assets -0.088        
 (0.638)        
Pay Directors Equity 
Based Compensation 
0.012* -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.004 0.007 0.008 
(0.080) (0.770) (0.202) (0.102) (0.202) (0.863) (0.228) (0.205) 
Activist Institutional -0.216 -0.054 0.071 -0.013 -0.119 1.575** -0.281 -0.296 
 (0.403) (0.394) (0.117) (0.741) (0.562) (0.024) (0.151) (0.123) 
CEO Cash 0.017** -0.003 0.007*** 0.002** -0.013* -0.096*** -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.025) (0.122) (0.001) (0.035) (0.055) (0.000) (0.189) (0.253) 
CEO Compensation -0.007* -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.022 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.078) (0.430) (0.679) (0.238) (0.598) (0.177) (0.941) (0.836) 
CEO Compensation -0.017* -0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.010 -0.073** -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.074) (0.701) (0.209) (0.271) (0.181) (0.021) (0.170) (0.207) 
Herfindhal Index 0.341*** -0.038 -0.013 0.029 0.354*** 0.403 0.305*** 0.287*** 
 (0.006) (0.330) (0.625) (0.185) (0.001) (0.353) (0.002) (0.003) 
  
 
Table B.1.6 Continued         
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) 0.003 -0.004** -0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.608) (0.024) (0.849) (0.100) (0.968) (0.789) (0.673) (0.592) 
CEO Age -0.077** -0.012 -0.013* -0.003 -0.053** 0.073 -0.054** -0.055** 
 (0.019) (0.181) (0.080) (0.451) (0.037) (0.406) (0.021) (0.015) 
MBA (0/1) 0.014* -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.009* 0.001 -0.009* -0.009* 
 (0.063) (0.285) (0.322) (0.451) (0.086) (0.954) (0.079) (0.069) 
Founder (0/1) 0.014 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 0.023** 0.057 0.021** 0.020** 
 (0.321) (0.174) (0.318) (0.352) (0.033) (0.107) (0.036) (0.035) 
# Functional Areas -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.002 
 (0.765) (0.337) (0.518) (0.398) (0.262) (0.541) (0.376) (0.530) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
0.012 -0.005* -0.007*** -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.002 
(0.198) (0.072) (0.001) (0.481) (0.842) (0.992) (0.773) (0.792) 
Constant 0.283** 0.132*** 0.097*** 0.013 0.617*** 0.949** 0.602*** 0.606*** 
 (0.039) (0.000) (0.003) (0.542) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4826 5029 4914 5074 4693 4693 4693 4693 
R-squared 0.573 0.513 0.729 0.634 0.633 0.447 0.654 0.652 
Hansen's J-test (p-value) 0.759 0.818 0.460 0.569 0.131 0.708 0.121 0.150 
First Stage F-stat for 
#Employers 
62.88 65.67 46.56 50.99 68.92 93.96 72.06 72.29 
First Stage F-stat for #Employers * Industry 
Homogeneity 
34.82 
     
 
 
 
  
 
Table B.1.6 Continued 
Panel C: CEO Employment History Proxy: Firm Experience Diversification 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D Adv. 
Total Risk
(Ann. Daily 
Stock 
Return Std.)
Market 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk  
(4- Factor)
 (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
#Employers -0.081** 0.023*** 0.133* -0.007 -0.025 0.053 -0.037** -0.041** 
 (0.023) (0.009) (0.098) (0.117) (0.212) (0.485) (0.048) (0.024) 
#Employers * Ind. 
Homogeneity 
  -0.608*      
 (0.098)      
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover Policy 0.308*** 0.307*** 0.554*** 0.543*** 0.196*** 0.188*** 0.202*** 0.199*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.022*** -0.002** -0.001 0.001* -0.019*** -0.031*** -0.019*** -0.019***
 (0.000) (0.024) (0.355) (0.090) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.019*** -0.064*** -0.015*** -0.015***
 (0.794) (0.988) (0.138) (0.257) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.575***    -0.283*** -0.606*** -0.229*** -0.212***
(0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.021** 0.118*** -0.011     
  (0.013) (0.000) (0.242)     
Tobin's Q -0.023*** 0.003*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.007** 0.055*** 0.004 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.752) (0.010) (0.014) (0.000) (0.102) (0.162) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.346*** -0.043*  0.006 0.477*** 1.002*** 0.425*** 0.402*** 
 (0.000) (0.063)  (0.687) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets  0.017 -0.020  0.155 -0.110 0.174 0.179* 
  (0.629) (0.646)  (0.172) (0.765) (0.109) (0.094) 
CAPEXP   -0.018 0.016* 0.282*** 0.562*** 0.239*** 0.221*** 
   (0.494) (0.099) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.012 0.002 -0.006* 0.072*** 0.048 0.077*** 0.077*** 
  (0.113) (0.753) (0.062) (0.001) (0.523) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Homogeneity   0.350      
   (0.121)      
Capital Intensity 0.114***        
 (0.000)        
Depr./Total Assets -0.053        
 (0.774)        
Pay Directors Equity 
Based Compensation 
0.012* -0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.008 
(0.091) (0.711) (0.262) (0.093) (0.184) (0.877) (0.201) (0.179) 
Activist Institutional -0.227 -0.062 0.094* -0.012 -0.111 1.568** -0.272 -0.286 
 (0.381) (0.331) (0.079) (0.750) (0.590) (0.024) (0.170) (0.140) 
CEO Cash 0.018** -0.003 0.007*** 0.002** -0.012* -0.097*** -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.018) (0.103) (0.004) (0.031) (0.069) (0.000) (0.243) (0.329) 
CEO Compensation -0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.022 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.149) (0.220) (0.849) (0.186) (0.530) (0.196) (0.922) (0.987) 
CEO Compensation -0.020** 0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.011 -0.071** -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.046) (0.985) (0.571) (0.229) (0.173) (0.027) (0.139) (0.164) 
Herfindhal Index 0.369*** -0.043 -0.006 0.029 0.357*** 0.395 0.311*** 0.294*** 
 (0.003) (0.252) (0.857) (0.178) (0.001) (0.364) (0.002) (0.003) 
  
 
Table B.1.6 Continued         
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) 0.002 -0.004** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.688) (0.022) (0.862) (0.101) (0.910) (0.801) (0.551) (0.468) 
CEO Age -0.076** -0.014 -0.022** -0.003 -0.047* 0.072 -0.050** -0.051** 
 (0.018) (0.124) (0.027) (0.555) (0.065) (0.408) (0.033) (0.025) 
MBA (0/1) 0.013 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.010* 0.002 -0.009* -0.009* 
 (0.114) (0.313) (0.295) (0.410) (0.092) (0.898) (0.069) (0.058) 
Founder (0/1) 0.018 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 0.022** 0.055 0.021** 0.020** 
 (0.220) (0.186) (0.647) (0.337) (0.048) (0.124) (0.042) (0.039) 
# Functional Areas -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.002 
 (0.709) (0.353) (0.315) (0.402) (0.257) (0.528) (0.390) (0.552) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
0.009 -0.004 -0.008*** -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.310) (0.105) (0.007) (0.424) (0.898) (0.970) (0.870) (0.904) 
Constant 0.304** 0.123*** 0.001 0.015 0.610*** 0.929** 0.608*** 0.613*** 
 (0.042) (0.001) (0.991) (0.488) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4826 5029 4914 5074 4693 4693 4693 4693 
R-squared 0.568 0.515 0.673 0.633 0.632 0.447 0.652 0.650 
Hansen's J-test (p-value) 0.684 0.549 0.750 0.461 0.194 0.754 0.165 0.112 
First Stage F-stat for 
#Employers 
55.39 60.81 42.68 47.32 58.5 76.71 56.18 56.19 
First Stage F-stat for #Employers * Industry 
Homogeneity 
32.99 
     
 
 
 
Panel D: CEO Employment History Proxy: Industry Experience Diversification 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D Adv. 
Total Risk
(Ann. Daily
Stock 
Return Std.)
Market 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk  
(4- Factor)
 (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
#Employers -0.061** 0.017*** 0.027* -0.004 -0.014 0.054 -0.027 -0.031* 
 (0.020) (0.006) (0.050) (0.172) (0.475) (0.463) (0.136) (0.080) 
#Employers * Ind. 
Homogeneity 
  -0.084      
 (0.184)      
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover Policy 0.314*** 0.309*** 0.536*** 0.543*** 0.197*** 0.189*** 0.205*** 0.202*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.019*** -0.002* -0.002** 0.000 -0.020*** -0.030*** -0.020*** -0.020***
 (0.000) (0.083) (0.012) (0.188) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.005 0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.021*** -0.063*** -0.017*** -0.016***
 (0.418) (0.577) (0.007) (0.490) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.583***    -0.284*** -0.600*** -0.232*** -0.214***
(0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.022*** 0.128*** -0.012     
  (0.009) (0.000) (0.230)     
         
  
 
Table B.1.6 Continued
Firm Characteristics (Continued)        
Tobin's Q -0.022*** 0.003*** -0.001 0.001*** 0.007** 0.055*** 0.005* 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.527) (0.009) (0.012) (0.000) (0.084) (0.133) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.354*** -0.041*  0.005 0.474*** 1.002*** 0.421*** 0.397*** 
 (0.000) (0.067)  (0.735) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets  0.015 -0.014  0.158 -0.108 0.176 0.180* 
  (0.664) (0.688)  (0.159) (0.769) (0.100) (0.086) 
CAPEXP   -0.003 0.017* 0.283*** 0.547** 0.244*** 0.227*** 
   (0.845) (0.089) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.013* 0.009** -0.006* 0.074*** 0.046 0.080*** 0.080*** 
  (0.085) (0.030) (0.070) (0.001) (0.541) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Homogeneity   0.068      
   (0.140)      
Capital Intensity 0.112***        
 (0.000)        
Depr./Total Assets -0.031        
 (0.865)        
Pay Directors Equity 
Based Compensation 
0.012* -0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.008 
(0.083) (0.673) (0.141) (0.087) (0.181) (0.865) (0.203) (0.182) 
Activist Institutional -0.225 -0.064 0.063 -0.013 -0.109 1.563** -0.269 -0.283 
 (0.378) (0.307) (0.133) (0.741) (0.595) (0.025) (0.172) (0.142) 
CEO Cash 0.016** -0.003 0.006*** 0.002** -0.013* -0.096*** -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.034) (0.161) (0.002) (0.042) (0.058) (0.000) (0.180) (0.240) 
CEO Compensation -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.022 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.118) (0.299) (0.166) (0.194) (0.552) (0.191) (0.955) (0.951) 
CEO Compensation -0.017* -0.001 0.004** -0.002 -0.009 -0.072** -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.088) (0.683) (0.034) (0.298) (0.217) (0.022) (0.193) (0.234) 
Herfindhal Index 0.354*** -0.037 -0.011 0.027 0.350*** 0.408 0.301*** 0.283*** 
 (0.004) (0.315) (0.643) (0.209) (0.001) (0.348) (0.002) (0.003) 
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) -0.000 -0.003* 0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.988) (0.062) (0.538) (0.040) (0.791) (0.857) (0.404) (0.319) 
CEO Age -0.064** -0.017** -0.016** -0.001 -0.042 0.067 -0.044* -0.044** 
 (0.038) (0.046) (0.016) (0.795) (0.101) (0.431) (0.060) (0.048) 
MBA (0/1) 0.013* -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.009 0.003 -0.009* -0.009* 
 (0.089) (0.247) (0.348) (0.476) (0.115) (0.884) (0.083) (0.071) 
Founder (0/1) 0.010 -0.003 -0.005* -0.003 0.019* 0.059* 0.017* 0.016* 
 (0.443) (0.386) (0.066) (0.165) (0.073) (0.082) (0.075) (0.077) 
# Functional Areas -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.002 
 (0.716) (0.357) (0.457) (0.415) (0.239) (0.510) (0.379) (0.544) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
0.007 -0.004 -0.005*** -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.000 -0.000 
(0.425) (0.161) (0.002) (0.389) (0.939) (0.882) (0.989) (0.954) 
Constant 0.276* 0.127*** 0.064** 0.012 0.596*** 0.925** 0.596*** 0.601*** 
 (0.054) (0.001) (0.029) (0.579) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4826 5029 4914 5074 4693 4693 4693 4693 
R-squared 0.572 0.527 0.768 0.635 0.632 0.448 0.653 0.651 
         
Hansen's J-test (p-value) 0.764 0.596 0.340 0.402 0.184 0.755 0.147 0.135 
First Stage F-stat for 
#Employers 
140.21 158.59 91.53 110.44 78.15 115.47 71.28 71.17 
First Stage F-stat for #Employers * Industry 
Homogeneity 
73.31 
     
 
  
 
Table B.1.7: The Interaction of CEO Employment History and Pre-turnover Risk Level  
This table presents IV/2SLS results for firm policies and risks after including an interaction term of CEO 
Employment history and the firm’s pre-turnover risk-level. The dependent variables are listed at the top of each 
column. High Pre-turnover risk dummy equals one if the firm’s pre-turnover Total Risk (Annualized Daily Stock 
Return Standard Deviation). Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable definitions. Pre-turnover firm policies are 
the respective firm policies in the year before the CEO turnover year. Instrumental variables for #Employers are the 
unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his first fulltime job, non-business career dummy that equals 
one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the number of years the CEO has worked in his current firm’s 
industry. The instrumental variable for CEO employment history*Industry Homogeneity in the R&D regression is 
the unemployment rate described above multiplied by industry homogeneity. The predicted signs for the CEO 
employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at the top of each column. I report p-values based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D Adv. 
Total Risk
(Ann. Daily 
Stock 
Return Std.)
Market 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk  
(4- Factor)
 (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
#Employers 0.016*** -0.004*** -0.012** 0.003* 0.005 -0.008 0.006** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.027) (0.065) (0.108) (0.476) (0.027) (0.011) 
#Employers * Ind. 
Homogeneity 
  0.050*      
 (0.052)      
#Employers*High Pre-
turnover Risk  
-0.014 0.001 -0.002 -0.012 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 
(0.362) (0.832) (0.378) (0.119) (0.791) (0.957) (0.480) (0.509) 
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover Policy 0.302*** 0.301*** 0.543*** 0.545*** 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.194*** 0.190*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.022*** -0.002** -0.002*** 0.001* -0.019*** -0.031*** -0.019*** -0.019***
 (0.000) (0.024) (0.006) (0.075) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.004 0.000 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.020*** -0.063*** -0.016*** -0.015***
 (0.589) (0.848) (0.003) (0.323) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.571***    -0.281*** -0.609*** -0.228*** -0.210***
(0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.018** 0.126*** -0.010     
  (0.038) (0.000) (0.279)     
Tobin's Q -0.022*** 0.003*** -0.001 0.001*** 0.007** 0.055*** 0.005* 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.543) (0.008) (0.012) (0.000) (0.084) (0.133) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.383*** -0.033  0.004 0.467*** 1.023*** 0.410*** 0.386*** 
 (0.000) (0.147)  (0.791) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets  0.013 -0.018  0.168 -0.127 0.189* 0.195* 
  (0.719) (0.611)  (0.135) (0.729) (0.080) (0.066) 
CAPEXP   -0.007 0.016* 0.284*** 0.564*** 0.240*** 0.221*** 
   (0.659) (0.085) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.012 0.010** -0.006* 0.070*** 0.049 0.075*** 0.075*** 
  (0.113) (0.022) (0.066) (0.001) (0.514) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Homogeneity   -0.151*      
   (0.060)      
Capital Intensity 0.097***        
 (0.001)        
Depr./Total Assets 0.025        
 (0.890)        
  
 
Table B.1.7 Continued         
Firm Characteristics (Continued) 
Pay Directors Equity 
Based Compensation 
0.009 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.008 
(0.190) (0.780) (0.173) (0.173) (0.196) (0.919) (0.213) (0.193) 
Activist Institutional 
Holding (%) 
-0.213 -0.053 0.066 -0.014 -0.123 1.633** -0.273 -0.285 
(0.403) (0.406) (0.132) (0.763) (0.547) (0.017) (0.162) (0.136) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
0.023*** -0.003 0.007*** 0.002 -0.013** -0.097*** -0.008 -0.006 
(0.002) (0.164) (0.001) (0.118) (0.046) (0.000) (0.183) (0.267) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.007 -0.001 -0.000 0.002* 0.002 0.022 0.000 -0.000 
(0.145) (0.355) (0.793) (0.096) (0.529) (0.167) (0.910) (0.973) 
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
-0.031*** -0.001 0.003 -0.003 -0.012 -0.077** -0.010 -0.009 
(0.002) (0.823) (0.222) (0.109) (0.133) (0.011) (0.122) (0.155) 
Herfindhal Index 0.366*** -0.038 -0.006 0.040 0.361*** 0.460 0.314*** 0.296*** 
 (0.003) (0.320) (0.816) (0.121) (0.001) (0.283) (0.001) (0.002) 
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) 0.007 -0.005*** -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.012 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.220) (0.005) (0.438) (0.050) (0.903) (0.416) (0.522) (0.457) 
CEO Age -0.081** -0.012 -0.012 0.000 -0.051** 0.071 -0.050** -0.052** 
 (0.015) (0.212) (0.112) (0.988) (0.046) (0.425) (0.032) (0.023) 
MBA (0/1) 0.013* -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.009* 0.002 -0.009* -0.009* 
 (0.090) (0.297) (0.186) (0.928) (0.098) (0.912) (0.097) (0.077) 
Founder (0/1) 0.012 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007* 0.020* 0.049 0.016 0.016 
 (0.506) (0.205) (0.131) (0.052) (0.079) (0.208) (0.117) (0.110) 
# Functional Areas -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.001 
 (0.525) (0.544) (0.377) (0.562) (0.324) (0.499) (0.443) (0.620) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
0.010 -0.005* -0.006*** -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 
(0.264) (0.096) (0.001) (0.490) (0.869) (0.936) (0.786) (0.816) 
Constant 0.213 0.128*** 0.101*** -0.012 0.608*** 0.533 0.597*** 0.595*** 
 (0.133) (0.001) (0.003) (0.607) (0.000) (0.144) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4826 5029 4914 5074 4693 4693 4693 4693 
R-squared 0.582 0.515 0.748 0.525 0.636 0.457 0.655 0.653 
Hansen's J-test (p-value) 0.199 0.372 0.515 0.763 0.109 0.170 0.166 0.193 
First Stage F-stat for 
#Employers 
39.02 59.10 27.65 47.51 56.06 64.47 44.96 46.95 
First Stage F-stat for 
#Employers*High Pre-
turnover Risk 
10.00 11.05 9.97 8.67 11.55 11.84 10.68 10.77 
First Stage F-stat for #Employers * Industry 
Homogeneity 
17.95 
     
 
 
  
 
Table B.1.8: A subsample with Board Size and the Insider Percentage Information  
 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for firm policies and risks for a subsample of firms with board size and insider 
ratio information. The dependent variables are listed at the top of each column. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for 
variable definitions. Pre-turnover firm policies are the respective firm policies in the year before the CEO turnover 
year. Instrumental variables for #Employers are the unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his first 
fulltime job, non-business career dummy that equals one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the 
number of years the CEO has worked in his current firm’s industry. The instrumental variable for CEO employment 
history*Industry Homogeneity in the R&D regression is the unemployment rate described above multiplied by 
industry homogeneity. The predicted signs for the CEO employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at 
the top of each column. I report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in 
parenthesis.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D Adv. 
Total Risk
(Ann. Daily 
Stock 
Return Std.)
Market 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk  
(4- Factor)
 (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
#Employers 0.012** -0.004*** -0.011** 0.001* 0.008** -0.005 0.009*** 0.010*** 
 (0.028) (0.006) (0.026) (0.082) (0.025) (0.708) (0.004) (0.001) 
#Employers * Ind. 
Homogeneity 
  0.044*      
 (0.061)      
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover Policy 0.250*** 0.292*** 0.577*** 0.550*** 0.205*** 0.157*** 0.213*** 0.209*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.020*** -0.002* -0.001 0.001 -0.016*** -0.018* -0.016*** -0.016***
 (0.000) (0.062) (0.111) (0.183) (0.000) (0.090) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.009 0.000 -0.003** 0.001  -0.056***   
 (0.234) (0.814) (0.035) (0.508)  (0.002)   
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.563***    -0.284*** -0.632*** -0.228*** -0.207***
(0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.016* 0.116*** -0.015     
  (0.084) (0.000) (0.138)     
Tobin's Q -0.023*** 0.003*** -0.000 0.002*** 0.010*** 0.072*** 0.007** 0.006** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.831) (0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.021) (0.042) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.366*** -0.042*  -0.001 0.452*** 1.082*** 0.387*** 0.368*** 
 (0.000) (0.088)  (0.960) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets  0.014 -0.033  0.082 -0.448 0.114 0.121 
  (0.708) (0.408)  (0.507) (0.271) (0.327) (0.295) 
CAPEXP   -0.002 0.015 0.364*** 0.724*** 0.315*** 0.294*** 
   (0.914) (0.140) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.010 0.005 -0.007* 0.066*** 0.030 0.069*** 0.067*** 
  (0.206) (0.322) (0.058) (0.006) (0.722) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry Homogeneity   -0.125*      
   (0.093)      
Capital Intensity 0.117***        
 (0.000)        
Depr./Total Assets -0.087        
 (0.652)        
Pay Director Equity-
based compensation 
0.011 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.016** 0.010 0.013* 0.013** 
(0.141) (0.457) (0.213) (0.122) (0.045) (0.706) (0.061) (0.049) 
         
  
 
Table B.1.8 Continued         
Firm Characteristics (Continued) 
Activist Institutional 
Holding (%) 
-0.182 -0.030 0.075 -0.024 -0.116 1.844** -0.277 -0.291 
(0.498) (0.644) (0.132) (0.607) (0.594) (0.013) (0.173) (0.141) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
0.023*** -0.002 0.007*** 0.002 -0.028*** -0.150*** -0.019*** -0.016** 
(0.005) (0.361) (0.005) (0.119) (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) (0.018) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.017 -0.000 -0.001 
(0.390) (0.372) (0.561) (0.319) (0.704) (0.363) (0.935) (0.862) 
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
-0.020* -0.002 0.004* -0.002 -0.008 -0.076** -0.008 -0.007 
(0.060) (0.412) (0.076) (0.198) (0.411) (0.040) (0.340) (0.381) 
Board Size 0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004*** -0.009* -0.004*** -0.003** 
 (0.346) (0.961) (0.337) (0.916) (0.003) (0.090) (0.009) (0.021) 
Insider Ratio -0.015 -0.010 -0.002 -0.003 0.023 0.034 0.024 0.023 
 (0.564) (0.165) (0.779) (0.372) (0.257) (0.651) (0.176) (0.187) 
Herfindhal Index -0.051 -0.066 -0.006 0.049* 0.501*** 0.949* 0.430*** 0.405*** 
 (0.631) (0.124) (0.826) (0.062) (0.000) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) 0.003 -0.004** -0.000 -0.002** -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.591) (0.040) (0.952) (0.034) (0.269) (0.754) (0.159) (0.143) 
CEO Age -0.077** -0.009 -0.010 -0.003 -0.068** 0.075 -0.066** -0.067***
 (0.024) (0.403) (0.203) (0.525) (0.016) (0.454) (0.010) (0.007) 
MBA (0/1) 0.012 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.009 0.008 -0.010* -0.010* 
 (0.128) (0.411) (0.268) (0.329) (0.135) (0.704) (0.077) (0.057) 
Founder (0/1) 0.011 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 0.027** 0.068* 0.024** 0.024** 
 (0.460) (0.284) (0.131) (0.338) (0.021) (0.078) (0.020) (0.018) 
# Functional Areas -0.003 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.005* 0.012 0.004 0.003 
 (0.481) (0.676) (0.328) (0.227) (0.095) (0.277) (0.179) (0.297) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
0.010 -0.006* -0.007*** -0.001 -0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 
(0.315) (0.053) (0.000) (0.478) (0.965) (0.807) (0.986) (0.980) 
Constant 0.390*** 0.154*** 0.088** 0.004 0.530*** 0.400 0.562*** 0.564*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.010) (0.819) (0.000) (0.323) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3470 3614 3529 3685 3375 3369 3377 3377 
R-squared 0.572 0.505 0.763 0.634 0.640 0.446 0.662 0.661 
Hansen's J-test (p-value) 0.291 0.914 0.487 0.871 0.238 0.756 0.268 0.327 
First Stage F-stat for 
#Employers 
38.22 53.96 39.39 45.41 60.76 75.51 59.93 60.06 
First Stage F-stat for #Employers * Industry 
Homogeneity 
25.19 
     
 
 
  
 
Table B.1.9: Include an Insider Dummy as an additional control variable 
 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for firm policies and risks after including an insider dummy as an additional 
control variable. The dependent variables are listed at the top of each column. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for 
variable definitions. Pre-turnover firm policies are the respective firm policies in the year before the CEO turnover 
year. Instrumental variables for #Employers are the unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his first 
fulltime job, non-business career dummy that equals one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the 
number of years the CEO has worked in his current firm’s industry. The instrumental variable for CEO employment 
history*Industry Homogeneity in the R&D regression is the unemployment rate described above multiplied by 
industry homogeneity. The predicted signs for the CEO employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at 
the top of each column. I report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in 
parenthesis.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D Adv. 
Total Risk
(Ann. Daily 
Stock 
Return Std.)
Market 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk  
(4- Factor)
 (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
#Employers 0.015** -0.004** -0.015*** 0.002* 0.004 -0.020 0.006* 0.007** 
 (0.048) (0.036) (0.009) (0.091) (0.282) (0.212) (0.090) (0.045) 
#Employers * Ind. 
Homogeneity 
  0.058**      
 (0.033)      
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover Policy 0.260*** 0.302*** 0.555*** 0.543*** 0.199*** 0.192*** 0.204*** 0.199*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.021*** -0.002** -0.002** 0.001* -0.019*** -0.032*** -0.020*** -0.019***
 (0.000) (0.026) (0.040) (0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.005 0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.020*** -0.064*** -0.017*** -0.016***
 (0.471) (0.775) (0.008) (0.330) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.575***    -0.295*** -0.622*** -0.240*** -0.220***
(0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.020** 0.119*** -0.011     
  (0.018) (0.000) (0.251)     
Tobin's Q -0.022*** 0.003*** -0.000  0.008*** 0.057*** 0.005** 0.004* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.749) (0.010) (0.004) (0.000) (0.040) (0.075) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.332*** -0.040*  0.005 0.493*** 1.022*** 0.432*** 0.405*** 
 (0.000) (0.081)  (0.727) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets  0.017 -0.031  0.145 -0.123 0.169 0.176* 
  (0.635) (0.437)  (0.200) (0.743) (0.116) (0.097) 
CAPEXP   -0.003 0.016* 0.302*** 0.583*** 0.255*** 0.236*** 
   (0.886) (0.094) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.012 0.005 -0.007* 0.072*** 0.056 0.076*** 0.076*** 
  (0.116) (0.324) (0.057) (0.001) (0.454) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Homogeneity   -0.173**      
   (0.041)      
Capital Intensity 0.121***        
 (0.000)        
Depr./Total Assets -0.128        
 (0.488)        
Pay Director Equity-
based compensation 
0.011 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.008 
(0.114) (0.778) (0.177) (0.107) (0.177) (0.880) (0.198) (0.176) 
         
  
 
Table B.1.9 Continued         
Firm Characteristics (Continued) 
Activist Institutional 
Holding (%) 
-0.268 -0.061 0.060 -0.012 -0.139 1.506** -0.293 -0.304 
(0.305) (0.340) (0.180) (0.756) (0.497) (0.031) (0.135) (0.113) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
0.017** -0.003 0.007*** 0.002** -0.015** -0.102*** -0.009 -0.007 
(0.025) (0.150) (0.002) (0.033) (0.027) (0.000) (0.122) (0.191) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.021 -0.000 -0.001 
(0.168) (0.361) (0.672) (0.209) (0.619) (0.216) (0.951) (0.855) 
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
-0.020** -0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.010 -0.071** -0.009 -0.008 
(0.036) (0.783) (0.165) (0.249) (0.205) (0.025) (0.188) (0.228) 
Herfindhal Index 0.340*** -0.038 -0.006 0.028 0.358*** 0.389 0.310*** 0.292*** 
 (0.005) (0.317) (0.810) (0.201) (0.001) (0.371) (0.002) (0.003) 
CEO Characteristics        
Insider (0/1) 0.017 -0.001 -0.006* 0.001 -0.009 -0.048 -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.204) (0.874) (0.070) (0.546) (0.284) (0.146) (0.444) (0.552) 
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) 0.006 -0.004** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.314) (0.017) (0.515) (0.195) (0.922) (0.679) (0.570) (0.496) 
CEO Age -0.082** -0.011 -0.010 -0.004 -0.058** 0.093 -0.058** -0.059***
 (0.016) (0.251) (0.215) (0.390) (0.024) (0.304) (0.012) (0.008) 
MBA (0/1) 0.015* -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.010* 0.004 -0.010* -0.010** 
 (0.058) (0.314) (0.235) (0.393) (0.076) (0.853) (0.061) (0.050) 
Founder (0/1) 0.013 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 0.024** 0.054 0.022** 0.021** 
 (0.356) (0.185) (0.193) (0.362) (0.027) (0.131) (0.027) (0.025) 
# Functional Areas -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.001 
 (0.586) (0.563) (0.337) (0.318) (0.330) (0.446) (0.487) (0.676) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
0.010 -0.004 -0.006*** -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 
(0.287) (0.101) (0.001) (0.412) (0.838) (0.883) (0.814) (0.851) 
Constant 0.248* 0.131*** 0.109*** 0.007 0.572*** 0.624* 0.575*** 0.572*** 
 (0.086) (0.000) (0.001) (0.691) (0.000) (0.087) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4826 5029 4914 5074 4693 4693 4693 4693 
R-squared 0.570 0.513 0.740 0.631 0.634 0.450 0.654 0.651 
Hansen's J-test (p-value) 0.146 0.851 0.297 0.631 0.12 0.732 0.119 0.148 
First Stage F-stat for 
#Employers 
22.09 36.63 24.46 30.69 39.39 43.39 39.27 39.42 
First Stage F-stat for #Employers * Industry 
Homogeneity 
17.59 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table B.1.10: Excluding the Herfindhal Index 
 
This table presents IV/2SLS results for firm policies and risk, excluding Herfindhal index as an additional control 
variable. The dependent variables are listed at the top of each column. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Pre-turnover firm policies are the respective firm policies in the year before the CEO turnover year. 
Instrumental variables for #Employers are the unemployment rate for the year when the CEO started his first 
fulltime job, non-business career dummy that equals one if the CEO had academic or government jobs, and the 
number of years the CEO has worked in his current firm’s industry. The instrumental variable for CEO employment 
history*Industry Homogeneity in the R&D regression is the unemployment rate described above multiplied by 
industry homogeneity. The predicted signs for the CEO employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at 
the top of each column. I report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in 
parenthesis.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D Adv. 
Total Risk
(Ann. Daily 
Stock 
Return Std.)
Market 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk  
(4- Factor)
 (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
#Employers 0.011** -0.004*** -0.013** 0.001* 0.007** -0.008 0.007*** 0.008*** 
 (0.049) (0.005) (0.016) (0.073) (0.041) (0.511) (0.010) (0.004) 
#Employers * Ind. 
Homogeneity 
  0.054**      
 (0.039)      
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover Policy 0.259*** 0.302*** 0.556*** 0.543*** 0.197*** 0.190*** 0.202*** 0.198*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.021*** -0.002** -0.002** 0.001* -0.019*** -0.031*** -0.019*** -0.019***
 (0.000) (0.024) (0.043) (0.070) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.006 0.001 -0.003** 0.001  -0.062***   
 (0.397) (0.769) (0.011) (0.347)  (0.000)   
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.576***    -0.294*** -0.620*** -0.239*** -0.219***
(0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.020** 0.120*** -0.011     
  (0.019) (0.000) (0.253)     
Tobin's Q -0.021*** 0.003*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.057*** 0.006** 0.005* 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.702) (0.008) (0.003) (0.000) (0.032) (0.061) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.346*** -0.039*  0.004 0.499*** 1.056*** 0.435*** 0.407*** 
 (0.000) (0.085)  (0.768) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets  0.016 -0.031  0.146 -0.126 0.171 0.177* 
  (0.638) (0.424)  (0.197) (0.734) (0.114) (0.095) 
CAPEXP   -0.005 0.017* 0.296*** 0.558*** 0.251*** 0.233*** 
   (0.773) (0.084) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.012 0.006 -0.006* 0.072*** 0.053 0.077*** 0.077*** 
  (0.112) (0.296) (0.061) (0.001) (0.480) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Homogeneity   -0.163**      
   (0.047)      
Capital Intensity 0.119***        
 (0.000)        
Depr./Total Assets -0.103        
 (0.573)        
Pay Director Equity-
based compensation 
0.011 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.008 
(0.110) (0.784) (0.155) (0.109) (0.176) (0.876) (0.197) (0.176) 
         
  
 
Table B.1.10         
Firm Characteristics (Continued) 
Activist Institutional 
Holding (%) 
-0.273 -0.060 0.063 -0.012 -0.136 1.521** -0.290 -0.301 
(0.296) (0.342) (0.155) (0.748) (0.509) (0.029) (0.140) (0.117) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
0.016** -0.003 0.007*** 0.002** -0.014** -0.100*** -0.009 -0.007 
(0.028) (0.151) (0.001) (0.035) (0.033) (0.000) (0.139) (0.211) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.006 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.022 0.000 -0.000 
(0.136) (0.368) (0.743) (0.219) (0.555) (0.184) (0.984) (0.908) 
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
-0.019** -0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.011 -0.075** -0.009 -0.008 
(0.047) (0.771) (0.203) (0.260) (0.173) (0.018) (0.166) (0.208) 
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) 0.005 -0.004** -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.397) (0.014) (0.767) (0.137) (0.920) (0.875) (0.672) (0.576) 
CEO Age -0.076** -0.011 -0.012 -0.004 -0.062** 0.070 -0.061*** -0.061***
 (0.021) (0.233) (0.107) (0.416) (0.016) (0.431) (0.009) (0.007) 
MBA (0/1) 0.015* -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.010* 0.004 -0.010* -0.010* 
 (0.059) (0.323) (0.211) (0.381) (0.078) (0.855) (0.063) (0.051) 
Founder (0/1) 0.013 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 0.024** 0.056 0.022** 0.021** 
 (0.351) (0.184) (0.168) (0.362) (0.028) (0.116) (0.028) (0.027) 
# Functional Areas -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.001 
 (0.666) (0.558) (0.382) (0.325) (0.399) (0.550) (0.547) (0.732) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
0.011 -0.005* -0.006*** -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.206) (0.096) (0.001) (0.447) (0.855) (0.963) (0.813) (0.843) 
Constant 0.298** 0.126*** 0.106*** 0.011 0.613*** 0.662* 0.611*** 0.606*** 
 (0.038) (0.001) (0.002) (0.568) (0.000) (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4826 5029 4914 5074 4693 4693 4693 4693 
R-squared 0.573 0.513 0.745 0.632 0.633 0.452 0.652 0.650 
Hansen's J-test (p-value) 0.167 0.856 0.379 0.628 0.131 0.887 0.139 0.166 
First Stage F-stat for 
#Employers 
39.44 55.58 40.67 47.89 62.54 76.47 61.66 61.75 
First Stage F-stat for #Employers * Industry 
Homogeneity 
27.08 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table B.2.1: OLS Results 
 
This table presents OLS results for firm policies and risk. The dependent variables are listed at the top of each 
column. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable definitions. Pre-turnover firm policies are the respective firm 
policies in the year before the CEO turnover year. The predicted signs for the CEO employment history proxies are 
presented in parenthesis at the top of each column. I report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level in parenthesis.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D Adv. 
Total Risk
(Ann. Daily 
Stock 
Return Std.)
Market 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk  
(4- Factor)
 (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
#Employers 0.005* -0.000 -0.002* 0.001* 0.004** 0.004 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.055) (0.581) (0.050) (0.059) (0.035) (0.528) (0.027) (0.019) 
#Employers * Ind. 
Homogeneity 
  0.007*      
 (0.084)      
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover Policy 0.314*** 0.311*** 0.585*** 0.591*** 0.193*** 0.189*** 0.202*** 0.199*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.025*** -0.001 -0.002** 0.000 -0.019*** -0.027*** -0.020*** -0.019***
 (0.000) (0.165) (0.018) (0.242) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.009 0.002 -0.004*** 0.000 -0.020*** -0.058*** -0.017*** -0.017***
 (0.193) (0.299) (0.002) (0.758) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.547***    -0.290*** -0.627*** -0.235*** -0.215***
(0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.022** 0.130*** -0.008     
  (0.012) (0.000) (0.397)     
Tobin's Q -0.021*** 0.003*** -0.000 0.001** 0.008*** 0.057*** 0.005* 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.900) (0.016) (0.008) (0.000) (0.080) (0.138) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.372*** -0.041*  -0.021 0.476*** 1.052*** 0.414*** 0.387*** 
 (0.000) (0.067)  (0.166) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets  0.006 -0.055*  0.157 -0.156 0.183* 0.189* 
  (0.864) (0.062)  (0.163) (0.670) (0.087) (0.071) 
CAPEXP   -0.008 0.021** 0.285*** 0.580*** 0.239*** 0.220*** 
   (0.585) (0.029) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.015* 0.007 -0.007** 0.072*** 0.038 0.079*** 0.079*** 
  (0.055) (0.103) (0.043) (0.001) (0.612) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Homogeneity   -0.040***      
   (0.002)      
Capital Intensity 0.083***        
 (0.003)        
Depr./Total Assets 0.080        
 (0.662)        
Pay Director Equity-
based compensation 
0.011 -0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.008 
(0.122) (0.597) (0.331) (0.054) (0.197) (0.945) (0.202) (0.177) 
Activist Institutional 
Holding (%) 
-0.200 -0.059 0.053 -0.019 -0.130 1.501** -0.281 -0.291 
(0.439) (0.340) (0.269) (0.657) (0.531) (0.033) (0.155) (0.132) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
0.023*** -0.003 0.006*** 0.004*** -0.014** -0.101*** -0.008 -0.006 
(0.002) (0.130) (0.003) (0.004) (0.045) (0.000) (0.181) (0.272) 
  
 
Table B.2.1Continued         
Firm Characteristics (Continued) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.022 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.103) (0.342) (0.153) (0.993) (0.578) (0.191) (0.994) (0.885) 
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
-0.027*** -0.002 0.005** 0.000 -0.010 -0.078** -0.009 -0.007 
(0.007) (0.460) (0.015) (0.941) (0.172) (0.014) (0.189) (0.247) 
Herfindhal Index 0.354*** -0.037 -0.002 0.027** 0.355*** 0.411 0.306*** 0.288*** 
 (0.005) (0.322) (0.771) (0.010) (0.001) (0.349) (0.002) (0.003) 
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) 0.003 -0.003* 0.000 -0.001* -0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.569) (0.077) (0.867) (0.086) (0.991) (0.937) (0.512) (0.399) 
CEO Age -0.058* -0.021** -0.018** -0.003 -0.049* 0.038 -0.047** -0.046** 
 (0.053) (0.015) (0.012) (0.544) (0.055) (0.659) (0.045) (0.040) 
MBA (0/1) 0.015** -0.003* 0.002 0.000 -0.009 -0.000 -0.008* -0.008* 
 (0.047) (0.093) (0.329) (0.807) (0.103) (0.989) (0.096) (0.084) 
Founder (0/1) 0.007 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 0.021** 0.070** 0.018* 0.016* 
 (0.563) (0.808) (0.114) (0.665) (0.042) (0.030) (0.062) (0.069) 
# Functional Areas -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 
 (0.812) (0.222) (0.278) (0.127) (0.307) (0.687) (0.383) (0.517) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
0.011 -0.005* -0.005*** -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 
(0.232) (0.077) (0.001) (0.542) (0.858) (0.972) (0.786) (0.808) 
Constant 0.140 0.159*** 0.107*** 0.030 0.574*** 0.668* 0.582*** 0.581*** 
 (0.305) (0.000) (0.000) (0.182) (0.000) (0.069) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4826 5029 4914 5074 4693 4693 4693 4693 
R-squared 0.585 0.525 0.752 0.597 0.636 0.453 0.656 0.654 
 
  
 
Table B.2.2: Results based on Between Effects 
 
This table presents results based on the between effect estimation. The dependent variables are listed at the top of 
each column. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable definitions. Pre-turnover firm policies are the respective 
firm policies in the year before the CEO turnover year. The predicted signs for the CEO employment history proxies 
are presented in parenthesis at the top of each column. I report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level in parenthesis.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D Adv. 
Total Risk
(Ann. Daily 
Stock 
Return Std.)
Market 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk  
(4- Factor)
 (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
#Employers 0.011** -0.003** -0.019* 0.001** 0.004 -0.006 0.005** 0.006** 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.060) (0.039) (0.169) (0.663) (0.045) (0.026) 
#Employers * Ind. 
Homogeneity 
  0.084*      
 (0.098)      
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover Policy 0.337*** 0.366*** 0.587*** 0.612*** 0.215*** 0.249*** 0.224*** 0.222*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.020*** -0.003*** -0.002** 0.001* -0.021*** -0.050*** -0.020*** -0.019***
 (0.000) (0.009) (0.036) (0.055) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.013*** -0.049*** -0.011*** -0.010** 
 (0.997) (0.884) (0.196) (0.985) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) 
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.665***    -0.457*** -0.290 -0.418*** -0.407***
(0.000)    (0.000) (0.195) (0.000) (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.018 0.090*** -0.030***     
  (0.359) (0.000) (0.007)     
Tobin's Q -0.012** 0.003** 0.001 0.002** 0.012*** 0.020 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.018) (0.032) (0.465) (0.019) (0.001) (0.167) (0.001) (0.002) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.431*** -0.056*  -0.017 0.422*** 1.092*** 0.358*** 0.338*** 
 (0.000) (0.074)  (0.307) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets  0.002 -0.056  0.196* -0.599 0.224** 0.236** 
  (0.954) (0.221)  (0.073) (0.184) (0.025) (0.015) 
CAPEXP   -0.009 0.035** 0.365*** 0.447 0.330*** 0.315*** 
   (0.746) (0.044) (0.000) (0.187) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.007 0.002 -0.014*** 0.090*** 0.267*** 0.085*** 0.083*** 
  (0.409) (0.842) (0.003) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Homogeneity   -0.276      
   (0.108)      
Capital Intensity 0.097***        
 (0.003)        
Depr./Total Assets 0.041        
 (0.848)        
Pay Director Equity-
based compensation 
0.010 -0.002 0.005 0.004** 0.019* -0.012 0.020** 0.020** 
(0.456) (0.552) (0.119) (0.043) (0.060) (0.771) (0.031) (0.027) 
Activist Institutional 
Holding (%) 
0.180 0.017 -0.056 -0.085 0.256 1.895 0.083 0.014 
(0.656) (0.882) (0.618) (0.182) (0.411) (0.140) (0.769) (0.961) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
0.003 -0.005 0.017*** 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.010 0.011 
(0.878) (0.381) (0.002) (0.120) (0.508) (0.929) (0.432) (0.398) 
  
 
         
Table B.2.2 Continued        
Firm Characteristics (Continued) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.040* -0.000 -0.000 
(0.618) (0.279) (0.874) (0.353) (0.629) (0.068) (0.984) (0.922) 
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
-0.035** 0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.019 -0.004 -0.004 
(0.026) (0.806) (0.530) (0.416) (0.853) (0.690) (0.691) (0.687) 
Herfindhal Index 0.863 -0.056 -0.092 0.060 1.301*** 2.168 1.136*** 1.061*** 
 (0.117) (0.715) (0.566) (0.469) (0.001) (0.183) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) -0.022** -0.011*** -0.004* -0.002* -0.004 0.059* -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.031) (0.000) (0.074) (0.096) (0.606) (0.069) (0.440) (0.453) 
CEO Age -0.079** -0.003 -0.009 -0.005 -0.025 0.088 -0.031 -0.032 
 (0.010) (0.739) (0.250) (0.305) (0.272) (0.352) (0.137) (0.117) 
MBA (0/1) 0.009 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.004 0.024 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.200) (0.783) (0.506) (0.885) (0.445) (0.267) (0.337) (0.291) 
Founder (0/1) 0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 0.012 0.007 0.013 0.013 
 (0.693) (0.566) (0.210) (0.228) (0.225) (0.874) (0.156) (0.156) 
# Functional Areas -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.410) (0.340) (0.218) (0.234) (0.321) (0.876) (0.375) (0.396) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
0.010 -0.003 -0.006** -0.000 0.003 -0.008 0.003 0.003 
(0.204) (0.279) (0.028) (0.936) (0.583) (0.741) (0.576) (0.639) 
Constant -0.449 0.061 -0.045 -0.013 0.543* 0.049 0.713* 0.681 
 (0.471) (0.741) (0.795) (0.896) (0.054) (0.967) (0.096) (0.101) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4826 5029 4914 5074 4693 4693 4693 4693 
R-squared 0.673 0.605 0.744 0.736 0.742 0.558 0.749 0.744 
         
 
 
  
 
Table B.2.3: The Heckman Two-step Estimation 
 
This table presents results based on the Heckman Two-step Estimation to control for the CEO-firm selectivity. The 
dependent variables are listed at the top of each column. Mover equals one if the CEO has worked for more than 
three firms (sample median). Refer to Table 1 and Appendix A for variable definitions. Pre-turnover firm policies 
are the respective firm policies in the year before the CEO turnover year. The predicted signs for the CEO 
employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at the top of each column. I report p-values based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level in parenthesis.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D Adv. 
Total Risk
(Ann. Daily 
Stock 
Return Std.)
Market 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk  
(4- Factor)
 (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
Mover (0/1) 0.066*** -0.014***0.001 0.004*** 0.007 -0.100*** 0.016* 0.019** 
(1: #Employers>3) (0.000) (0.000) (0.137) (0.008) (0.452) (0.007) (0.068) (0.027) 
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover Policy 0.325*** 0.327*** 0.814*** 0.570*** 0.196*** 0.197*** 0.206*** 0.204*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.022*** -0.002***-0.000 0.001** -0.019*** -0.032*** -0.020*** -0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.405) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.006* 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.022*** -0.063*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 
 (0.057) (0.545) (0.152) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.580***    -0.292*** -0.622*** -0.238*** -0.218*** 
(0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.018** 0.006** -0.011***     
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.006)     
Tobin's Q -0.020*** 0.003*** -0.000 0.002*** 0.008*** 0.049*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.337) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.436*** -0.052*** -0.013* 0.480*** 1.322*** 0.391*** 0.359*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets  0.015 -0.013**  0.079 -0.610** 0.128** 0.139** 
  (0.478) (0.045)  (0.221) (0.013) (0.027) (0.013) 
CAPEXP   -0.006* 0.018*** 0.264*** 0.418*** 0.234*** 0.218*** 
   (0.067) (0.007) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.010** -0.001 -0.006*** 0.075*** 0.064 0.080*** 0.080*** 
  (0.011) (0.181) (0.002) (0.000) (0.176) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital Intensity 0.132***        
 (0.000)        
Depr./Total Assets -0.096        
 (0.334)        
Pay Director Equity-
based compensation 
0.011** -0.001 -0.000 0.002*** 0.008* 0.003 0.007* 0.007* 
(0.017) (0.321) (0.553) (0.004) (0.063) (0.882) (0.089) (0.077) 
Activist Institutional 
Holding (%) 
-0.291** -0.047 0.027** -0.013 -0.123 1.710*** -0.286** -0.300*** 
(0.035) (0.240) (0.028) (0.517) (0.352) (0.001) (0.015) (0.008) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
0.016*** -0.004** 0.000 0.003*** -0.015*** -0.101*** -0.009* -0.007 
(0.006) (0.046) (0.753) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.072) (0.124) 
         
         
  
 
Table B.2.3 Continued        
Firm Characteristics (Continued) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.006** -0.001 0.000 0.001* 0.002 0.027*** 0.000 -0.000 
(0.030) (0.392) (0.849) (0.054) (0.359) (0.004) (0.982) (0.855) 
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
-0.023*** -0.000 -0.002*** -0.002* -0.011* -0.080*** -0.009* -0.008 
(0.000) (0.821) (0.001) (0.083) (0.064) (0.000) (0.077) (0.115) 
Herfindhal Index 0.064** -0.003 0.002 0.017*** -0.082*** -0.393*** -0.055** -0.051** 
 (0.036) (0.771) (0.348) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.030) (0.037) 
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) 0.005 -0.005***-0.000 -0.001** 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.116) (0.000) (0.228) (0.013) (0.690) (0.869) (0.654) (0.465) 
CEO Age -0.092*** -0.009* -0.006*** -0.004 -0.049*** 0.088 -0.051*** -0.052*** 
 (0.000) (0.054) (0.000) (0.101) (0.001) (0.132) (0.000) (0.000) 
MBA (0/1) 0.014*** -0.002** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.008** 0.004 -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.353) (0.014) (0.783) (0.007) (0.005) 
Founder (0/1) 0.015** -0.004** -0.000 -0.003*** 0.019*** 0.046** 0.017*** 0.016*** 
 (0.013) (0.043) (0.665) (0.002) (0.001) (0.035) (0.001) (0.001) 
# Functional Areas -0.005** -0.001* 0.000 -0.001** 0.004** 0.015** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.019) (0.052) (0.100) (0.013) (0.038) (0.035) (0.156) (0.327) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
0.012*** -0.005***-0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.008 0.001 0.001 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.714) (0.319) (0.953) (0.589) (0.757) (0.779) 
Constant 0.333*** 0.097*** 0.024*** 0.012 0.690*** 0.857*** 0.668*** 0.657*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.194) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4826 5029 1465 5074 4693 4693 4693 4693 
         
Lambda -0.038 0.010 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.053 -0.002 -0.003
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.378 0.512 0.610 0.021 0.752 0.519
         
 
 
  
 
Table B.2.4: A Subsample analysis of CEOs with different tenure lengths 
 
This table presents results for firm policies and risk for CEOs that have been the CEO of their current firms at least 
five or three years. Panel A presents the post-turnover policies in the first three years for CEOs who have been the 
CEO for three or more years. Panel B presents the post-turnover policies in the first five years for CEOs who have 
been the CEO for five or more years. The dependent variables are listed at the top of each column. Refer to Table 1 
and Appendix A for variable definitions. Pre-turnover firm policies are the respective firm policies in the year before 
the CEO turnover year. The predicted signs for the CEO employment history proxies are presented in parenthesis at 
the top of each column. I report p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in 
parenthesis.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Post-turnover Policies in the first three years for CEOs with CEO tenure>=3 years 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D Adv. 
Total Risk
(Ann. Daily 
Stock 
Return Std.)
Market 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk  
(4- Factor)
 (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
#Employers 0.010** -0.005*** -0.016* 0.000 0.012 -0.015 0.012* 0.012* 
 (0.048) (0.001) (0.055) (0.789) (0.108) (0.316) (0.079) (0.076) 
#Employers*Industry 
Homogeneity 
  0.071*      
  (0.085)      
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover Policy 0.505*** 0.560*** 0.693*** 0.760*** 0.339*** 0.420*** 0.347*** 0.348*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Total Sales) 0.024*** -0.003** -0.001 0.000 -0.010** -0.021* -0.011*** -0.011***
 (0.000) (0.027) (0.168) (0.506) (0.010) (0.073) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm Age -0.005 -0.001 -0.003*** 0.000 -0.029*** -0.076*** -0.025*** -0.024***
 (0.424) (0.471) (0.007) (0.787) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.462***    -0.273*** -0.500* -0.230*** -0.210***
(0.000)    (0.000) (0.058) (0.000) (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.022 0.126*** -0.005     
  (0.202) (0.000) (0.474)     
Tobin's Q -0.012*** 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.015 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.978) (0.148) (0.115) (0.737) (0.376) (0.748) (0.636) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.317*** -0.071*  -0.020* 0.453*** 0.911*** 0.410*** 0.400*** 
 (0.000) (0.052)  (0.095) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets  0.020 -0.099***  -0.040 -0.451 0.034 0.054 
  (0.618) (0.010)  (0.783) (0.313) (0.781) (0.662) 
CAPEXP   -0.010 0.012 0.197** 0.251 0.197*** 0.161** 
   (0.658) (0.222) (0.016) (0.381) (0.008) (0.023) 
Leverage  -0.003 0.003 -0.004 0.053* 0.083 0.056* 0.057** 
  (0.710) (0.679) (0.165) (0.091) (0.391) (0.057) (0.047) 
Industry Homogeneity   -0.222*      
   (0.064)      
Capital Intensity 0.088***        
 (0.001)        
Depr./Total Assets -0.039        
 (0.849)        
Pay Director Equity-
based compensation 
0.004 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.027 0.001 0.002 
(0.622) (0.420) (0.444) (0.827) (0.983) (0.322) (0.844) (0.760) 
Activist Institutional 
Holding (%) 
-0.185 -0.195* 0.144** -0.076 -0.119 1.361 -0.286 -0.286 
(0.427) (0.059) (0.029) (0.226) (0.643) (0.113) (0.226) (0.213) 
  
 
Table B.2.4 Continued        
Firm Characteristics (Continued) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
0.022** -0.007** 0.006* 0.004*** -0.012 -0.077* -0.010 -0.007 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.062) (0.007) (0.307) (0.063) (0.329) (0.459) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.004 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.010 0.043 0.008 0.007 
(0.516) (0.804) (0.818) (0.978) (0.243) (0.105) (0.255) (0.338) 
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
-0.034** 0.003 0.003 0.000 -0.022 -0.104* -0.020 -0.018 
(0.013) (0.454) (0.295) (0.999) (0.156) (0.050) (0.109) (0.143) 
Herfindhal Index 0.055 -0.012 0.008 0.012 -0.041 -0.223* -0.028 -0.028 
 (0.193) (0.221) (0.249) (0.139) (0.265) (0.060) (0.431) (0.415) 
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) 0.008 -0.007** -0.003 -0.001 0.014 0.022 0.004 0.004 
 (0.337) (0.013) (0.167) (0.382) (0.140) (0.510) (0.598) (0.645) 
CEO Age -0.038 -0.005 -0.021*** 0.001 -0.110** -0.065 -0.100*** -0.097***
 (0.232) (0.652) (0.003) (0.887) (0.010) (0.593) (0.006) (0.007) 
MBA (0/1) 0.010 -0.005** 0.002 -0.001 -0.006 0.001 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.219) (0.029) (0.340) (0.287) (0.453) (0.960) (0.495) (0.458) 
Founder (0/1) 0.008 -0.004 -0.003 0.000 -0.004 -0.102** 0.002 0.004 
 (0.580) (0.427) (0.400) (0.834) (0.811) (0.039) (0.887) (0.796) 
# Functional Areas -0.006* -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.016 0.001 0.000 
 (0.099) (0.260) (0.503) (0.987) (0.894) (0.251) (0.873) (0.965) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
0.009 0.003 -0.005* -0.000 -0.003 -0.021 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.375) (0.271) (0.052) (0.910) (0.734) (0.491) (0.842) (0.772) 
Constant 0.054 0.124*** 0.145*** -0.003 0.799*** 1.379*** 0.761*** 0.736*** 
 (0.667) (0.004) (0.000) (0.856) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1791 1834 1777 1861 1774 1774 1774 1774 
R-square 0.662 0.461 0.764 0.747 0.664 0.464 0.684 0.683 
         
Hansen's J-test (p-value) 0.420 0.726 0.356 0.675 0.171 0.73 0.214 0.253 
First Stage F-stat for 
#Employers 
75.34 53.42 42.82 53.87 44.65 70.1 60.95 60.96 
First Stage F-stat for #Employers * Industry 
Homogeneity 
)
24.97      
      
 
 
Panel B. Post-turnover Policies in the first five years for CEOs with CEO tenure>=5 years 
 Leverage CAPEXP R&D Adv. 
Total Risk
(Ann. Daily 
Stock 
Return Std.)
Market 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk 
(CAPM) 
Firm-
specific 
Risk  
(4- Factor)
 (+) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
#Employers 0.021*** -0.007*** -0.013 0.002* 0.007 -0.014 0.007* 0.007* 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.101) (0.085) (0.200) (0.438) (0.098) (0.084) 
#Employers*Industry 
Homogeneity 
  0.060      
  (0.135)      
Firm Characteristics        
Pre-turnover Policy 0.452*** 0.549*** 0.631*** 0.639*** 0.322*** 0.329*** 0.327*** 0.320*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
 
Table B.2.4 Continued.         
Firm Characteristics (Continued)       
ln(Total Sales) 0.034*** -0.003* -0.001 0.002*** -0.014*** -0.029** -0.015*** -0.015***
 (0.000) (0.063) (0.316) (0.001) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age 0.005 -0.002 -0.003* 0.000 -0.025*** -0.066** -0.023*** -0.023***
 (0.545) (0.360) (0.088) (0.613) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
Operating Return on 
Assets 
-0.518***    -0.373*** -0.868*** -0.301*** -0.276***
(0.000)    (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Surplus Cash  0.036** 0.141*** -0.017     
  (0.023) (0.000) (0.251)     
Tobin's Q -0.008** -0.000 -0.002 0.002** 0.002 0.023 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.030) (0.930) (0.244) (0.015) (0.693) (0.152) (0.847) (0.791) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.368*** -0.106***  -0.036** 0.614*** 1.310*** 0.520*** 0.492*** 
 (0.000) (0.006)  (0.019) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adv./Total Assets  0.054 -0.099**  -0.088 -0.972** 0.006 0.032 
  (0.284) (0.015)  (0.517) (0.034) (0.959) (0.782) 
CAPEXP   -0.025 0.024** 0.180** 0.072 0.173*** 0.138** 
   (0.382) (0.035) (0.016) (0.808) (0.009) (0.029) 
Leverage  -0.012 0.003 -0.008** 0.042 -0.086 0.050* 0.052* 
  (0.260) (0.655) (0.037) (0.172) (0.373) (0.087) (0.066) 
Industry Homogeneity   -0.187*      
   (0.100)      
Capital Intensity 0.079**        
 (0.017)        
Depr./Total Assets -0.103        
 (0.673)        
Pay Director Equity-
based compensation 
0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.019 0.004 0.004 
(0.721) (0.375) (0.339) (0.304) (0.648) (0.476) (0.645) (0.612) 
Activist Institutional 
Holding (%) 
-0.406 -0.200* 0.090 -0.064 -0.119 1.581* -0.314 -0.342 
(0.108) (0.059) (0.137) (0.261) (0.649) (0.073) (0.201) (0.157) 
CEO Cash 
Compensation 
0.034*** -0.012*** 0.007* 0.005*** -0.018* -0.139*** -0.011 -0.009 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.053) (0.004) (0.097) (0.000) (0.231) (0.334) 
CEO Compensation 
Delta 
-0.004 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.006 0.027 0.003 0.002 
(0.357) (0.228) (0.687) (0.853) (0.278) (0.199) (0.471) (0.581) 
CEO Compensation 
Vega 
-0.059*** 0.007* 0.003 -0.004 -0.018 -0.089* -0.016 -0.012 
(0.000) (0.080) (0.376) (0.134) (0.171) (0.072) (0.150) (0.244) 
Herfindhal Index 0.111 -0.027 0.009 0.021* -0.044 -0.266 -0.025 -0.023 
 (0.114) (0.128) (0.449) (0.059) (0.387) (0.150) (0.591) (0.589) 
CEO Characteristics        
Ln(CEO Tenure+1) 0.014 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.031*** 0.017 0.021** 0.018** 
 (0.133) (0.270) (0.621) (0.895) (0.002) (0.567) (0.019) (0.033) 
CEO Age -0.031 0.003 -0.025*** -0.003 -0.104** -0.066 -0.098** -0.097** 
 (0.485) (0.817) (0.004) (0.634) (0.021) (0.625) (0.016) (0.014) 
MBA (0/1) 0.009 -0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.019** -0.029 -0.015** -0.016** 
 (0.408) (0.182) (0.180) (0.563) (0.027) (0.346) (0.043) (0.033) 
Founder (0/1) 0.027 -0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.009 -0.013 0.009 0.009 
 (0.126) (0.479) (0.374) (0.195) (0.559) (0.799) (0.489) (0.475) 
         
         
  
 
Table B.2.4. Continued         
CEO Characteristics (Continued)       
# Functional Areas -0.006 -0.003** 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.228) (0.049) (0.628) (0.630) (0.951) (0.898) (0.966) (0.871) 
Has Finance 
Background (0/1) 
0.015 0.002 -0.007** -0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.004 0.003 
(0.221) (0.496) (0.018) (0.366) (0.578) (0.979) (0.621) (0.677) 
Constant -0.079 0.106** 0.150*** -0.011 0.805*** 1.633*** 0.770*** 0.770*** 
 (0.611) (0.032) (0.000) (0.592) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2095 2187 2117 2225 2068 2068 2068 2068 
R-square 0.594 0.467 0.742 0.625 0.658 0.425 0.680 0.677 
         
Hansen's J-test (p-value) 0.647 0.613 0.736 0.652 0.163 0.545 0.167 0.241 
First Stage F-stat for 
#Employers 
35.4 26.01 24.96 24.64 21.1 31.01 30.73 30.7 
First Stage F-stat for #Employers * Industry 
Homogeneity 
)
15.79      
      
 
  
 
Table B.2.5. The Number of Employers and Long-run Performance (Matched Sample) 
The table presents change in industry-median-adjusted accounting/stock performance following CEO turnovers for the subsample of CEOs that have worked for 
at least five employers. The matched sample is a subsample of CEOs that have worked for only one employer. Panel A presents results based on the nearest 
neighborhood match proposed in Abadie and Imbens (2002). The table reports the average treatment effect on the treated. Panel B presents results based on the 
match method proposed in Baber and Lyon (1996). The statistical significance in Panel B is based on the paired t-test. For variable definitions, refer to Appendix 
A and Table 1. I report changes in performance for year -1 to +1, year -1 to +2, year -1 to +3. Year 0 is the year of CEO turnover. # Employers is the number of 
employer the CEO has worked for. Survival ratio is the number of CEOs who remain as CEOs for the year of interest divided by the total number of CEOs in that 
group at year 1. Year 1 is one year after the year of CEO turn over. I indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 Abadie and Imbens (2002) Baber and Lyon (1996)
 #Employers>=5  #Employers >=5  (CEO Tenure>=3)  #Employers >=5 
 Change in Operating Return On Assets
 ATT Coef. p-value  Obs.  ATT Coef. p-value  Obs.  Mean p-value  Obs. 
t=-1 to t=1 -0.014 0.163  311  -0.015 0.192  271  -0.013 0.185  164 
t=-1 to t=2 -0.011 0.324  293  -0.010 0.409  271  -0.027 0.222  148 
t=-1 to t=3 -0.002 0.832  272  -0.003 0.82  271  -0.027 0.208  130 
 Change in Annual Stock Returns 
 ATT Coef. p-value  Obs.  ATT Coef. p-value  Obs.  Mean p-value  Obs. 
t=-1 to t=1 0.203 0.091 * 302  0.145 0.077 * 260  0.065 0.066 * 164 
t=-1 to t=2 0.125 0.034 ** 282  0.257 0.015 ** 260  0.083 0.24  148 
t=-1 to t=3 0.067 0.25  261  0.061 0.287  260  0.121 0.588  130 
 Change in Return on Equity 
 ATT Coef. p-value  Obs.  ATT Coef. p-value  Obs.  Mean p-value  Obs. 
t=-1 to t=1 -0.028 0.578  311  -0.026 0.500  271  -0.027 0.415  164 
t=-1 to t=2 0.006 0.840  293  0.004 0.915  271  -0.057 0.443  148 
t=-1 to t=3 0.015 0.670  272  0.012 0.740  271  -0.099 0.176  130 
 Change in Market to Book Ratio 
 ATT Coef. p-value  Obs.  ATT Coef. p-value  Obs.  Mean p-value  Obs. 
t=-1 to t=1 -0.606 0.322  303  -0.879 0.199  260  -0.091 0.396  164 
t=-1 to t=2 -0.107 0.768  283  -0.058 0.87  260  -0.264 0.482  148 
t=-1 to t=3 -0.671 0.211  261  -0.663 0.21  260  -0.499 0.164  130 
 Change in Sales Growth 
 ATT Coef. p-value  Obs.  ATT Coef. p-value  Obs.  Mean p-value  Obs. 
t=-1 to t=1 -0.025 0.549  309  -0.026 0.58  268  0.005 0.008 *** 164 
t=-1 to t=2 0.081 0.096 * 290  0.067 0.094 * 268  0.032 0.041 ** 148 
t=-1 to t=3 0.023 0.132   269   0.018 0.108   268  0.040 0.011 ** 130 
Matching Criteria Exact on Prior Performance, Closest on Size. The changes in 
performances are industry median adjusted. 
 Prior Performance (+/-90%, then +/-80%), Size (+/-
90%, then 80%, 70%, 50%), Industry (4-digit SIC, 
then two-digit SIC, 1-digit SIC)  
 
  
 
Table B.3.1. Differences in Pre-turnover Firm Policies for CEOs with different employment histories 
This table presents differences in prior CEO characteristics and firm policies in the year prior to the year of CEO turnover for 714 CEOs in the CEO-firm match 
analysis. Refer to Tables 1 and 2 and Appendix A for variable definitions. Q1 includes CEOs in the bottom quartile and Q4 includes CEOs in the top quartile. 
Q4-Q1 is the difference in means (medians) between the top and the bottom quartiles. The differences in means and medians for the bottom and top quartiles are 
presented at the right side of the table. The statistical significance for difference in means is based on t-test and for difference in medians is based on the 
nonparametric signed rank test. Comparison based on #Employers is presented in Table 3. This table presents results based on the other four employment history 
variables. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 CEO Employment History Proxy 2: # Employers per year 
  Least  Frequent Q2 Q3 Most Frequent Q4-Q1 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median  
Prior CEO Characteristics             
Prior CEO Tenure 11.026 8 10.195 7 8.598 7 7.961 6 -3.065*** -2*** 
Prior CEO Is Chairman 81.42%  77.27%  78.72%  69.31%  -12.10%**   
Forced Turnover 6.09%  9.02%  14.81%  16.90%  10.81%***   
Board Characteristics            
Board Insiders (%) 0.260 0.250 0.272 0.250 0.257 0.222 0.258 0.222 -0.002 -0.028 
Board Size 11.071 11 9.818 9 9.388 9 8.787 9 -2.284*** -2*** 
Firm Characteristics            
Firm Size 8.132 7.872 7.568 7.400 7.448 7.267 6.991 6.840 -1.141*** -1.032*** 
Firm Age 78.957 80 59.955 51 53.804 44 50.465 39 -28.492*** -42*** 
Leverage 0.231 0.198 0.188 0.156 0.197 0.161 0.179 0.121 -0.052** -0.077*** 
R&D Exp./Total Assets 0.019 0.005 0.025 0.000 0.031 0.007 0.037 0.007 0.018*** 0.002* 
Advertising/Total Assets 0.014 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.002 0.000 
Capital Expenditure 0.060 0.048 0.062 0.051 0.060 0.049 0.055 0.041 -0.005 -0.007** 
Industry Adjusted OROA 0.048 0.033 0.057 0.043 0.075 0.052 0.056 0.045 0.008 0.012 
Firm Risk Measures            
Total Risk (Daily Stock Ret. Std.) 0.368 0.344 0.393 0.368 0.461 0.435 0.505 0.449 0.137*** 0.105*** 
Market Risk 0.763 0.715 0.903 0.877 1.062 0.975 1.080 0.962 0.316*** 0.247*** 
Firm Specific Risk (CAPM) 0.334 0.309 0.357 0.328 0.413 0.384 0.459 0.405 0.125*** 0.096*** 
Firm Specific Risk (4 Factors) 0.323 0.300 0.345 0.316 0.399 0.368 0.443 0.390 0.120*** 0.090*** 
Shocks            
Positive Industry Shock (%) 31.30%  38.35%  37.57%  37.32%  6.02%   
Negative Industry Shock (%) 7.83%  6.02%  7.41%  7.75%  -0.08%   
Industry Shocks (0/1) (%) 39.13%  44.36%  44.97%  45.07%  5.94%   
Positive Firm Shock (0/1) (%) 13.91%  15.79%  23.28%  22.89%  8.97%**   
Negative Firm Shock (0/1) (%) 14.78%  20.30%  20.63%  26.76%  11.98%**   
Firm Shocks (0/1) (%) 28.70%  36.09%  43.92%  49.65%  20.95%***   
  
 
Table B.3.1 Continued. 
CEO Employment History Proxy 3: Employer Change Recency 
  Distant Changes Q2 Q3 Recent Changes Q4-Q1 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median  
Prior CEO Characteristics             
Prior CEO Tenure 10.158 7 9.748 7 9.314 7 7.406 5 -2.752*** -2*** 
Prior CEO Is Chairman 78.33%  79.74%  76.28%  68.78%  -9.56%**   
Forced Turnover 10.93%  7.10%  13.21%  19.20%  8.27%**   
Board Characteristics            
Board Insiders (%) 0.272 0.250 0.246 0.222 0.273 0.250 0.253 0.222 -0.019 -0.028* 
Board Size 10.250 10 9.824 9 9.179 9 8.896 9 -1.354*** -1*** 
Firm Characteristics            
Firm Size 7.760 7.491 7.604 7.483 7.120 7.008 7.161 7.053 -0.599*** -0.439*** 
Firm Age 70.279 73 54.323 45 55.340 47 51.228 36 -19.051*** -38*** 
Leverage 0.207 0.161 0.182 0.128 0.203 0.181 0.184 0.140 -0.022 -0.022* 
R&D Exp./Total Assets 0.025 0.006 0.032 0.008 0.028 0.000 0.035 0.005 0.010** -0.001 
Advertising/Total Assets 0.013 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.002 0.000** 
Capital Expenditure 0.064 0.051 0.059 0.048 0.056 0.041 0.056 0.044 -0.008 -0.007** 
Industry Adjusted OROA 0.054 0.043 0.076 0.047 0.061 0.041 0.053 0.042 -0.001 -0.001 
Firm Risk Measures            
Total Risk (Daily Stock Ret. Std.) 0.406 0.369 0.443 0.411 0.467 0.410 0.482 0.437 0.076*** 0.068*** 
Market Risk 0.906 0.798 0.986 0.882 0.978 0.916 1.077 0.965 0.170*** 0.167*** 
Firm Specific Risk (CAPM) 0.365 0.332 0.401 0.367 0.426 0.372 0.436 0.385 0.072*** 0.054*** 
Firm Specific Risk (4 Factors) 0.351 0.317 0.386 0.349 0.412 0.357 0.422 0.366 0.070*** 0.049*** 
Shocks            
Positive Industry Shock (%) 31.69%  40.65%  38.36%  36.61%  4.91%   
Negative Industry Shock (%) 7.65%  8.39%  6.92%  6.70%  -0.95%   
Industry Shocks (0/1) (%) 39.34%  49.03%  45.28%  43.30%  3.96%   
Positive Firm Shock (0/1) (%) 15.30%  19.35%  18.87%  25.89%  10.59%***   
Negative Firm Shock (0/1) (%) 20.22%  20.00%  24.53%  23.21%  3.00%   
Firm Shocks (0/1) (%) 35.52%  39.35%  43.40%  49.11%  13.59%***   
  
 
Table B.3.1 Continued. 
CEO Employment History Proxy 4: Firm Experience Diversification 
  Most Diversified Q2 Q3 Least Diversified Q4-Q1 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median  
Prior CEO Characteristics             
Prior CEO Tenure 7.386 5 8.798 6 9.541 7 10.577 7 3.191*** 2*** 
Prior CEO Is Chairman 72.97%  70.88%  79.10%  78.31%  5.34%   
Forced Turnover 19.58%  11.48%  10.50%  10.71%  -8.86%**   
Board Characteristics            
Board Insiders (%) 0.254 0.222 0.276 0.226 0.243 0.222 0.270 0.258 0.016 0.036 
Board Size 8.773 9 9.176 9 9.644 9 10.518 10 1.745*** 1*** 
Firm Characteristics            
Firm Size 7.059 6.824 7.266 7.184 7.445 7.270 7.878 7.600 0.819*** 0.776*** 
Firm Age 50.127 40 55.240 40 56.602 47 69.804 73 19.677*** 33*** 
Leverage 0.184 0.149 0.194 0.160 0.193 0.144 0.205 0.163 0.021 0.014* 
R&D Exp./Total Assets 0.035 0.007 0.028 0.000 0.030 0.008 0.028 0.006 -0.007 -0.002 
Advertising/Total Assets 0.016 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.014 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Capital Expenditure 0.057 0.042 0.056 0.043 0.061 0.049 0.060 0.048 0.002 0.006* 
Industry Adjusted OROA 0.065 0.057 0.045 0.034 0.066 0.045 0.063 0.041 -0.002 -0.016 
Firm Risk Measures            
Total Risk (Daily Stock Ret. Std.) 0.489 0.444 0.461 0.410 0.437 0.402 0.413 0.369 -0.076*** -0.075*** 
Market Risk 1.074 0.956 0.976 0.950 1.016 0.896 0.891 0.801 -0.183*** -0.155*** 
Firm Specific Risk (CAPM) 0.446 0.401 0.417 0.369 0.393 0.359 0.372 0.332 -0.073*** -0.069*** 
Firm Specific Risk (4 Factors) 0.432 0.385 0.404 0.354 0.377 0.343 0.360 0.315 -0.072*** -0.070*** 
Shocks            
Positive Industry Shock (%) 37.57%  35.52%  35.36%  38.10%  0.53%    
Negative Industry Shock (%) 6.88%  4.92%  9.94%  7.74%  0.86%    
Industry Shocks (0/1) (%) 44.44%  40.44%  45.30%  45.83%  1.39%    
Positive Firm Shock (0/1) (%) 21.16%  23.50%  20.44%  15.48%  -5.69%    
Negative Firm Shock (0/1) (%) 26.98%  22.95%  16.02%  22.02%  -4.96%    
Firm Shocks (0/1) (%) 48.15%  46.45%  36.46%  37.50%  -10.65%**   
  
 
Table B.3.1 Continued. 
CEO Employment History Proxy 5: Industry Experience Diversification 
  Most Diversified Q2 Q3 Least Diversified Q4-Q1 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median  
Prior CEO Characteristics             
Prior CEO Tenure 7.383 5 9.071 7 8.500 6 10.570 7 3.187*** 2*** 
Prior CEO Is Chairman 70.05%  75.56%  78.49%  77.92%  7.87%*   
Forced Turnover 17.41%  10.33%  15.96%  10.74%  -6.67%**   
Board Characteristics            
Board Insiders (%) 0.253 0.222 0.242 0.218 0.260 0.222 0.282 0.267 0.029** 0.044*** 
Board Size 8.812 9 9.656 10 9.591 9 9.917 10 1.104*** 1*** 
Firm Characteristics            
Firm Size 7.073 6.871 7.457 7.202 7.488 7.271 7.592 7.475 0.519*** 0.605*** 
Firm Age 51.607 41 57.011 48 61.660 45 61.554 52 9.947*** 11*** 
Leverage 0.196 0.160 0.193 0.166 0.173 0.128 0.201 0.144 0.005 -0.016 
R&D Exp./Total Assets 0.034 0.009 0.032 0.010 0.025 0.004 0.027 0.000 -0.007 -0.009* 
Advertising/Total Assets 0.014 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Capital Expenditure 0.051 0.038 0.062 0.046 0.060 0.047 0.061 0.050 0.010** 0.012*** 
Industry Adjusted OROA 0.045 0.038 0.065 0.045 0.072 0.046 0.063 0.045 0.018* 0.007 
Firm Risk Measures            
Total Risk (Daily Stock Ret. Std.) 0.490 0.444 0.437 0.394 0.457 0.439 0.427 0.379 -0.064*** -0.064*** 
Market Risk (CAPM) 1.020 0.932 1.014 0.896 0.972 0.941 0.960 0.886 -0.060  -0.046 
Firm Specific Risk (CAPM) 0.448 0.409 0.394 0.352 0.414 0.386 0.384 0.341 -0.063*** -0.069*** 
Firm Specific Risk (4 Factors) 0.433 0.391 0.380 0.339 0.399 0.361 0.370 0.332 -0.062*** -0.059*** 
Shocks            
Positive Industry Shock (%) 34.33%  38.59%  38.30%  36.36%  2.04%    
Negative Industry Shock (%) 7.46%  7.61%  9.57%  6.20%  -1.26%    
Industry Shocks (0/1) (%) 41.79%  46.20%  47.87%  42.56%  0.77%    
Positive Firm Shock (0/1) (%) 21.39%  20.65%  20.21%  19.01%  -2.38%    
Negative Firm Shock (0/1) (%) 26.87%  17.93%  21.28%  21.49%  -5.38%    
Firm Shocks (0/1) (%) 48.26%  38.59%  41.49%  40.50%  -7.76%*   
 
